

ROYAL UNITED SERVICE INSTITUTION.

MAY, 1914.

SECRETARY'S NOTES.

I.—OFFICERS JOINED.

The following officers joined the Institution during the month of April :—

Lieutenant J. A. Anstruther, 6th Dragoon Guards.
Lieutenant H. W. Randall, R.N.R.
Major W. L. Alexander, Yorkshire Regiment.
Captain H. H. MacD. Stevenson, Highland Light Infantry.
Lieutenant-Commander C. D. O. Shakespear, R.N.
Lieutenant R. H. Gardiner, R.F.A.
Captain H. B. Roffey, Lancashire Fusiliers.
Colonel A. Peterkin, M.B., late A.M.S.
Lieutenant C. L. Awbery, 4th Bn. Essex Regiment.
Lieutenant J. M. Bonham-Carter, Northumberland Fusiliers.
Commander R. C. Hamilton, R.N.

II.—JOURNAL. (IMPORTANT.)

The Council have decided with the completion of the present volume of the JOURNAL in June next, to make the issue quarterly in place of monthly. The JOURNAL will be of a larger size and will contain 320 pages of matter. The price to non-members and the public will be six shillings a copy; to members who may desire extra copies the price will be three shillings. It will be published on August 15th, November 15th, February 15th, and May 15th.

III.—OLD COMRADES ASSOCIATIONS.

The Council granted free admission to the Museum to all members of the Royal Engineers' Old Comrade Association on April 18th, the day of their gathering; upwards of 100 availed themselves of this privilege, and were specially conducted round the exhibits. A similar privilege will be granted to other such Associations on application.

IV.—THEFT FROM THE MUSEUM.

The Curator regrets to announce the theft from the collection of Lord Cheylesmore's Medals of two Decorations, on Friday, April 24th, the lock of one of the frames having been tampered with. The following is

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a description of the two Decorations as it is thought possible that they might be offered to members, *vis.* :—

- (1) The order of the Dooranee Empire, a Silver Star on which is placed a Maltese Cross, supported by two cross swords. In the centre surrounded by a circle of pearls a blue and green enamelled ground with an inscription in Persian.
- (2) Small gold medal for the Siege of Acre, 1840. Obverse, the Sultan's Cypher encircled by a Laurel Wreath. Reverse, the Fortress of Acre over which the Turkish Standard is displayed surrounded by Six Stars.

The Decorations were fully insured.

V.—TYPEWRITING.

A typist is employed at the Institution, and is available, when not otherwise employed, to type manuscript for members. The rate charged is 1d. per folio or 1½d. for duplicating.

VI.—MUSEUM PURCHASE FUND.

This Fund has been opened with the object of purchasing suitable exhibits which are from time to time offered to the Museum, or which are put up for sale at various auctions. The Council hope it will receive support from members of the Institution who are interested in the Museum.

	£	s.	d.
Amount already acknowledged	29	9 0
Lieut.-Colonel N. A. H. Budd, 1st Brahmans ...	1	1	0
Lieut.-Colonel Sir Arthur Leetham	1	1	0
		31	11 0
Less expended to date	11	16	0
	£19	15	0

VII.—ADDITIONS TO THE MUSEUM.

- (6672) An artist's proof Engraving entitled "The Attack of the Vanguard (commanded by Sir W. Winter) on the Spanish Armada," from the painting by Sir O. Brierley, engraved by A. Whitmore.—Presented by the Council of the Arts Union of London.
- (6673) A steel Pistol Ramrod with priming Powder-Horn of Persian origin.—Given by Lieut.-Colonel W. H. M. Jackson, late 81st Regiment.
- (6674) Seventeen Line Engravings published in 1725 at Brussels, depicting scenes in the Dutch War of Independence against the Spaniards.—Given by Sir Philip Waterlow, Bart.
- (6675) Ammunition Pouch Ornament, universal pattern, William IV. period.—Given by Colonel E. Montagu.
- (6676) Officer's dress Coatee, Shell Jacket, Shako, undress Cap to
- 6680) and Shoulder-belt plate of the 45th Bengal Native Infantry, about 1840. The Shako plate is 10 years later, having been renewed.—Purchased.

- (6681). Model of the White Star Royal Mail Steamship "Britannic" (the first), built by Harland & Wolff in 1874. Length 467 ft., breadth 45 ft., depth 33 ft., tonnage 5,004 tons. This historic vessel made 271 round voyages from Liverpool to New York, steaming 2,032,500 statute miles, consuming 560,407 tons of coal in doing so, and carrying 395,396 passengers. She acted as Transport, No. 62, during the South African War, making 11 voyages to Cape Town, and carrying 20,728 Officers and Men. She also took out to Australia the Imperial representative corps, composed of details of various branches of the British Army on the occasion of the inauguration of the Commonwealth of Australia, at Sydney, on 1st January, 1901.—Given by The White Star Line.
- (6682) Pair of Regimental Colours of the 2nd Battalion of the British German Legion, which was raised for service during the Crimean War.
- (6684) Pair of Regimental Colours of the 5th Battalion of the British German Legion, which was raised for service during the Crimean War.
- (6686) Pair of Regimental Colours of the 1st Battalion of the British Foreign Legion, which was raised for service during the Crimean War.
- (6688) The King's Colour of the 6th Battalion of the British German Legion, which was raised for service during the Crimean War. (This completes the pair to Exhibit 2052, the Regimental Colour already in the Museum.)
- (6689) The King's Colour of the 3rd Battalion of the British German Legion, which was raised for service during the Crimean War.
- (6690) The King's Colour of the 1st Light Infantry Battalion of the British Swiss Legion, which was raised for service during the Crimean War. (This completes the pair to Exhibit 2054, the Regimental Colour already in the Museum.)
- (6691) The Regimental Colour of the Devon Local Militia, 1808 to 1816.
- (6692) A Regimental Colour consisting of the Cross of St. George, the topmost quarter bearing the Union Flag previous to 1802. Regiment unknown.
- (6693) King's Colour, regiment unknown, bearing the Cypher of King George III., its date is subsequent to 1802.
- All the above-mentioned Colours have been transferred from the Tower of London, and placed in repair by the Institution.
- (6694) The Werndle Carbine, calibre .500, Austrian make.
- (6695) The Albini Carbine, of Belgian manufacture.
- (6696) The Martini-Henry Mackenzie Rifle; the breach is engraved with the Arms of Persia on one side and two lions on the other.

These three Exhibits formed part of those taken from gun-runners in the Persian Gulf by vessels of the Royal

Navy in 1912, under the command of Rear-Admiral Sir E. J. W. Slade, K.C.I.E., K.C.V.O., and are given by the Secretary of State for India.

- (6697) A Line Engraving entitled "The Death of General Wolfe," at Quebec, September 13th, 1759, engraved by William Woollett, from the painting by Benjamin West.
- (6698) A Photograph of a Line Engraving of "The Martyrdom of King Charles I.," from a book of Common Prayer, dated 1706.
- (3406 & 3407) A Coattee and Cocked Hat of a surgeon of the Royal Navy, date about 1825.—Deposited by Colonel C. Haggard.

The amount taken at the Museum Public Entrance during the month of April amounted to £57 9s. 6d.

The attention of members is drawn to the Museum Purchase Fund.

PRINCIPAL ADDITIONS TO LIBRARY.

April, 1914.

- Deutschlands Flotte im Entscheidungskampf.** By Rudolf Troeltsch. Crown 8vo. 2s. 3d. (E. S. Mittler & Sohn). Berlin, 1914.
- The War Office, Past and Present.** By Captain Owen Wheeler. 8vo. 12s. 6d. (Presented by the Publishers) (Methuen & Co., Ltd.). London, 1914.
- Waterloo.** By James Thiriar. Oblong fol. 3s. 6d. (Presented by the Publisher) (A. de Boeck). Brussels, 1914.
- Census of India, 1911. Vol. I. Part I, Report; Part II., Tables.** By E. A. Gait, C.S.I., C.I.E., I.C.S. 2 Vols. fc. fol. (Presented by Government of India). Calcutta, 1913.
- Germany's Economic Progress and National Wealth, 1888—1913.** By Dr. Karl Kelfferich. 8vo. 2s. 6d. (Georg Stilke). Berlin, 1913.
- Das Neue Russische Kavalleriereglement vom Jahre 1912.** By Lieut.-Colonel Graf. Spannocchi. 8vo. 1s. 10d. (Carl Konegen). Vienna, 1912.
- History of the 4th V.B. East Surrey Regiment.** Compiled from official records by Captain Albert Larking. 8vo. (Presented by Lieut.-Colonel H. C. Clements, V.D.). London, 1914.
- Das Deutsche Heer. Leitfaden der Militärischen Fachsprache und Einrichtungen.** By Major Gernandt. 2nd Edit. 12mo. 1s. 3d. (Presented by the Publishers) (J. Bielefelds Verlag). Freiburg, 1914.
- The Peerage of England.** By Arthur Collins and B. Longmate. 9 Vols. 5th Edit. (Presented by Major J. H. Leslie). London, 1779—84.
- Ocean Trade and Shipping.** By Douglas Owen. (Cambridge Naval and Military Series). 8vo. 10s. 6d. (Presented by the Author). (University Press). Cambridge, 1914.
- Obsolete Military Punishments.** By Major-General William Starke. 12mo. (Presented by Lady Wolseley). (J. E. Francis). London, 1901.

- Memoirs of the Life and Actions of James Keith, Field Marshal in the Prussian Armies.** By Andrew Henderson. Crown 8vo. (Presented by Lady Wolseley). (A. Johnson). London, n.d.
- The Siege of Ostend, or The New Troy, 1601—1604.** By Edward Belleroche. 8vo. (Presented by Lady Wolseley.) (Spottiswoode & Co.). London, 1892.
- The Crimes of Cabinets.** By Lewis Goldsmith. 8vo. (Presented by Lady Wolseley). (W. Taylor). London, 1801.
- The Defence of India: A Strategical Study.** By Major-General Sir C. M. MacGregor. 8vo. (Presented by Lady Wolseley). (Central Branch Press). Simla, 1884.
- Un Ministère de la Guerre de Vingt-quatre Jours, du 10 Août au 4 Septembre, 1870.** By General Cousin de Montaubon, Comte de Palikao. 2nd Edit. 8vo. (Presented by Lady Wolseley). (Henri Plon). Paris, 1871.
- Batailles de Leipsick, depuis le 14 Jusqu'au 19 Octobre, 1813.** Traduit de l'Anglais de M. Frédéric Schoberl. Crown 8vo. (Presented by Lady Wolseley). (J. G. Dentu). Paris, 1814.
- Thoughts on National Defence.** 8vo. (Presented by Lady Wolseley). (W. Bulmer & Co.). London, 1804.
- Napoléon et Alexandre Ier.** By Albert Vandal. 3 Vols. 8vo. (Presented by Lady Wolseley). (E. Plon). Paris, 1894—97.
- Calendar of State Papers, Colonial Series, East Indies, China and Japan, 1622—1624. Preserved in H.M.'s Public Record Office and Elsewhere.** Edited by W. N. Sainsbury. 8vo. (Presented by Lady Wolseley). (Longman & Co.). London, 1878.
- The Naval Battle—Studies of the Tactical Factors.** By Lieutenant A. Baudry, French Navy. Followed by Observations on "Unity of Doctrine." By Captain G. Laur, French Army. Translated by C. F. A., with an introduction of Admiral Sir Reginald N. Custance, G.C.B. 8vo. 8s. 6d. (Presented by the Publishers) (Hugh Rees, Ltd.). London, 1914.
- Naval and Military Essays, being papers read in the Naval and Military Section at the International Congress of Historical Studies, 1913.** (The Cambridge Naval and Military Series). 8vo. 7s. 6d. (University Press). Cambridge, 1914.
- American Campaigns.** By Major Matthew Forney Steele, U.S. Cavalry. 2 Vols. 8vo. 32s. (Byron S. Adams). Washington, 1909.
- The Logs of the Serapis—Alliance—Ariel, under the command of John Paul Jones, 1779—1780.** (U.S. Naval History Society). Edited by Lieut.-Comdr. John S. Barnes, U.S.N. 8vo. 32s. (De Vinne Press). New York, 1911.
- Fanning's Narrative, being the Memoirs of Nathaniel Fanning, an officer of the Revolutionary Navy, 1778—1783.** (U.S. Naval History Society). Edited and annotated by Lieut.-Comdr. John S. Barnes, U.S.N. 8vo. 28s. (De Vinne Press). New York, 1912.
- The Despatches of Molyneux Shuldham, Vice-Admiral of the Blue and Commander-in-Chief of His Britannic Majesty's Ships in North America, January—July, 1776.** (U.S. Naval History Society). Edited by Robert Wilden Neeser. 8vo. 24s. (De Vinne Press). New York, 1913.

Out-Letters of the Continental Marine Committee and Board of Admiralty, August, 1776—September, 1780. (U.S. Naval History Society). Edited by Charles Oscar Paullin. 8vo. 20s. (De Vinne Press). New York, 1914.

Instructions for the Commanders of such Merchant Ships or Vessels who shall have Letters of Marque and Reprizals, from 17th May, 1803, to 20th June, 1810. Fc. fol. (Presented by Colonel A. W. Chambers, V.D.). (T. Mitchell). London.

Quelques Renseignements Pratique Sur l'Aviation. By R. Esnault-Pelterie. 8vo. 2s. 3d. (Librairie Aeronautique). Paris, 1914.

Le Combat. By General Percin. Crown 8vo. 2s. 6d. (Felix Alcau). Paris, 1914.

THE JOURNAL OF THE ROYAL UNITED SERVICE INSTITUTION.

VOL. LVIII.

MAY, 1914.

No. 435.

[Authors alone are responsible for the contents of their respective Papers.]

THE STATUS UNDER THE HAGUE CONFERENCE OF CIVILIANS WHO TAKE UP ARMS DURING THE TIME OF WAR.

By GILBERT MELLOR, Dep. Judge Advocate.

On Thursday, March 12th, 1914.

COLONEL THE EARL OF FORTESCUE, K.C.B., A.D.C.,
in the Chair.

THE subject for discussion this afternoon, namely, "The Status under the Hague Conference of Civilians who take up Arms during the time of War," cannot be separated from that of the status of civil populations, generally, in time of war, and in order to deal with it adequately it will be necessary to trace briefly the manner in which civil populations have acquired a status in International Law, and to ascertain the nature of the rights and duties which that status involves. Having done this it will be possible to examine in proper perspective the Hague Rules bearing upon the matter, to ascertain the limits to which they extend, and the present position of affairs in the region not covered by them.

It is necessary to ascertain first the basis upon which laws of war are founded or, in other words, to inquire what is the sanction which justifies the use of the word "Law" in such a connection. The delegates at the Hague Conference of 1899 laid down that the laws of war depend upon "the usages established between civilized nations, the laws of humanity and the requirements of the public conscience." It would seem, however, to be sufficient to identify the sanction with the public conscience alone, since International usages and laws are no more than manifestations of the development of public opinion in the direction of civilization.

Taking, then, for our present purpose, the public conscience of the more civilized nations as providing the ultimate sanction or basis of the laws of war, the next step is to ascertain and define the manifestations of that conscience, that is to say, the laws and usages of war, in relation to civil populations in time of war.

The immediate aim of all wars should be, both in theory and in practice, the disablement of the adversary in the shortest possible time. It is allowed to a nation to adopt all such means as tend directly to that end, provided that there is nothing in them repugnant to the public conscience. It is by virtue of this proviso that the civil inhabitants of an invaded territory have acquired certain rights, involving corresponding duties, as contrasted with the rights and duties of their national army.

Historically the civil population of an invaded country may be taken to have had, in the beginning of things, no rights whatever. Until, at any rate, the 17th century, war was waged indiscriminately against the whole population of an invaded country, and the unoffending civilian suffered accordingly, regardless of any question whether his ill-treatment furthered the immediate object of the war or not.

The turning point in the history of the customs of war is the early part of the 17th century, and the central figure in it is Grotius, from whom the International Law of Warfare, in its modern conception, may be said to date. The barbarities which characterized the relations of States to one another during the preceding centuries had not been without effect on the minds of men, but the progressive spirit obtained clear and convincing expression for the first time in the writings of Grotius, writings which very soon came to the notice of rulers of States, and which, by asserting the theory of an all-regulating natural law, afforded a basis for the efforts of the more humane States to mitigate the horrors of war as then practised.

Gradually, since the time of Grotius, and in pursuance of his teaching, the position of civil populations in relation to war has changed. It has come to be recognized that certain severities directed against civilians are irreconcilable with a claim to advancing civilization; in other words, civil populations have acquired rights, based upon the public conscience. To such a point have some writers advanced that the proposition has found acceptance among them that whole nations no longer make war on whole nations, but only Governments upon Governments, by means of organized military forces on both sides. Such a theory of war may have more importance in the abstract than in the concrete, but it is irreconcilable with any theory of democratic government, and the better opinion appears to be that it is untenable. The wiser and simpler course is to base our principles upon the public conscience, and to say that certain treatment of civil population is repugnant to the better opinion of nations, and has therefore ceased to be allowable.

We have, then, for our present purpose, to follow out this proposition by endeavouring to ascertain and state the rights and duties of an invader as against the civil inhabitants of the country invaded, and the corresponding rights and duties of the inhabitants. Keeping in view the immediate object of all wars, and the ultimate basis of the laws of war, two questions have to be answered in order to ascertain whether any specified act is permissible or not :—

1. Does it tend directly to the disablement of the enemy.
2. Is it otherwise such an act as would commend itself to the public conscience.

By applying this test we have a suitable method of ascertaining the propriety or otherwise of any given act of war.

It is obvious that the gravest possible danger to an invading army would arise, if the non-military population, while ostensibly devoting itself to civil pursuits, were to be at liberty to adopt treacherous methods of hostility, or were to be permitted to take up arms and lay them aside as opportunity offered, claiming alternately the rights of a soldier or those of a civilian at will, and an invader ought not to be liable to secret assassination by persons indistinguishable from peasants. If any such state of affairs were permitted by the laws of war, an invading army could only render itself reasonably safe by complete extirpation or removal of a civil population in its rear, and we should be in danger of a return to the savagery of primitive warfare. As a necessary result, therefore, of recent humane developments in the treatment of civil populations, a legal duty has arisen on the part of such populations to abstain to a corresponding extent from hostile acts.

For the present purpose, it is sufficient to say that it is now settled law, in the International sense, that, as long as the civil population of an invaded territory confines itself strictly to its civil occupations, it is entitled to remain immune from any direct personal molestation. Such is the effect of Section III. of the Hague Rules relating to the laws of war.

This being the position of a civil population, which is content to take no part whatever in hostilities, we have now to ascertain to what extent and in what circumstances civilians are entitled to take up arms for purposes of engaging in hostile acts. For this purpose our main authority is the Hague Rules, and it is advisable to deal briefly with their origin and history.

The source from which they may be said to derive is "The Instructions for the Government of the Armies of the United States in the Field," compiled by Professor Lieber and issued in 1863, during the War of Secession.

In 1870-71 the Franco-Prussian War seems to have convinced some among the European nations of the advantages which would be afforded by an International compact regarding the usages of war, and, in 1874, the Brussels Conference was

promoted by Russia, for the purpose of preparing a code of the laws of war on land. A series of articles were drawn up, but failed to obtain ratification by the Powers. In 1880 the Institute of International Law drew up a draft code of the laws of war, which was sent to all Governments of Europe and America.

Nothing further, however, was done to reach an international agreement till the Hague Conference of 1899. At that Conference the articles of the Brussels Declaration were taken as the basis of discussion. A convention was agreed upon, and subsequently received general ratification. This convention was revised at the Hague Conference of 1907 and now appears as Convention IV. of the Peace Conference of 1907. It has been ratified by all except a very few Powers and takes the form of an undertaking by each signatory Power to issue instructions to its armed forces in conformity with the Regulations annexed to the Convention.

It has been suggested that the Regulations, being only an annex to a Convention, are not so binding on the signatories as if they had actually formed the text of the Convention. This contention appears to be untenable. If a contracting party agrees to act in conformity with a certain code of rules, it cannot without breach of faith depart from them in any particular to which they expressly refer. The rules become the law governing the action of the contracting parties and are binding upon them.

In order that we may clearly appreciate the force of the Hague Rules and of the Law of Nations, a part of which they codify, it is necessary also to notice a contention which has been put forward that the International Law of War, including the Hague Rules, is only effective up to a point where it may be considered to conflict with the necessities of war. At the Hague Conference of 1907 the representative of one great Power appealed to what he called the Law of Facts, or, as it might better be called, the Law of Military Necessity, in such a way as to amount to a claim on behalf of his nation to over-ride, when thought necessary, any convention, or any rule or custom depending upon the public conscience.

The Hague Convention, as has already been pointed out, is as binding as any other treaty freely entered into by nations, and lest it should be thought that the entire Convention is subject to a condition precedent, to the effect that no part of it is to be binding, unless in any given case military necessities are considered to allow compliance, and that this alleged condition qualifies the whole Convention, I would point out that the preamble states, first, that the drafting of the rules has been inspired by a desire to diminish the evils of war, *so far as military requirements permit*, and then proceeds to say that it has not been possible to agree on all points, and that the code is therefore

incomplete. The plain meaning of this pronouncement is that the Convention has been drawn up with the real necessities of war ever in view, and that the rules represent the bed-rock of the laws of war, the solid principles upon which all agree, and against which no supposed necessities of war are to prevail.

If further proof were necessary, I would point out that Article 27 expressly adds the words "as far as possible" to its provisions for the sparing of certain buildings during bombardments, showing that elsewhere no such words are to be implied and that the Rules in general are unqualified by any such implied condition.

The mere fact, however, that such a contention should be put forward by any person of authority ought to serve as a warning. Those who are engaged in defining, codifying, and endeavouring to secure the enforcement of International Law must be careful, above all, to see that they do not go too fast. The whole body of International Law rests ultimately upon, and obtains its sole force from, the public conscience. Its development can therefore only proceed *pari passu* with the universal advance of opinion throughout the civilized world. If doctrines of International Law are asserted for which there is no real support of International opinion, there is a danger that when the test of war is applied the top-heavy structure will not only collapse but involve in ruin and waste much sound work. To assert too much is to court disaster, and when we find nations endeavouring to wriggle out of or undermine conventions, we find no reason to release them from their agreements, but we do find reason to hesitate to rely too much on the observance of anything which falls outside formal and universal agreement as being liable to fail when put to practical test. Any opinion, theory or suggestion of a jurist on matters not covered by convention should be accepted only in this sense.

The Hague Rules do not profess to be exhaustive. At the Hague Conference, 1899, the delegates made a declaration in these terms :—

"Until a more complete code of the laws of war is issued, the high contracting parties think it right to declare that in cases not included in the Regulations adopted by them, populations and belligerents remain under the protection and empire of the principles of International Law, as they result from the usages established between civilized nations, from the laws of humanity, and the requirements of the public conscience."

The usages referred to, that is to say, the rules and customs of war not included in the Hague Rules, range in importance from mere amenities, or matters of good taste, to customs which have become so generally recognized that they approach a point where they can properly be called laws.

The force of the usage in any particular case can be estimated by considering whether the Rule in question has become

so generally accepted and is so clearly in accordance with the dictates of the public conscience that it would be wrong to disregard it. In that case it has the value of a law of nations, and is no less morally binding because the agreement is tacit instead of having received definite expression in an International Convention.

If, at this time of day, we were to admit that any nation might disregard any law of war, at military pleasure, for that is what the claim above referred to really means, we should deny the whole foundation on which International Law rests. In present conditions no effective material power could prevent a strong enough nation from working its will in this respect, but a movement in the direction of barbarism would have occurred, and the offender would be in danger of forfeiting all claim to be considered a civilized nation.

We now come to an examination of the Hague Rules. Article 1 of the Rules recognizes as belligerents one permanent military class, namely, the regular army, including such militia and volunteer corps as form a permanent part of it; secondly, one military class not of a permanent character, namely, such militia or volunteer corps as do not form part of the army, and one non-military class, namely, an entire population taking up arms as a *levée en masse*. Questions relating to the regular army form no part of the subject of this paper, and we therefore come at once to the second class, that is to say, civilians taking up arms as members of a militia or volunteer corps.

Under the first article of the Rules, recognition is extended to these on the following conditions:—

1. They must be commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates.
2. They must have a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance.
3. They must carry arms openly.
4. They must conduct their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war.

We have first to consider the meaning of the word "corps" in this connection. It would appear that a corps must be composed of a sufficient number of men, having regard to all the circumstances of the case, to avoid any suspicion that it is a colourable pretence to cover acts of irresponsible brigandage or other war crimes. It must also be remembered that "once a soldier always a soldier," in the sense that a man who has once taken up arms cannot divest himself of his military character, so long as he remains in the theatre of war, except by the permission of the enemy, and a corps must, therefore, have about it some elements of permanence if it is to be regarded as fulfilling requirements. But the main object is to exclude that which is merely colourable, namely, an organization purporting

to be a corps but really a fraud got up for the purpose of covering the unlawful act of alternating at pleasure the part of a soldier with that of a civilian.

The real case against the Franc-Tireurs in the Franco-Prussian War, as put forward by Germany, was largely a charge that the whole thing was a pretence. It was asserted, whether truly or not, that such Franc-Tireurs as were captured in uniform invariably carried a suit of plain clothes about them. It would be idle to try now to elicit the truth from the violent assertions of each side as to this matter. I only mention it to show the application of the Rule and the principle which underlies it.

The first requirement of the Rule as to corps, namely that "they must be commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates," may lead to difficulties in practice, but is sufficiently clear in principle. It will be noticed that the word used is "person" and not "officer," and the history of this part of the Rule shows that the right to recognition does not depend upon authorization by the Government of the country. The original Rule, in the draft agreed upon at the Brussels Conference of 1874, which draft formed the foundation of the Rules adopted at the Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907, required that volunteers must be subject to orders from headquarters. This I interpret to mean that each corps must have received official recognition from its own Government before it could be recognized as a belligerent force. It must also be remembered that the Brussels Conference followed immediately after the controversy with regard to the Franc-Tireurs in the Franco-Prussian War, in which one of the main subjects of dispute was the question of recognition.

This requirement has been omitted, advisedly, from the Hague Rules, and it is clear that under those Rules recognition cannot be denied to a corps, merely because it has organized itself and elected its own leader, without any communication with headquarters, or to its members merely because they do not carry credentials to show Government authority.

The expression used with regard to the leader of the corps that he must be "responsible for his subordinates" appears to mean that, as regards the status of each member of the corps, the leader must either have direct personal control over him, or else, in the case of detached duties, be able to account for him in such a way as to show that he is acting under the leader's general authority, in any hostile act which he may carry out. It seems to follow from this that a militiaman or volunteer, if captured, is entitled to be treated as a prisoner of war for the time being, if he produces *prima facie* evidence to show that he is a member of such a corps, and if, at the time, he is acting in such a manner as the leader of the corps might reasonably be supposed to have authorized. It is also, needless to say, necessary that the leader should be able to enforce his authority,

and thereby secure the observance of the laws of war by his subordinates.

The second requirement, namely, "the fixed distinctive sign, recognizable at a distance," leaves room for much difference of opinion. It is quite certain that a man taken prisoner does not fulfil the requirement if he has not upon him at least a badge of some kind which clearly shows his enemy character, and which could not easily be removed or replaced without detection. But the question as to the nature of the sign and as to the distance at which it must be recognizable is left in a completely vague state. It seems impossible to lay down anything more definite than that everything must depend upon the circumstances of the war, and that the marks must be such that no reasonably intelligent and careful enemy ought to be misled into mistaking enemies for friends. In this case also the matter really turns upon the question whether there is or is not an intention to deceive. If the obvious effect is one of deception, then no one has a right to complain if the natural consequences are presumed to have been intended, and if prisoners are dealt with accordingly.

In the case of the Franc-Tireurs controversy also took place as to the fixed nature of the badge. It is obvious that no badge which can be instantly removed without leaving any traces would fulfil the requirements of the Rule.

The third requirement is that of carrying arms openly. Bearing in mind that this requirement applies to individuals, each of whom, by the previous rule, must be wearing a distinctive mark, it seems to add little, since the distinctive mark labels each one as a carrier of arms and he can be treated accordingly, whether he happens to have them upon him or not. Certain writers suggest that this is aimed against carrying a sword or revolver concealed about the person, but I am unable to see how in the case of a man properly labelled outside, and who otherwise conforms to the laws of war, the contents of his pockets are any concern of the enemy as enemy. Of course, an unmarked individual who carries arms for an improper purpose commits a war crime, but then his real offence is in carrying them at all, not in carrying them secretly, which is a mere aggravation of the offence.

It should here be pointed out that when an enemy has been captured and disarmed, if there is any doubt as to his belligerent status, the only duty of his captors is to keep him safe until such time as he can be brought before a Court duly qualified to determine the question. Summary execution is absolutely forbidden in civilized warfare.

A question arises here as to recruiting for the armed forces of the invaded State. When a district is in the occupation of the enemy may a civilian properly absent himself in order to join the regular forces of his country? In this case there is

no question of a secret and treacherous attack by a person posing as a civilian, and I do not think that it would be justifiable to treat the absentee as a war criminal, if subsequently captured while properly serving in the army. I believe also that it is now admitted that the measures taken or threatened by the Germans, during the Franco-Prussian War, against the inhabitants of a district, in order to stop this practice, cannot be regarded as legitimate, and many of their proclamations must be considered to be no more justifiable than some issued by other nations during more recent wars.

There is, so far as I know, nothing to prevent recruiting by the army of the country among the civil population, when advancing into the territory hitherto in the occupation of the enemy, since the effective occupation must be held to have ceased to the extent controlled by the national army.

It stands to reason that volunteer corps may not organize themselves in territory occupied by the invader.

I now come to the only case dealt with by the Hague rules in which civilians are permitted to take up arms as such. I refer to the "*levée en masse*." Article 2 of the rules is as follows:—

"The inhabitants of a territory not under occupation who, on the approach of the enemy, spontaneously take up arms, to resist the invading troops, without having had time to organize themselves in accordance with Article 1, shall be regarded as belligerents if they carry arms openly, and if they respect the laws and customs of war."

The modern usage as to *levée en masse* seems to date from the great wars of the end of the 18th and beginning of the 19th century. In earliest times, when a civil population was treated as being at the mercy of the invader, no question of a *levée en masse* arose. The civil population had no rights, whether they defended themselves or not. But with the development of standing armies, or at all events of recognized classes of men systematically trained to arms, the interference of outsiders in warfare began to be discouraged, not only by the enemy, but by the military class of their own country, and there was a tendency to consider war as a matter solely for regular armies, but, after the French Revolution, war became again a matter of whole nation against whole nation, and in the subsequent wars forces of more or less untrained and undisciplined civilians were not only permitted to engage in the conflict but were officially recognized and used. Since that time the *levée en masse* has occupied a recognized place in International Law, and is now dealt with in the Hague rule above quoted.

It is there laid down, as a condition precedent, that a *levée en masse* can only come under the terms of the rule if it occurs in a territory not under occupation. It has been suggested that invasion is to be distinguished from occupation in this matter,

and that when once invasion has taken place a *levée en masse* is no longer legitimate. But as against that view it is to be noticed that the words used are "territory not yet occupied," and that Article 42 of the Rules contains a definition to show when territory is to be considered as occupied, namely, when actually "placed under the authority of the hostile army." The question must be one of fact in every case. It is clear, however, that a mere invasion or raid would not prevent, in the legal sense, a subsequent *levée en masse*. If invasion is to be the test, we shall have to talk of and define "effective" invasion, and it seems impossible and unnecessary to attempt to distinguish "effective invasion" from occupation as defined by Article 42. It would appear, therefore, that a *levée en masse* is legitimate until the territory in which it occurs has passed under the authority of the invader. It is a question of fact whether this has occurred or not, but a territory can hardly be considered occupied unless it is sufficiently policed to render a real *levée en masse* impossible.

I would also submit that if, in a territory which has been invaded, a *levée en masse* occurs which is successful in entirely expelling the invader, the latter, if he subsequently regains control, would not be justified in treating the inhabitants as war criminals, since the fact that he has been expelled has shown that his former occupation of the country was not effective.

It should be noticed that the word "territory" is used, not in a political, but in a geographical sense, and the inhabitants of every town and district may rise at the approach of the invader and defend that particular locality.

Article 2 uses the word "spontaneously" in connection with the taking up of arms, but it seems clear that a *levée en masse* does not become unlawful merely because a rising, which otherwise fulfils the conditions laid down, has taken place at the instigation of the Government, any more than it would become illegal by reason of a greater or less degree of organization. It is also plain that Article 2 requires no organization or uniform as essential to recognition, and it would have been unnecessary to go into the matter further, had not the German official handbook *Kriegsbrauche im Land Kriege* implied that an invader is entitled to insist upon both organization and uniform before recognizing a *levée en masse*. The plain sense of Articles 1 and 2, read together, absolutely excludes any such contention, and the passage in the German *Kriegsbrauche* is really an argument against permitting a *levée en masse*, properly so-called, under any circumstances whatever. Any nation may, if it chooses, declare an intention to disregard any law of war, if it is strong enough to do so, but if the German pronouncement is to be taken as laying down a rule to be followed in practice, which its position in an official book would seem to imply, then it is difficult to reconcile such an intention

with the ratification by Germany of the rules drawn up at the Hague, in view of Article 1 of the Convention, by which the contracting Powers bound themselves to issue instructions to their forces in conformity with the Annexed Regulations.

The Article further requires that the members of the *levée en masse* must carry arms openly and that they must respect the laws and customs of war.

I am inclined to think that the requirement as to carrying arms openly means that there is to be nothing in the nature of treachery, *i.e.*, secret carrying of arms under a pretence of being a non-fighter. But in this connection it must be remembered that when a *levée en masse* has occurred an invader is justified in treating every able-bodied inhabitant as an active enemy, subject only to the dictates of humanity, and ought therefore to be able to protect himself against treachery.

The fourth requirement, relating to the observance of the laws of war, is sufficiently clear. A civilized nation, fighting against a civilized nation, is entitled to demand that the laws of war will be observed, and the statement of this requirement in this place seems only to amount to a notification that ignorance of the laws of war, as of other laws, is to be taken to be no excuse, even for a civilian.

If the question be asked, what kind of rising constitutes a *levée en masse*? the best answer appears to be that there is a *levée en masse* when so large a proportion of the inhabitants, capable of bearing arms, have risen, that there can be no doubt that the whole locality is in a state of armed opposition to the invader.

On the other hand, if what has happened can properly be called a *levée en masse*, the invader is justified in treating every inhabitant as an enemy and dealing with him accordingly. All persons captured would have to be treated as prisoners of war. It would, apparently, be justifiable to clear the country of inhabitants, and even to devastate it, if the invader could secure himself by no other means. This would particularly apply to cases where the invader is constantly harassed by snipers, acting in collusion with the non-combatant civilian population.

The case of a fortified town defended by civilians is treated by some writers as an exception to the general rules as to the belligerent rights of civilians. There can be no doubt that modern custom has allowed civilians to take part in such defences, but if the real meaning of a *levée en masse* is appreciated it may be held that this is not an exception, but a special instance of inhabitants taking up arms in defence of a locality not previously occupied. It is obvious that in this case there can be no double dealing, the question of open carrying of arms or of distinguishing marks is immaterial, and it must be remembered that the civil inhabitants are exposed to the risks of war on the same footing as the regular troops.

A question has been raised whether the terms of Article 2 give the status of a belligerent to individuals who offer armed opposition to an invading army. The article, literally interpreted, includes such action; there is nothing in it which prohibits individual action within the conditions laid down, but here I think that the circumstances of each case would have to be carefully considered. The words of the article are "without having had time to organize themselves," and in a case where the inhabitants have sufficient notice of the approach of the invader, it would seem that isolated individual action would not be allowable against an enemy observing the rules of war. In the case of a raid or sudden attack, without declaration of war, isolated action against the advance of the enemy ought probably to be held lawful, provided that there is no deception, and that the other conditions of the article are fulfilled. The chief motive of International Law is a desire for the maintenance of peace, and this object is forwarded by permitting all straightforward methods of opposition to an invader.

Against an enemy committing war crimes, for instance, marauding, it would seem that individual hostile action might be justified at any stage of a war.

It is remarkable that although civilians have taken part in many wars under all kinds of circumstances, in very few cases are there any such accurate details available as would make an inquiry into the legal aspect of the occurrence either profitable or feasible.

Large bodies of civilians were certainly employed in hostilities on behalf of France in the wars following the French Revolution, but perhaps the term "general levy" is more appropriate in this case than that of *levée en masse*. In Russia in 1812 Napoleon found himself opposed by what was probably a real *levée en masse*.

In the early stages of the Peninsular War a *levée en masse* took place in Oporto under ecclesiastical supervision, which appears to have been a source of more embarrassment to its own Government than to the enemy. In the later stages of the war large bodies of irregulars took part on our side, and were treated as criminals by the French. Wellington contended that they were the Ordenanza, the ancient constitutional force of Portugal, in which case they would be a corps of militia or volunteers rather than a *levée en masse*. They certainly had no uniform. When, in 1814, we invaded the south of France, opposition was made by the inhabitants of certain districts, whom Wellington in his turn refused to recognize as belligerents. It does not seem that he was actually compelled to resort to severe measures against them.

In 1813 the King of Prussia decreed a *levée en masse* against the expected onslaught of Napoleon. Owing to the turn which events were then taking it never materialized to the extent of taking part in hostilities.

Among recent wars, the South African War presented features of such an anomalous kind that it would probably be useless to try to fit many of its incidents into any legal classification. If the mobilization of the Boers cannot be considered to be a *levée en masse* it certainly corresponds with nothing else; but at the outset it presents the curious feature of a *levée en masse* for offensive rather than defensive purposes. The circumstances of the earlier events of the war, together with the complications of a vast rebellion and of an overwhelming native population, render the conduct of both sides of little or no value as precedent. This is probably the best way to treat the subject, and to classify the events of such a war as not provided for by recognized rules and properly dealt with on general principles, without regard to precedent.

In the Russo-Japanese War two incidents of the kind only seem to have been recorded of sufficient importance to have any bearing upon the subject of this paper.

In February, 1905, the Russians threatened an attack on Ying Kow, a town in the rear of the Japanese main force. The whole Japanese able-bodied population took up what arms they could find, of a most miscellaneous kind, and with the assistance of some regular soldiers prepared to resist the enemy. No attack actually took place, and the incident has only academic interest, as raising the question whether the proposed resistance could be justified as being carried out by a corps of volunteers or a *levée en masse*. There appears to be little doubt that the laws of war were not infringed. The case seems to have been either one of a *levée en masse* or one not provided for by the Hague Rules, and in either case the resistance was justifiable.

A more complicated case occurred in Sakhalin in July, 1905. The facts are not easy to ascertain with certainty, but it appears that almost the entire population of that region was accounted for by a Russian penal establishment for the confinement of criminals of a bad type. On the approach of the Japanese, the convicts were invited to join in the defence as volunteers, certain remissions of sentence being offered as an inducement. The Japanese entry into the town of Vladimorowka was opposed by the inhabitants in general, who are said not to have worn any distinctive sign. The resistance was unsuccessful, and more than a hundred of the participants were sentenced to death, apparently by court martial. I have not been able to obtain information as to the evidence on which the accused were condemned, but it is said that they were ignorant of the laws of war, and, of course, in so far as they were guilty of war crimes in the course of the defence no objection could be taken to this treatment.

It has, however, been put forward as an alternative or additional justification that, being convicts, and probably of savage

character, they could not take part in military operations at all, either as volunteers or as a *levée en masse*. Apart from the commission of war crimes, the savage character could not be taken for granted, and it is at least open to question whether in a desperate fight there would be much to choose between the behaviour of convicts and other civilians.

It is also said that, being convicts, they could have no country and no hearths to defend. There appears to be no justification for this proposition, and any doctrine that criminals, as a matter of law, cannot be allowed to fight on behalf of their country, would appear to be a very modern one, without any authority behind it. It is also worth noting that in this case the convicts were fighting for an earlier return to their own homes.

As I have said, the facts are obscure, and such a case is not likely to occur again, but it can hardly be admitted that convicts can be executed merely on the ground that they are found fighting for the only country they have, on the theory that they are wild beasts and can be treated accordingly.

The main applications of the Hague Rules have now been considered, and it remains to say a few words as to cases not in terms covered by them, which in the opinion of the delegates, "should not be left to the arbitrary opinion of military commanders." In such cases inhabitants and belligerents are to remain under the protection and governance of the principles of the laws of nations, derived from the usages established among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity, and from the dictates of the public conscience.

This declaration is stated especially to apply to Articles I. and II. of the rules, with which we are now particularly concerned. It is also to be noticed that it had pointed reference to the rights of defence of civilian populations, since at the Conference of 1899 it was accepted by Great Britain in place of a draft proviso proposed by our military delegate, the late Sir John Ardagh, to the effect that nothing in the rules was to be taken as derogating from the right of the inhabitants of an invaded territory to oppose a vigorous resistance by every means in their power. I take it that one effect of this declaration is that the patriotic and natural instinct of every man to defend his own home is to be acknowledged and respected to the utmost extent compatible with the urgent necessities of war, and that everything in the nature of harsh reprisals or penalties, such as can have no direct effect in forwarding the proper purpose of the war, must be regarded as wholly illegitimate.

The case of most importance in relation to our present subject is naturally that of civilians who, without having the qualifications of belligerents prescribed by the rules, take up arms. There can be no doubt that, in most cases, such persons,

if captured, will be dealt with by the invader as war criminals, and that, as a general rule, International Law will hold him justified in so doing. Exceptional cases will occur, and these must be dealt with upon the general principles referred to in the Hague declaration to which I have already referred.

It is necessary to mention briefly the subject of guerilla warfare. There is nothing unlawful in guerilla methods in themselves, provided that the bands fulfil the conditions laid down for volunteer corps and otherwise keep within the laws of war. It stands to reason that what is called sniping is also not wrong in itself, but if carried on by individuals acting independently it becomes unlawful because a necessary qualification of a belligerent is absent. An invader must take all necessary steps to protect himself from snipers, and it is clearly allowable to destroy houses or other property which are used, or are likely to be used, as cover by them, provided that this is not done for punitive reasons but as a matter of military necessity. If such measures do not go beyond the necessities of the case, the hardships inflicted on harmless individuals must be left out of account.

The last case which remains to be considered is that of insurgents taking up arms in a civil war. Civil wars do not, properly speaking, come within the province of International Law, unless the legitimate Government or foreign States recognize the insurgents as a belligerent power.

If the legitimate Government chooses to recognize its insurgents as orthodox belligerents it acquires rights of blockade and search for contraband against all foreign States, whether the latter grant recognition to the insurgents or not.

If foreign States recognize the insurgents they can either assist them or remain neutral, and their rights and duties are exactly the same as if the insurgents and legitimate Government were two independent States engaged in an ordinary war. Even if they remain neutral they may receive into their territory insurgent refugees, provided that they detain them until the termination of hostilities. It also follows that if foreign States take up a position of neutrality, they cannot supply the insurgents with ammunition or subsidies, nor can they permit expeditions to be fitted out and organized in their territory without breach of neutrality.

But a foreign State is held not to be justified in recognizing insurgents unless the latter fulfil the following conditions:—

1. They must be in effective occupation of a specific portion of territory.
2. They must have established a Government, exercising sovereign rights over the territory in question.
3. They must conduct their military operations by means of armed forces observing the laws and customs of war.

But in so far as foreign States are not involved, the relations between the contending parties are outside the purview of International Law in general, and the laws and customs of war in particular. The war between them is, in theory at any rate, a domestic concern, to be settled between themselves by their own laws and customs. If the combatants choose to carry on their war in a savage manner and to break every law of war, still no foreign nation can claim any right to intervene. Even if recognition has taken place, the legitimate Government is not debarred from treating its captured foes as criminals and traitors, and no foreign State can intervene in the name of any rule of International Law. If it does so it must seek to justify its action on some humanitarian principle not so far recognized in the law of nations.

DISCUSSION.

Colonel G. P. Ranken: I think we are indebted to Mr. Mellor for a most interesting and exhaustive lecture. We have listened to a dissertation of the way in which it is proposed that our generals and our troops generally shall not be allowed to treat the enemy, but what we really want to know is, how the enemy are likely to treat us? Supposing, say, Germany were to invade this country? Would she adhere to these stipulations and these limitations which Mr. Mellor has laid before us? That is what we should all like to hear. I suppose it would be asking Mr. Mellor too much to request him to predicate what course a foreign nation would take under such circumstances, but that is what really concerns us most. There is another matter upon which I should like to ask the lecturer a question. There is a great number of miniature rifle corps about the country. What conditions would they have to fulfil to bring them into line with actual combatants? As there would be a lot of material available in such corps in case of an invasion, it would be well to know what they would have to do to entitle them to the privileges of combatants.

Major E. G. Curtis: I should like to join with the last speaker in thanking Mr. Mellor for his highly interesting lecture. I think it is a great pity there are not more members present, and it is also a great shame that we as a nation do not attach more importance to this subject. I take it for granted that Germany is one of the signatories to the Convention. I would like to ask Mr. Mellor if it is not a fact that in one of the official handbooks published in Germany since that Convention—I think within the last six years—it is distinctly laid down that hostile inhabitants—in other words, people who are not serving or who have not served in the organized armed forces of their country—have no right to take up arms; also whether it is not a fact that it is further laid down in the handbook that not only is the individual to be punished, but that the punishment may be extended to a particular locality in which the man was arrested. I think it is laid down that they may set on fire the town or village and take all precautions to prevent the inhabitants from attempting to put the fire out, or attempting to rescue their property. I should like to ask Mr. Mellor in whom would rest the decision as to

whether a territory is occupied or not. I take it it would rest with the military commander of the invading force.

Dr. T. Miller Maguire: I wish to thank very much Mr. Mellor for his elaborate treatise on this subject, and also to supplement the remarks of the gentleman who has just sat down by stating most distinctly that in my opinion England should be in a position to cope, whether under the abstract laws of war or not, with each and every invader—not necessarily the Germans; we are always harping about that particular race of people—whether they come from the sky, or from under the sea, or through a tunnel. The Hague Convention does not weigh with me in the very least. I believe the moment there is war all these fine and small differentiations will disappear. They are metaphysical doctrinaire notions, and cannot possibly apply to the fierce realities “when warring nations meet.” I may point out that the following are the German Orders as to Guerillas, issued in August, 1870, to which reference is made and which will be binding, whether the Hague views are adopted or not:—

“(1) Military jurisdiction is established by this decree. It will be extended to all the territory occupied by German troops, to every action tending to endanger the security of those troops, to causing them injury, or lending assistance to the enemy. Military jurisdiction will be considered as in force and proclaimed through all the extent of a canton as soon as it is posted in any locality forming part of it.”

We recently had a paper by Col. Simpson on the Duties and Rights of the Civil Population in Time of War, and I think careful study of it will probably lead the lecturer to modify his admiration for impracticable Conventions. Meanwhile I commend the lecture and its discussion to the War Office.

The Orders continue:—

“(2) All persons not forming part of the French Army, and not proving their quality as soldiers by outward signs, and who—

(a) Shall serve the enemy as spies;

(b) Shall mislead the German troops when charged to act for them as guides;

(c) Shall kill, wound, or rob persons belonging to the German troops, or making part of their suite;

(d) Shall destroy bridges or canals, damage telegraphic lines or railways, render roads impassable, set fire to munitions and provisions of war, or troops' quarters;

(e) Shall take up arms against the German troops;

will be punished by death. In each case the officer in command will institute a council of war, with authority to try the matter and pronounce sentence. These councils can only condemn to death. Their sentences will be executed immediately.

“(3) The communes to which the culprits belong, as well as those whose territory may have been the scene of the offence, will be condemned in a penalty for each case equalling the amount of their taxes.”

This Hague Convention would not save either Lorraine or Kent one franc or one shilling of these exactions.

“(4) The inhabitants will have to supply all necessities for the support of the troops. Each soldier will receive daily 750 grammes of bread, 500

grammes of meat, 250 grammes of lard, 30 grammes of coffee, 60 grammes of tobacco or 5 cigars," and so on.

I have far more regard for any officer, German or French, or Japanese or Russian, who thus looks after his men, than for the philosophers who make utterly futile and preposterous rules which would never be carried out.

Study the very serious occurrences which took place quite recently in the Balkan Peninsula. I have been told by several observers on the spot that the laws of the Hague Convention were scarcely obeyed even with regard to nurses. I think this matter is a serious one, because a lot of our people are still under the notion that they can be suddenly summoned to fight, and that nothing will happen to them if they are beaten, except to return home with a medal to display to their family. I doubt exceedingly if an invader will acknowledge the improvisation of armies at all. It does not follow at all that because the Northern States of America found themselves confronted by such a vigorous resistance as that of the Confederates that under other circumstances an invading power would have recognised the Confederacy at all. The North of Ireland officers, in an anti-Home Rule revolt, would be in a similar position. Would their belligerency be recognized? My advice to the members is to read the Hague Convention, and to read the Declaration of London, mark, learn and inwardly digest both, and pay no regard to the Prize Court, or Declaration of London, or Hague. I prefer Grotius' *de jure belli*, and yet his admirable theories did not prevent the horrors of warfare, 1630 to 1748. Do not think that the routine of warfare and so-called civilization will be modified by this metaphysical kind of murderous philanthropy. A large number of people argue that all war is contrary to civilization. We had to waste much brain power in this very hall recently respecting such silly illusions. What I say is, stick to your guns, repudiate the Hague Convention as far as you possibly can with any degree of conscience, and make up your mind if you go to war to use all your resources, *levée en masse*, obligatory service, and every other resource, and the rules of 1870, as quoted already, to crush your enemy—if he dares to invade any part of your Empire.

Mr. J. S. Mellor, in reply, said: The last speaker has practically asked me what I think of the Hague Convention—whether I do not think it ought to be disregarded altogether. My opinion on the point would be irrelevant to the subject of our discussion this afternoon, which is the position of affairs under the Hague Convention. We have to accept the Hague Convention for better or for worse. A nation may say it is going to disregard it altogether, but naturally one asks: "Well, if you are not going to pay any attention to it, why do you attach your signature to it? why do you agree to a thing and then say that you intend to disregard it?" As to the question, whether nations when they go to war will be bound by any limitation whatever, it is impossible to prophesy. I have intimated that whether a rule is or is not absolutely settled and fixed by Convention, it would be a mistake to think it will necessarily be observed. A nation, if it is going to war, ought to be prepared for infractions, and I suppose that a nation which is likely to have a fight with Germany had better be prepared for them to upset the Hague Convention in the sense in which they have intimated they think it ought to be upset. That is not a matter of law at all; it is a question of what faith

you are to put into human nature and in the sanctity of agreements. That is a much larger question than I came here to debate this afternoon. A question has been asked about rifle clubs and under what conditions they can take part in hostilities. They would have to bring themselves under the First Article of the Hague Convention. That is to say, they would have to have a responsible commander, a distinctive sign, carry arms openly, and conduct their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war. When a territory has actually been occupied, nothing more can be done in the way of a rifle club or anybody else organizing themselves for hostilities. They have to do it before the enemy arrives. Something has been said also about who is to decide whether there has been an infraction of any principle or rule of International law. At the present moment there are no special courts set up for the purpose. The matter all rests on the public conscience and on the opinion of civilized nations. It may be thought that International law is a matter that you can sweep aside altogether, but the fact remains that there has been progress. It is the progressive opinion of civilization that enforces, whether merely morally or not, the principles of International law. From century to century we have progressed in the direction of civilization, by way of International agreement, and that is entirely because there is a real sanction behind it. Under the last Hague Convention there is a small step towards giving a further material sanction; that is to say, infractions of the Convention are to be dealt with as wrongs for which penalty is to be paid. Of course, I quite understand there is no court to enforce that penalty. At the same time it is possible that, after a war, other nations would step in and decide between the belligerents and would form themselves into a court to determine whether those two belligerents had infringed the principles which in their opinion should have been maintained, and might inflict a penalty upon one or other of the nations for disregarding them. At present, however, you cannot, with confidence, expect that an International court, or anyone else, will enforce against a nation a penalty for infraction of International law. The matter rests upon the opinion of nations, and there is good reason to think that if a nation were to disregard the laws of war to a serious extent, its position in the council of nations would be lowered for many years, and its influence impaired. Ill-feeling among nations counts for much, and the loss of influence could probably be estimated, in the long run, in terms of serious material loss.

The Chairman: I think the only thing which is quite clear from the lecture and from the remarks upon it is that International law is rather a vague matter, which is not very much better than a pious opinion. The limitations imposed by it are not likely in practice to be regarded very much more than is convenient; but just as in ordinary society there are certain things which are "not done," though they are not illegal or criminal, so in war an understanding appears to have grown up that certain practices are bad form, and the lecturer has given us some reason to expect that nations will be sufficiently impressed by that view of the case as to keep more or less within the limitations imposed by Conventions to which they have been parties. I should think it is very likely that if Spain and Portugal went to war and did not play the game with each other, other nations might mark their displeasure; but if the same thing happened as between France and Germany I do not quite know who

would be in a position to call the offender to order, much less to enforce any penalties. The whole thing is a matter of degree, and I should think that would probably be the view the belligerents would take of it. It only remains for me to ask the meeting to give Mr. Mellor their cordial thanks for his very exhaustive and interesting lecture.

The vote of thanks was carried with acclamation.

Colonel Sir Lonsdale Hale: In the name of the Council it falls to my pleasant lot to ask you, sir, to accept the best thanks, not merely of this audience, but of the Council of the Institution, for your kindness in presiding here to-day. (Hear, hear.)

THE ROYAL NAVAL VOLUNTEER RESERVE.

By COMMANDER THE MARQUIS OF GRAHAM, C.V.O., C.B.,
R.N.V.R.

On Wednesday, March 18th, 1914.

ADMIRAL OF THE FLEET, SIR A. D. FANSHAWE, G.C.B.,
G.C.V.O., Vice-Chairman of the Council, in the Chair.

THE CHAIRMAN: My Lords, Ladies and Gentlemen, I think that a few preliminary words ought to be said from the Chair on this occasion, although our noble and gallant lecturer requires no introduction here; in fact, I may say that he is very much at home under this roof, because he is not only a distinguished and valued member of this Institution, but he has for years past performed active duty in command of the Royal Naval Artillery Volunteers in the Clyde Division. Besides that, he has done, as everybody in Scotland and, in fact, everywhere else, knows, very good work indeed for his country in that important district; and I may add that long ago he qualified as a practical seaman by taking a master's certificate in the Mercantile Marine. I think all of us know perfectly well that he distinguished himself in the service of his country in the South African War. Therefore, I may say that our noble friend is amphibious, like a Royal Marine.

Now I know no man outside the regular ranks of the Navy and of the administration of the Navy who has done more, who has worked harder, or in a more devoted and zealous manner, in strengthening the sea defences of the country than he; and I am quite sure that by the devotion and energy that Lord Graham has shown in the work which he has done for years past in the Clyde district he has shown a very fine example of patriotism to his fellow countrymen. I am sure you will quite understand that it is very natural that there should be, as, indeed, there is, a very warm and cordial feeling for Lord Graham amongst his many friends in the Navy.

I will now ask him to proceed with his lecture.

LECTURE.

FROM time to time Service matters are discussed within the walls of this institution, and I appreciate the opportunity to lay before you this afternoon a few facts concerning the Volunteer Reserve for the Navy.

The manning strength of the Navy, according to the estimates for last year, is composed as follows:—

Seamen, Stokers, and Marines,	}	R.N. 109,026
all ranks of the permanent		
strength	}	R.M. 17,522
All ranks of the Coastguard...	...	3,053
All ranks of the Royal Fleet Reserve		25,794
All ranks of the Royal Naval Reserve		20,169
All ranks of the Royal Naval		
Volunteer Reserve		4,114

which gives a total available strength of 179,678 men.

It is obvious that with Naval Estimates showing an expenditure of £48,800,000, the Admiralty authorities are wise to seek relief, as far as possible, in the cost of manning the ships, so that available cash resources may be husbanded to provide those essentials which are necessary to modern fighting efficiency, but which cannot be drawn from an auxiliary source or reserve.

In 1903 the Government of the day appointed a committee under the chairmanship of Sir Edward Grey, Bart., to enquire into the whole question of the Naval Reserves, and in due course this committee reported as follows:—

“The experience of the Army has shown that large numbers of civilians take a pride in acquiring knowledge and discipline, and in training themselves for service in war. It seems to be both wasteful and unnatural that all the amateur talent in this country should, for want of opportunity, be obliged to turn to military to the exclusion of naval training, and in view of the expansion of the Fleet that may be found necessary in a struggle for the supremacy of the British Empire at sea, the committee cannot but think that a body of volunteers would be likely to prove a most valuable auxiliary branch of the personnel of the Navy in time of war.”

There would seem to have been in the opinion of this committee but little doubt that a force of partially-trained volunteer gunners or seamen, to whom the routine and discipline of a ship of war would be familiar by reason of short annual periods

of training at sea, would be a better source from which to make good losses in action than recruits picked up at random.

Experience of the Spanish-American War of 1898 would seem to lend weight to this idea. At the outbreak of hostilities the American naval manning strength consisted of 12,500 men; but between February and August of that year 128 vessels of various kinds were added to the Fleet, and by calling on Volunteers and retired men, the Navy personnel was immediately raised to 24,123, or approximately doubled, and with most satisfactory results.

A modern battleship has been likened to a box of machinery. Certainly, a Dreadnought carries in her manning complement a great many men who are most necessary to her efficiency, but are not in reality sailors, gunners, or stokers. These persons are skilled mechanics, or artisans, representing a number of trades, and whose work is not so very different from that done by their fellow craftsmen on shore.

For instance, a warship carries in her crew electricians, carpenters, caulkers, smiths, painters, coopers, plumbers, shipwrights, etc., and, therefore, the whole idea underlying the formation of the R.N.V.R. would seem to be to find out and organize a supply of men who hold these and other useful qualifications, and who have an aptitude for the sea; who are always at hand, and who can be called out for service with the Navy if, and when, occasion should arise.

The first point of importance is that all officers and men are enrolled on the distinct understanding that they are liable to be called out for service anywhere in the world, ashore or afloat, and that they can be mobilised in times of emergency as well as at the time of actual hostilities. This extensive liability has not apparently acted in any way as a deterrent to recruiting, or to men remaining on in the Service.

The Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve was constituted by Act of Parliament in 1903, and up till now the strength of the force has been limited to 5,000 men. There are six Divisions in the United Kingdom, and I give you their names and present strength:—

		Officers and men.
1. London	...	808
2. Clyde (with sub-divisions on the Tay and Forth)	...	1,146
3. Mersey	...	665
4. Tyneside	...	603
5. Sussex	...	492
6. Bristol	...	373

For the maintenance and training of this force Parliament voted last year £30,330, which works out at little more than £7 per Volunteer.

The fixed establishment of a Division R.N.V.R. as to ranks and ratings is as follows:—

	To each Company.	To each Division in addition.
<i>Officers.</i>		
Commander	—	1
Lieutenant	1	1
Sub-Lieuts., Acting Sub-Lieuts. or Mid-shipmen	2	—
Surgeon	1	—
Paymaster	—	1
Assistant-Paymaster	—	1
Total Commissioned Officers	4	4
<i>Petty Officers and Men.</i>		
Chief Petty Officer	1	—
Petty Officer (as Bugle Major)	—	1
Petty Officer	4	—
Leading Seamen	4	—
Able and Ordinary Seamen and Recruits and Signal ratings	89	—
Total P.O's and men	98	1
<i>Permanent Staff (not R.N.V.R.)</i>		
Officer Instructor	—	1
Petty Officer Instructor	1	—
Armourer's Mate	—	1
Shipkeepers (as may be allowed by the Admiralty)	—	—
Total R.N.V.R. enrolled (excluding Honorary Officers)	103	5

The instructional staff is one lieutenant R.N. with temporary rank of commander to each Division, and one chief petty officer to each company of 103 men. The instructional staff is drawn wholly from the active list of the Navy, and their appointments last for two years in the case of commander instructor, and three years in the case of chief petty officer instructors. By this means the R.N.V.R. is kept in close touch with the Permanent Service and its many rapid changes.

The Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve is directly under the command of the Admiral Commanding the Coast Guard and Reserves; but the administration of the force is carried on through a special committee at the Admiralty called the Admiralty Volunteer Committee, which body is composed of a number of civilians, the officers commanding Divisions, and a Naval captain representing the Admiral. The present-day County Territorial Associations are based upon this same idea, and it is found that the unofficial or civilian element at the head of affairs imparts a useful knowledge of the special requirements and circumstances which attach to Volunteering in different localities.

Most of the Divisions have a cadet corps of boys affiliated to them. These associations take boys from the age of fourteen years, and they act as useful feeders to the R.N.V.R., which enrol the boys at the age of eighteen years. These cadet corps, though receiving Admiralty recognition, make no charge on naval funds. They adopt the principle of the "Scouts," and are self-maintaining. The cadet corps also form a source of recruiting for the Navy, the character of the boys being well gauged before they are enrolled in one or other of the senior forces.

In some cases the headquarters of a Division is centred in an old man-of-war moored in the port or river, such as H.M.S. "President" off the Thames Embankment, H.M.S. "Calliope" in the Tyne, and H.M.S. "Eagle" in the Mersey. At other places the headquarters takes the form of a battery or drill hall, such as in the Sussex Division, and Glasgow.

All men joining the R.N.V.R. sign an undertaking form promising three years' service. The recruit is then given a free kit, and he starts upon his training. Each recruit has to pass a strict medical examination before being enrolled, and the minimum physical standard requirements are 5 ft. 4 ins. in height, and 34 ins. deflated chest measurement.

The training of a naval volunteer comprises :—

"Drills with guns and rifles used in the Royal Navy, with such firing practice as is found practicable; company drill and sufficient battalion movements to enable the men to take part in parades with other forces; seamanship, including handling boats under oars and sails, knotting, splicing both hemp and wire rope, rigging sheers and derricks; signalling and telegraphy, together with such other gun drills and instruction as the Admiralty from time to time direct."

Each man has to put in not less than 40 drills during his first year's service, and not less than 24 drills in each subsequent year, and he must be present at the annual inspection of his Division before he can be rated as an "Efficient."

A grant of 50s. per annum is made to a Division in respect of each efficient. Should a Volunteer fail to conform to these minimum requirements, he is liable to a fine of 21s. in respect of each year that he has failed to make himself efficient.

As a matter of fact there has not been much trouble under this head in the R.N.V.R. The training is so varied and so interesting that most of the men put in many more drills than the minimum required. Indeed, it is not uncommon to find some men putting in as many as 200 drills per annum.

By far the most important part of the Naval Volunteer's training are the "courses" at the Naval Gunnery, Signalling, Torpedo, and Engineering schools, and the periodical embarkations with the Fleet. Both the "courses" and "embarkations" are entirely voluntary, and generally extend from 14 to 28 days' duration.

Notices of when these instructional opportunities can be taken are posted to each Division early in the year, and the men selected take advantage of that "course" or "embarkation" which suits their convenience the best.

Volunteers going through courses or embarkations receive pay and allowances according to their Naval ratings for such time only as they are actually in the school or afloat. If the Volunteers pass a satisfactory examination on leaving the Naval schools they earn an extra capitation grant of 30s. for their Division, but in order to hold these they have to re-qualify once in every three years. The extra capitation, or pro-efficiency, grants are as follows:—

	£	s.	d.
Gunnery (officers and petty officers)	1	10	0
Torpedo (officers and petty officers)	1	10	0
Engine room work or electrician (all hands) ...	1	10	0
Signalling (all hands)	1	10	0
Signalling and telegraphy (all hands)	4	0	0
Board of Trade Master's Certificate (officers) ...	1	10	0

No Volunteer can be rated as ordinary seaman before he has passed an examination and completed 40 drills, and no ordinary seaman can become an able seaman before he has passed an examination and done 14 days' training afloat as O.S., and no able seaman can become a leading seaman before he has passed an examination and held the ratings of O.S. and A.B. for a total period of not less than one year. A leading seaman can become a petty officer after he has held the rating of leading seaman for not less than one year, and completed 14 days' training in the rating of leading seaman in one of H.M. ships, has passed an educational test, and also an examination in seamanship and gunnery.

In addition to the "courses" in general training there are some special courses arranged for men wishing to obtain trade certificates. Volunteers intending to qualify for these have first to pass an educational test examination at their headquarters. They then receive a provisional trade certificate, and are sent to one of H.M. naval establishments or ships for a 14 days' course. On passing out successfully the Volunteer is granted his trade certificate, and should he be called upon in future to work at his trade whilst embarked with the Fleet, he receives a special allowance of pay according to scale, thus:—

	Per Day.
	s. d.
Engine-room artificer, 1st class... ..	6 0
Electrician	5 6
Blacksmith's mate	2 9
Carpenter's crew	2 4
Cooper's crew	2 6
Painter, 1st class	3 0
Plumber's mate	2 5
Shipwright	4 0

From the above it will be gathered that the R.N.V.R. is largely an artisan corps. It is true that in London there is a Stock Exchange and also a Law Courts Company, but these are exceptions to prove the rule.

In the majority of cases the Naval Volunteer is a working man, and as such the training is designed to suit his means and ability.

Periodical embarkation with the Fleet not only provides the most valuable part of a volunteer's training, but also a very popular experience. Last year, out of a total strength of 4,300 officers and men, 1,513, or 35 per cent., went to sea in the proportion of 744 for 14 days, and 769 for 28 or more days. The results are eminently satisfactory to the R.N.V.R., and unquestionably contribute a great deal towards the general utility of the force as a reserve for the Navy. Of late the Admiralty have favoured giving the Volunteers exceptional opportunity for longer cruises. When His Majesty the King (as Prince of Wales) went to Canada to take part in the tercentenary celebrations of the Dominion, five officers and 136 men of the R.N.V.R. formed part complement of his escorting fleet. Last year 68 officers and men were embarked as part of the crews of fully commissioned ships of the Fleet that went to the Mediterranean. This year more officers and men have again been embarked with the Home Fleet for a cruise to, and exercise off, Spanish ports. Should these experiences prove that the R.N.V.R. are capable of taking a competent part in the everyday work of a man-of-war, it is to be hoped that they may yet be increased in number, as they are extremely popular, so much so that when recently some Volunteers were required from the Clyde Division, 25 post-cards were sent out from headquarters, and within six hours 20 replies in the affirmative were received.

So much for the organization and work of the R.N.V.R. at the present time. As to the future and further improvement, some useful additions might be made. There is no reason why some companies might not be established in a few of the minor ports along the coast; nor why motor-boat sections should not be organized, nor why some seaplane branches might not be established. Already three men in the Dundee companies have applied for a flying course.

The present total establishment strength of the R.N.V.R. (viz., 5,000) is too small. Any further increased expenditure on these numbers would seem disproportionate. It is believed that with increased facilities of training afloat and other inducements there would be no difficulty in raising a further 5,000 men. Motor-boats manned by a crew possessed of intimate local knowledge would be useful in conducting the Harbour or Port Examination Service; also for harbour defence and coast-guard work. The seaplane branch would be useful for local scout, message, or signal service.

The training of the R.N.V.R. could be much improved by the supply of more modern guns and equipment to drill ships and batteries. It was only last year that in Dundee we got rid of some muzzle-loading guns. It seems to be the general practice in this country to drill the reserve forces with the discarded weapons of the fighting line. Of course, this is the cheapest policy at the moment, but it is bound to be the more expensive in the long run, for there is nothing more costly than trying to teach men their business when war has actually begun. Under existing conditions many Naval Volunteers never see the things they will have to handle in war until they are embarked. On account of the very short time at the disposal of the Reserves by reason of their civil employment, particular care ought to be taken that not a moment is wasted in drilling with weapons no longer used in the Service. Every hour of instruction should be utilized in handling just those things that a man will have to handle when called afloat.

It would be an advantage if embarkation afloat was made compulsory for the R.N.V.R. in just the same way that attendance in camp has been made compulsory for the Territorial. At present it is frequently the same men who go to sea year after year, while there are others who never go to sea at all. There are cases of men who have been in the R.N.V.R. ten years and have never yet been on board a man-of-war. The choice of time should remain for the Volunteer's convenience as now.

If possible a small sea-going gunboat should be attached to each Division, so that a Volunteer could do his service afloat in this, or in a commissioned ship of the Fleet. It is not every Volunteer who can leave his private occupation for a fortnight or a month at a time, but there are few men who could not fit in 14 days' work by taking advantage of suitable week-ends.

Another advantage of having a gunboat would be that the routine of the ship could be specially arranged to suit the training of the R.N.V.R. This is not possible in a fully commissioned battleship, and consequently a good deal of valuable time is lost before a Volunteer has found out "the ropes" and knows exactly what he is doing. It might be laid down that no Volunteer should be embarked in the Fleet for training who has not passed through the local gunboat satisfactorily as an A.B. That is to say, only trained men would, in future, be taken as part complements of fully commissioned ships of the Navy. Actual sea training in the local port would make service in the R.N.V.R. even more popular than it is now, and it would make recruiting easy. It would give a sense of reality to the whole service, and it is *reality* that is wanted.

In an indirect way the R.N.V.R. confers another benefit on the country. Its members are brought in close personal touch with the Navy. They learn all they can about its affairs;

they appreciate its splendid service; they realise its importance, and so as they move about in their private employments they impress their fellow countrymen with a proper sense as to what the Navy is, what it does, and what it means to the nation.

Naval Volunteers owe a deep debt of gratitude to officers and men of the permanent strength; for whether ashore or afloat, in school or ship, the Volunteers have always been treated with unfailing patience, courtesy, and tact.

The Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve movement has taken root in the great Dominions of the Empire: Australia, India, and South Africa have each their Naval Volunteer brigade. Though not formed on exactly the same lines as the United Kingdom Reserve, the members are all keen on their work, and have from time to time been well reported on as to their drill. Naval Volunteers have in the past rendered good service to the Empire. In the Egyptian campaign of the eighties, three officers and fifty men from the United Kingdom were landed and took part in active operations. In the Maori Wars and Zulu Wars, Naval Volunteers took part in large numbers. In the Boxer troubles in China, Australia sent over 260 Naval Volunteers to fight. In the late South African War, Natal's Naval Volunteers did much good work, both in and out of Ladysmith. Given the same opportunities, and properly encouraged, there is no reason why the present members of the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve should not emulate afloat, and equal, if not surpass, the creditable performances of their predecessors in naval service.

DISCUSSION.

Lieutenant Nairn: Admiral Fanshawe, my Lords, Ladies and Gentlemen, Lord Graham has said that the Volunteer Reserve could be increased by 5,000 men, and speaking as a late officer of the Sussex Division I wish entirely to concur in his suggestion. Owing to the special kindness of one of our members, the Speaker of the House of Commons, I was favoured with a seat in his gallery yesterday, and was therefore able to listen to the extremely able speech of the First Lord introducing the Estimates for the coming year; and there was one point which I should like to bring to your attention, and that is that the First Lord asks this year for 5,000 more men for the Royal Navy, at a standing expense of £400,000. Now, Lord Graham has shown us that we can have 5,000 more Volunteers at a standing expense of £40,000 per annum, and an important feature is that we shall have those volunteers in the right place, in England, which seems to me a very important matter to which he has called attention in his very interesting lecture. There is another point which I should like also to raise, because other gentlemen will follow me who will probably be able to speak better on the subject, and that is the question of the capitation grant, which is now a matter of 50s. for every efficient. I must say I do not think that is a sufficient amount. I know in the Sussex Division there were always a great many things which we could not do which might have been very useful, and the capitation grant

was raised from 25s. to 50s.; and there is no reason so far as I know why we cannot have £5 per head. I am afraid this proposition may be slightly startling, but as other gentlemen will probably succeed me, and I know there are some other officers present, I hope they will speak somewhat on the points which I have raised.

Lieut.-Colonel Campbell Hyslop: Mr. Chairman, my Lords, Ladies and Gentlemen, I doubt whether a soldier can usefully contribute anything of value to this discussion, but I should like shortly to allude to one subject which is mentioned in the very informative and interesting paper which we have heard. I refer to the matter of the cadets mentioned by Lord Graham on page four of his lecture. This is another instance of the vast amount of training, naval, military, and disciplinary, which is given to the boyhood of the country, and of which the public do not know very much. My special object in rising is to ask Lord Graham if he and the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve would give their special interest to a scheme which has been put forward recently under the auspices of the Mansion House Advisory Committee for Boys, by which it is sought firmly to establish the Boys' Naval Brigade under the management and direction of the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve. This proposal was made to the Admiralty, and I believe it is now receiving consideration. At the present moment there are in London, in the Boys' Naval Brigade, some 1,200 or more boys, but their training and organization has not yet been well defined, and they are impatiently waiting the decision of the Admiralty as to whether they are to receive official recognition or not. I note that the term "recognition" is mentioned by the lecturer, but I am not aware if it has the same significance attached to it here as is usually attached to the "recognition" of military cadets. Territorial military cadet corps are officially recognized by the Territorial Associations, and they receive certain assistance, some very small grants in cash, when favourably reported upon, and assistance in the way of equipment, facilities for camping, instruction, inspection, and so forth. Now, the Mansion House Committee think that if the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve are good enough, may I say wise enough, to act as the Territorial Associations are doing, as an intermediary between the Boys' Naval Brigade and the Admiralty, we hope they would find it within their power enormously to extend the sphere of operations and very largely to increase the number of boys who are receiving naval training. We would hope to see it go even further, because through the National Reserve we contemplate making in each London Borough a small committee of ex-Naval ratings, officers and men who have retired from the Navy (there are a very considerable number of them registered), which committees would act as the shepherds or guardians of the boys in the Naval Brigade. In this way we hope, through the old sailors, to establish a closer touch with the boys, and to extend the sphere of interest of the public generally, and certainly to enlarge the field of recruiting for the Navy. I do not think that I can profitably add more to this discussion except, perhaps, to repeat the hope that if and when this proposition is put to the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve they will give it their sympathetic help and interest; and we feel sure that if they do, and if the Admiralty do give recognition to the Boys' Naval Brigade in the same way as the War Office and the Territorial Associations are now giving recognition to the Boys' Cadet Force, there is no reason why the Boys' Naval Brigade should not very largely increase in strength. I may tell you that throughout the country there are no less than 300,000 boys

receiving some sort of military or semi-military training. We all think that an increase in that number by the Boys' Naval Brigade would be for the good, not only of the boyhood of the country, but for the good of the Navy.

Admiral the Hon. Sir Edmund Fremantle: Mr. Chairman, my Lords, Ladies and Gentlemen, I meant to have come and heard this lecture, but I am afraid I was rather late, because the date being altered, I forgot it. I have not very much to say, but I should like to say that I think great value ought to be attached to all the volunteers that we can get for the Navy. I thought it was a great mistake when we abolished the Royal Naval Artillery Volunteers. If they were not as complete as they ought to have been, I think the regulations might have been modified or altered; and that is very much what is being done now with the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve. At its inception I took some part in it: I went to Lord Selborne and introduced gentlemen who knew a great deal more about it than I did; and after telling Lord Selborne, who was then First Lord of the Admiralty, what I thought about it and what I had heard about it, and feeling sure that those gentlemen were very anxious to make it a really efficient Reserve, I left it in their hands as, of course, I had nothing further to do in the matter. I am very pleased with the results so far, and I am very glad to hear what Lord Graham has told us in his lecture. I should like to correct two mistakes which have been made this afternoon: a former speaker, when speaking about increasing the Navy by 5,000 men, seemed to think it would be exactly the same thing if we increased the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve by 5,000 men, which, of course, no naval officer will agree to at all. There are very many naval officers—and that was the objection raised by Admiral Tryon, amongst others, which caused the abolition of the Royal Naval Artillery Volunteers—who objected to the Royal Naval Artillery Volunteers on the ground that they were not sailors. Exactly what we want to do is to induce a great number of people who live in this country and who may be partly sailors, or have a love for the sea, or an inclination to do something for the great naval service of the Crown, to be sailors. It was quite a mistake to suppose that because they were not entirely sailors, therefore, they were not fit to be enrolled in any Reserve. This is all the more important now that we know how much depends upon machinery, and I was glad to hear from Lord Graham that a large number of the volunteers are really artisans. We want artisans, and we shall want artisans. I recollect a French naval officer telling me that the Bretons they had got were comparatively good sailors, but they got them late as regards age, and they came only for a short time, and he said that they were not much use to them now. "It is true," he said, "we like them to be sailors, but we have to make them artisans, and these people, not having sufficient education originally, do not make artisans." And I have heard the same thing in our own service. I have heard many people say they did not always want sailors. I am sorry to hear it sometimes, and I cannot agree that you do not want sailors, but, at the same time, there is a great deal in it, for you do want men who are adaptable men, men who are accustomed to some extent to machinery, and who can deal with all the improvements and all the changes and all the mechanical appliances which we have at the present day. I should not have spoken at all only the Chairman rather appealed to somebody to continue the discussion, and I thought that as I have always taken a great interest in Reserves, and as I think we have neglected the Reserves,

generally speaking, in this country, I would say a word or two on the subject. It is true, we cannot make use of them in the naval service very much during peace time, but I think we certainly shall want Reserves in case of war, and if we can have even half-trained people in peace time, they will be very superior to the very large number of men who had to be got into the naval service, as we know, from the gaols and by the press gangs, and so on, in the old wars, and yet who fought very good battles for this country and gave us that naval supremacy which we hold so dear. I am very glad to have been able to be here and hear something of Lord Graham's lecture.

Commander the Marquis of Graham: Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen, I should like just to answer one or two points which were raised by those who have just spoken. Mr. Nairn, in his remarks, dwelt chiefly on the subject of a capitation grant and a proposed increase of the manning strength. He suggested that our present capitation grant of 50s. per man was not enough, and he would like us to have £5. Well, if you have £5 I presume that some of the men would expect a share in it, and once the men begin to share in the money paid them it would do away with the spirit of volunteering. At present no man receives money: it is paid to the Division, and the Division meets its current expenses, the upkeep of the drill hall or of the ship, and all the other payments from the sums so received.

Mr. Nairn: I did not suggest that the money should be payable to the men.

Commander the Marquis of Graham: Then, of course, if we get £5 for the Division it would be very nice indeed. Then as regards the manning strength of 5,000, which was also alluded to by Admiral Sir Edmund Fremantle, Mr. Churchill suggested that the naval strength should be increased by 5,000 men, but I rather gathered that he required 5,000 men to add to the permanent strength, and that they should be thoroughly trained bluejackets. I do not think that if the increase of strength of 5,000 was made solely by means of the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve you would obtain the same efficiency, and I doubt if that would be satisfactory from the point of view of national defence. The R.N. Volunteers are Reserves and nothing more. With regard to what Colonel Hyslop said, I am very glad indeed to hear that there is a movement on foot in London to organize cadet corps. Colonel Hyslop suggested that the R.N.V.R. should act as intermediaries between the people who are organizing these boys' brigades and the Admiralty, and try to get Admiralty recognition for them. There is no difficulty in the matter, because as the present regulation stands, all that has to be done is for the people, who are organizing the boys' brigade, simply to write to the Commanding Officer of the Local Division (that would be the Commanding Officer of the London Division) and ask him to affiliate the boys' brigade under the Admiralty scheme as a cadet corps, and if he says "Yes," then it is done. There is nothing to stop it, and the Admiralty would then give recognition. The main point about Admiralty recognition is that the officer who commands these boys' brigades becomes an honorary Lieutenant in the R.N.V.R., and the boys are subject to the discipline of the R.N.V.R., take all their orders and take all their drill from the R.N.V.R. That means to say that the Committees who organize them now would have nothing more to do with them beyond looking after their

outside social affairs. So far as their drill and training are concerned, that must come from the officer commanding the R.N.V.R. to which Division they are affiliated. Admiral Sir Edmund Fremantle referred to the fact that he took part in the inception of the R.N.V.R. We do not forget that : we are very grateful to him and, as one who also took part in it, I remember the most valuable services which he gave in forming the R.N.V.R. It was a mistake to abolish the old R.N.A.V., but the whole question was one of reality, as it is now with the R.N.V.R. We must have reality in the training, we must have modern arms, modern equipment and experience afloat, and unless we get that reality it disheartens everybody.

The Chairman : If I may, I will endeavour to sum up or to emphasize the principal points which Lord Graham has put before us, but before doing so I should like most emphatically to support what Sir Edmund Fremantle has said to the effect that whatever you do in manning the Navy, there is one thing you must not do, and that is to put in Reserve men of any kind whatever in the place of, or in substitution for, any of the active service ratings of the Navy. I cannot say how important I feel that point to be. But I think that we none of us can help being greatly impressed (I am sure I am) with the extreme value of the body of men who have been described by Lord Graham, the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve, and realize the use that they should be to us. Now I will try to sum up and to emphasize the principal points of Lord Graham's lecture as they appear to me, although I know I shall repeat a great deal of what our noble lecturer has said. I think Lord Graham has made out a very strong case for the increase of the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve as at present constituted, and I think the principal requirement to bring it to the ideal position which he wishes for apparently is, first of all, to increase it greatly, even to have 10,000 men instead of 5,000, to have more training afloat, and such training to become compulsory for all the men, instead of some doing it and some not, as at present. A small seagoing gunboat for each Division impresses me greatly, I must say : I think it would be an enormous advantage. What I felt in the old days when I was connected with the old Naval Reserve was how very important it was that there should be modern arms and equipment. What is the use of a rich nation like we are wasting the time of a lot of men over obsolete guns which they will not see afloat ? It is absolutely nonsense in my opinion. Those seem to me to be the principal requirements to bring the force up to Lord Graham's ideal, and I only hope that the Admiralty may, at any rate, give very sympathetic consideration to his proposals. Lord Graham has supported his proposals by some very encouraging facts on the situation which he has put before us. One which strikes me particularly is the remarkable keenness of the men. He says that they offer themselves without restriction to serve anywhere and everywhere, in the Fleet or anywhere else. Another thing which strikes me as very remarkable and very different from my experience, which goes back a good many years, of the old Naval Reserve, is that they actually put in more drills than the minimum requirement. Well, human nature being what it is, or rather what it was, I do not remember men in the old days putting in more drills than they were required to put in ; certainly the object was to get full pay for all they did and not do more than they need. I think what he told us in regard to that is a very refreshing and delightful thing to hear of this force. Then he told us that the embarkation in the Fleet is

extremely popular. I am particularly glad to hear that; but what occurs to me as being also a very important point among the points he has put before us is that embarkation can be made compulsory for the whole of the men without affecting the recruiting. I should like to say that I very much sympathize with what Lieutenant-Colonel Campbell Hyslop has said with regard to training boys, and it would appear that with the present Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve as they are, there are something like 350 boys affiliated to them. Of course, if the Reserve increased, the proportion of those boys would increase also. I do not say that is a principal point, but it is a very important one, because if they were doubled there would be 700 boys, most desirable future recruits. I have said all that occurs to me to say in doing my duty in the chair, and, therefore, it only remains for me now to perform the particularly pleasing duty of thanking our noble lecturer most heartily, as I am sure I may from us all, for his exceedingly interesting and instructing lecture.

Commander the Marquis of Graham: I thank you very much for the kind way in which you have received the Chairman's remarks, and in return I should like to ask you to record a hearty vote of thanks to Admiral Fanshawe for his kindness in presiding here this afternoon. I take it as a great compliment that the Vice-Chairman of the Council of this Institution should occupy the chair for my lecture, especially as I know that he came up from the country in order to be present this afternoon. I was pleased to be able to read the lecture this afternoon, because I think we want to have more Naval lectures in this Institution. We have a great many Army ones, and I think the Navy should have a look in occasionally. I now beg to move a hearty vote of thanks to Admiral Fanshawe for presiding here to-day.

The Chairman: I thank Lord Graham very much for his kind remarks, and I may say that it has been a real pleasure to preside on this occasion.

REMARKS BY REAR-ADMIRAL R. G. O. TUPPER, C.V.O.

I had hoped to have been present to attend the very interesting paper read by the Marquis of Graham, but as I was unable to do so, I beg leave to forward a few observations on the subject in case they may not have already been made during the discussion. In the first place, I cordially agree with the noble Marquis in advocating an increase in the establishment of the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve for the reasons he gives, and I would add that the Corps has already justified its existence. In my humble opinion the best way to make a corps thoroughly interested and keen is to give it some definite duty to perform in wartime—at present the duties of the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve are vague—if the idea is to draft them to ships in active commission, where they practice a trade or take part in the least important duties of seamen and stokers. The noble Marquis suggests that they might be employed to carry out the Examination Service at the Ports they belong to, that is to say, cause merchant ships to anchor in a certain locality and wait there until their papers and cargoes had been examined, and then if correct, conduct them to their berths inside the harbour. I agree that they can be most usefully employed in that service, and feel sure they would conduct it admirably, but I go further and suggest that the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve should be given the responsibility of keeping the approaches to our mercantile ports clear of mines, a very important duty which requires study

and local knowledge, as well as drill and constant practice. Weekly practice at clearing a passage of blockade mines would give plenty of interesting boat work and work with small steamers, and would ensure the sweeping vessels and gear attached being thoroughly efficient and immediately available. It would, in my opinion, be inconvenient to use our active Royal Navy officers and seamen for mine sweeping and examination service, but the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve supplemented, where necessary, by retired officers and pensioners, could perform these services efficiently and would relieve the high seas Navy of an important but subsidiary duty for which they are not trained. It will be necessary to clear the approaches to our principal ports for at least 20 to 30 miles from the entrance, and to organize the approaches and ports of assembly for entry, etc.; this requires careful study and organization which cannot be in better hands than those of the local authorities who have local knowledge and time to think out the best methods and channels of approach. The loss of a valuable cargo and mail steamer by a mine near the entrance to a port, would do incalculable damage to the port and prevent the use of the port by the traders until they were satisfied that the approach was safe. For instance, a port service vessel would proceed to a certain locality and form a point of assembly for merchant ships, and then lead them into port on a certain course that had been made safe, by sweeping—the position of the pilot vessel could be altered or not from day to day as circumstances demanded. I also quite agree that money spent on giving up-to-date guns, etc., for the instruction of Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve is well spent, and money spent in giving them obsolete gear is partially wasted and tends to discourage keenness. Finally, the more you can bring the Navy in touch with the people of all classes the better it will be for the Empire, and increasing the establishment of the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve will greatly help to do this.

FRONTISPIECE.

FIELD-MARSHAL SIR EDWARD BLAKENEY, G.C.B.

THIS distinguished officer died at Chelsea Hospital, of which Institution he was Governor, on August 2nd, 1868. He was for 74 years in the service of his country, having entered the army as cornet in the 8th Light Dragoons in 1794, and afterwards exchanging into the 99th Regiment, in which he was gazetted captain in September, 1794, and in which regiment he accompanied the expedition under Major-General White in 1796 to the West Indies, and was present at the capture of Demerara, Berbice, and Essequibo. He later accompanied the expedition to Holland, was present at the actions of the 10th and 19th of September, also in those of the 2nd and 6th of October. In 1807 he went with the Royal Fusiliers to the Baltic, joined Cathcart's expedition, and was present at the capture of the Danish Fleet and surrender of Copenhagen; in 1809 he was at the taking of Martinique. In 1811 he joined the British Army at Lisbon as major and brevet lieutenant-colonel, commanding the 7th Fusiliers, during that and following campaigns of 1812, 1813, and 1814. He was present at the Battle of Busaco, and was severely wounded in the thigh at Albuera. Colonel Blakeney was also present at the action of Aldea de Ponte, the Siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, and was severely wounded through the arm at the assault of Badajoz. He likewise was present at the Battles of Vittoria, Pyrenees and Nivelle. In 1814 he accompanied his regiment, the Royal Fusiliers, to America, to join the force against New Orleans, and was present at the assault of the lines before that place. In 1815 he joined the army in Belgium after the Battle of Waterloo, and was present at the capture of Paris. In 1826 he went to Portugal with a force commanded by General Sir William Clinton, in the command of the 1st Brigade. In 1828 he was appointed to the Staff in Ireland, and from 1838 to 1855 commanded the forces in that country. He was a Privy Councillor of Ireland from 1836, was nominated a Knight Grand Cross of the Bath in 1849, and in 1836 was made by William IV. a Knight Grand Cross of the Royal Hanoverian Guelphic Order. From 1832 to 1854 he was colonel of the 7th Regiment Royal Fusiliers, when he was transferred to the 1st Regiment of Foot, which became vacant by his death. In August, 1865, he was appointed colonel-in-chief of the Prince Consort's Own Rifle Brigade. Sir Edward was a Knight of the Tower and Sword of Portugal, a distinction conferred upon him in 1812. He received the Gold Cross and one clasp for Martinique, Albuera, Badajoz, Vittoria, and Pyrenees, and the Silver War Medal with four clasps for Busaco, Ciudad Rodrigo, Nivelle and Nive. His commissions bore dates as follows:—Cornet, 28th February, 1794; Lieutenant, 24th September, 1794; Captain, 24th December, 1794; Major, 17th September, 1801; Lieut.-Colonel, 25th September, 1808; Colonel, 4th June, 1814; Major-General, 27th May, 1825; Lieut.-General, 28th June, 1838; General, 20th June, 1854; and Field-Marshal, 9th November, 1862. He was appointed Lieut.-Governor of Chelsea Hospital in 1855, and in the following year, on the death of Sir Colin Halkett, was made Governor; where he died, aged 90 years.

From a photograph, kindly lent by F. M. Hobday, Esq., of a picture by W. A. Hobday, R.A.

LEE'S INVASION OF MARYLAND ; THE SHARPSBURG CAMPAIGN.

By CAPTAIN E. F. TREW, *p.s.c.*, R.M.L.I.

ON September 2nd, 1862, the position of the Federals in the eastern theatre of war was as follows :—

(a) The main army, under McClellan, was at Alexandria and Washington, where it was reorganizing after its defeat in the campaign of the second battle of Bull Run.

(b) 3,000 infantry and artillery were at Winchester.

(c) 3,000 cavalry at Martinsburg.

(d) 8,000 infantry and artillery at Harper's Ferry.

The Confederate main army was about Chantilly. Lee's plan was to move his whole force to the north side of the Potomac and carry on the war in the enemy's country. His idea was that a single victory gained on northern soil would bring about the end of the war, and an acknowledgment of the independence of the Southern States. With this end in view he proposed to disregard the Federal detachments at Winchester, Martinsburg and Harper's Ferry; for he imagined that as soon as his advance threatened to cut them off from their main army, they would be withdrawn.

In pursuance of Lee's plan the Confederates marched through Leesburg, and on September 7th reached Frederick. Meanwhile, the Federal Army had concentrated west of Washington. Owing to the efficient service of Stuart's cavalry, McClellan was in doubt concerning the plans of the Confederates. He did not know whether the whole or only part of Lee's army had crossed the Potomac or whether Lee intended to invade Pennsylvania or to move towards Washington. At length McClellan decided to move against the Confederate force reported to be at Frederick.

Contrary to Lee's expectations the hostile detachment at Harper's Ferry was not withdrawn. This meant that the Confederate line of communications, which ran through Shepherdstown up the Valley of the Shenandoah, would be exposed to the attack of 8,000 men. To meet this situation the following courses were open to Lee :—

(a) Detach a force to mask the hostile troops at Harper's Ferry.

(b) Attack the hostile troops at Harper's Ferry with the whole or with a part of his force.

Lee chose the latter course and determined to divide his army into two parts. One part under Jackson was to move against Harper's Ferry, while the other was to engage the attention of the main Federal Army by threatening an invasion of Pennsylvania. The details of Lee's plan were as follows:—


(a) Longstreet with the train was to march on Hagerstown as if threatening an invasion of Pennsylvania.

(b) Jackson was to recross the Potomac in the neighbourhood of Sharpsburg and move on Harper's Ferry from the south-west.

(c) McLaws was to take possession of the Maryland Heights and attack Harper's Ferry from the north-east.

(d) Walker was to take possession of the Loudoun Heights and attack Harper's Ferry from the south-east.

GENERAL PLAN OF THEATRE OF OPERATIONS.




(e) D. H. Hill's division and Stuart's cavalry were to form the rearguard and cover the movements of the whole army.

Lee's plan for the attack on Harper's Ferry worked perfectly. Jackson marched from Frederick via Middletown, Williamsport, and Martinsburg and arrived at Halltown on the 13th. Meanwhile, McLaws had taken possession of the

Maryland Heights and Walker the Loudoun Heights, and thus Harper's Ferry was shut in on all sides. On the 13th also McClellan obtained information of the plans of the Confederates by means of a copy of Lee's orders picked up in Frederick. One Federal division advanced towards the South Mountains that evening; the remainder of the army spent the night about Frederick.

On the 14th Jackson took command of the Confederate forces round Harper's Ferry. Jackson's plan was to attack Harper's Ferry simultaneously from all sides, and most careful arrangements were made to bring this about. The action commenced with an artillery duel, and it was not until the Federal artillery had been subdued by the converging fire of the guns of McLaws, Walker and Jackson that the infantry advanced to the attack. No assault, however, took place, for the Federals

PLAN OF ENGAGEMENT AT HARPER'S FERRY.



surrendered before Jackson's infantry reached the intrenchments. The decision was gained practically by artillery alone. The peculiar conditions under which the battle was fought rendered this possible. Under ordinary conditions the object of artillery in the attack is to assist the forward movement of the infantry; but at Harper's Ferry the Federals were entrapped before the battle began, and there was no escape from the cross, enfilade and reverse fire of the Confederate guns.

While the above events were taking place at Harper's Ferry, McClellan had advanced and attacked D. H. Hill and Stuart in the passes of the South Mountain. Lee ordered Longstreet back from Hagerstown to their assistance; but when night fell one of the passes was in the hands of the Federals.

On the 15th Lee fell back to a position on the right bank of the Antietam Creek near Sharpsburg, and ordered Jackson, McLaws and Walker to rejoin him there. Lee still hoped to fight a decisive battle on Federal territory, and his plan was to hold the Federals in check with the commands of D. H. Hill, Longstreet and Stuart, until he could be rejoined by the Confederate detachments sent against Harper's Ferry; it was then his intention to deliver a counter-stroke as soon as opportunity offered.

For the execution of this plan the Confederates could not count on more than 40,000 men, while the Federals had 90,000. But the Confederates were superior in other ways, for they had gained victory after victory and had "better skill, better organization, and above all a firmer determination in all ranks to conquer" than their opponents, and these are the qualifications which form the chief factors of success.—Field Service Regulations, Sec. 99 (1).

On the 16th Jackson and Walker joined Lee at Sharpsburg. Meanwhile, the advanced troops of the Federals had reached the left bank of the Antietam. McClellan, however, was content with spending the day in reconnoitring.

The following is a description of the position occupied by Lee:—

(a) The general line was on a ridge running between the Hagerstown—Sharpsburg Road and the Antietam Creek. The position extended from the Nicodemus Run on the left to a spur overlooking Burnside Bridge on the right; a distance of three miles. This position can be divided easily into two parts: a wooded area from Nicodemus Run to Dunkard Church and an open area from Dunkard Church to the spur overlooking Burnside Bridge.

(b) The wooded area comprised the East, West, North and Poffenberger Woods. The Confederate line in this area ran in front of the West Wood. Opposite lay the East, North and Poffenberger Woods, which gave a covered approach to an enemy to within 500 yards of the position. The open spaces between the woods consisted of meadows and cornfields separated by stone walls, with here and there small buildings and farms. There was a position suitable for several batteries on a hill north of Nicodemus Run, from where cross fire could be delivered against an enemy attacking the front of the position.

The ground in this area was unsuitable for the mounted action of cavalry.

(c) The open area consisted of open slopes broken here and there by long ravines. It contained several positions suitable for artillery and was suitable for the mounted action of cavalry.

(d) The Antietam formed a considerable obstacle. It was 60 feet wide and unfordable except at Snively. There were

four bridges over the stream, none of which the Confederates had had time to destroy. Three of them were exposed to fire from the Confederate position; the fourth, at Pry's Mill, was covered from view and fire.

(e) In case of retreat the Potomac would have to be crossed. This river was 200 yards wide. There were no bridges, only a few deep fords, but one of which was practicable for wagons. The distance of this river from the position varied from two and a half miles in rear of the right to one mile in rear of the left.

(f) There was a ridge on the left bank of the Antietam forming a suitable position for the whole of McClellan's artillery.

Lee had at hand 25,500 men and 134 guns for the occupation of this position. His dispositions were as follows:—

(a) Longstreet commanded the right section from Burnside Bridge to Dunkard Church inclusive. His troops comprised the divisions of D. R. Jones, Evans, and D. H. Hill, with Walker's division in local reserve. Most of the Confederate artillery was allotted to this section.

(b) Jackson commanded the left section from Dunkard Church, exclusive, to Nicodemus Run. The troops under him consisted of the divisions of Jones and Ewell, with Hood's division in local reserve.

(c) Stuart, with FitzHugh Lee's brigade and some guns, was placed between West Wood and the Potomac in order to protect the left flank.

(d) Munford, with two regiments of cavalry and a battery, was placed at the Antietam Iron Works to hold the bridge and keep open communication with the Confederate troops, amounting to 14,500 men and 60 guns, who were marching on Sharpsburg from Harper's Ferry.

At 5 a.m. on the 17th the Federals advanced to the attack of Lee's position. The battle consisted of a series of piecemeal attacks tried in succession against the Confederate left, centre and right. Briefly, these attacks were as follows:—

(a) The first attack was made by the Ist Corps of 14,800 men under Hooker. Hooker formed up his troops under cover of the North Woods, and supported by artillery attacked the Confederates occupying the front Dunkard Church—Nicodemus Run. This attack was repulsed at 7.30 a.m.

(b) The second attack was made by the XIIth Corps of 8,500 men under Mansfield. It was delivered against the Confederate left. Some of the Federals got as far as the West Wood, but there their advance came to a standstill.

(c) The third attack was made at 10 a.m. by the IInd Corps and a part of the VIth against the front Piper House—Dunkard Church—West Wood. This attack was at first repulsed by a Confederate counter-attack, but the Confederates went on too far and were attacked in turn when in disorder. The whole

Confederate left and centre was then forced back to the West Wood and the Sharpsburg—Hagerstown Road; but there the Federal advance came to a standstill.

(d) The fourth attack was delivered in the afternoon by Burnside with the IXth Corps of 13,000 men against the Confederate right. Burnside drove back the Confederates and got as far as their main position on the ridge when he was attacked in flank and repulsed by A. P. Hill, who had just arrived with 5,000 men from Harper's Ferry. This ended the Federal attacks for the day.

The failure of the Federals to defeat half their number of Confederates can be ascribed chiefly to the total mismanagement of the whole affair on the part of McClellan and his staff. Field Service Regulations, Sec. 102 (3) gives the following two ways of seeking success in battle:—

(a) By means of a converging movement of separated forces so timed as to strike the enemy's front and flank or flanks simultaneously, few if any reserves being retained in hand by the Commander-in-Chief.

(b) A part of the force only may be employed in a preparatory action while the commander keeps a large reserve in his own hands with which eventually to force the decision.

McClellan adopted neither method. He took no advantage of his superior numbers at all; for when the first three attacks were being delivered against the Confederate left no attempt was made to pin the rest of the Confederate Army to the ground so as to prevent reinforcements being sent to the threatened part. Not only was there no concentration of effort, but part of the Federal Army—Porter's Corps and a part of the VIth Corps—was not employed at all. Our Field Service Regulations, Sec. 106 (1) lays down as a principle that for decisive success every man, horse and gun must co-operate. It is a principle that the Federal leaders at this stage of the war never grasped; but it was understood by Lee and Jackson, and to that fact they owe a great deal of their success.

ARTILLERY.—The Federals employed their artillery in two main groups as follows:—

(a) About 170 guns were massed on the ridge on the left bank of the Antietam. These for the most part fought an artillery duel with the Confederate batteries on the opposite ridge and silenced them. But they also assisted the advance of their own infantry across the open space between the woods by means of cross fire delivered against the Confederate infantry.


(b) About 90 guns were placed along the edge of North Wood. These were also employed in assisting the infantry attack across the open space between the woods.

By the above arrangement a converging fire was brought against the Confederate left. This artillery fire was very effective as long as the Confederates were in the open, but once they

were driven back to the shelter of the West Wood they appear to have suffered little loss from the hostile guns.

CAVALRY.—The Federal cavalry, numbering 4,000, were not employed at all. As already stated the country north of Dunkard Church was not suitable for the mounted action of cavalry; but they might have been employed very usefully against the Confederate right or in delaying the advance of the

PLAN OF BATTLE OF SHARPSBURG.



Confederate detachments from Harper's Ferry. The last Federal attack would probably have succeeded if A. P. Hill's 5,000 men had been prevented from reaching the battlefield when they did.

THE CONFEDERATE TACTICS.—When McClellan commenced his attack on the morning of the 17th, there were still 14,500 Confederates absent from the battlefield. The methods employed by the Confederates in meeting the various Federal attacks were as follows:—

(a) Jackson met the first attack by engaging the enemy along his whole front, forcing him to use up his reserves by

means of local counter attacks. At the same time he detached Early to join Stuart in making a counter-attack against the Federal right flank. Stuart employed his cavalry dismounted and enfiladed the enemy with his guns. This counter-attack succeeded and Hooker's corps was repulsed. Stuart's enfilade fire was most effective; it is a good example of the plan recommended in Field Service Regulations, Sec. 109 (2).

(b) Before the second Federal attack commenced Jackson recalled Early and reinforced his line with Hood, who up to then had formed the local reserve. Even with the whole of his reserves in the firing line Jackson was barely able to hold his own. Stuart, however, again acted against the flank of the attacking enemy, and at 9 a.m. the Federal advance came to a standstill.

(c) So far very few of Longstreet's troops had taken part in the fighting. Lee therefore withdrew 10,000 men from Longstreet and placed them at the disposal of Jackson. These troops included McLaw's division, which had just arrived from Harper's Ferry. Jackson used them partly to reinforce his main line and partly to join Stuart in making a fresh counter-attack against the Federal right. When the Federals advanced against the Confederate position for the third time, Stuart, by moving under cover of the woods, surprised the Federal right flank. The Federals were severely repulsed and only saved from destruction by the arrival of fresh reinforcements. The counter-attack was, however, pushed too far, and becoming disorganized was in its turn attacked by the Federal reserves. The whole of the Confederate left and centre was then pushed back as far as the West Wood and the Sharpsburg—Hagerstown Road; but by this time all the available reserves of the Federals had been used up and their attack came to a standstill.

(d) After the repulse of the third attack, Lee determined to make a counter-stroke against the Federal right. The general idea was to hold the Federals with Longstreet's force while Jackson carried out the counter-stroke. Jackson's plan was to reinforce Stuart with infantry and guns. Stuart was then to move round and attack the enemy's right while the remainder of Jackson's force attacked his in front. The preliminary reconnaissance, however, discovered that the Federal corps, that had been defeated earlier in the day, had been reorganized and so placed that it was impossible for a Confederate turning movement to pass between them and the Potomac. The Confederate plan was in consequence given up. While the above was taking place Longstreet was barely able to hold his own against Burnside. The arrival of A. P. Hill from Harper's Ferry, however, turned the scale in favour of the Confederates and Burnside was repulsed. This event ended the battle.

Lee's plan for winning a decisive victory north of the Potomac had failed. He was severely handicapped by not

having all his troops up at the beginning of the battle, nevertheless, thanks to the superior tactics of his troops, he had worsted double his numbers, and his army was once more united. The points to which Lee owes his success in this battle may be summarized as follows:—

(a) The complete co-operation between all parts of the Confederate Army.

(b) The constant delivery of well-timed vigorous local counter-attacks, which forced the enemy to use up his reserves and prevented him from massing superior forces against any particular portion of the Confederate line.

(c) The employment of the cavalry. Stuart was always ready to co-operate with the rest of the army. The nature of the ground prevented cavalry mounted action; but he made use of his mobility to get into the most favourable position for the use of fire action.

Some other points brought out by the Confederate tactics are as follows:—

(a) The employment of the artillery. During the first three Federal attacks the Confederate artillery, posted to the south of Dunkard Church, engaged the mass of the Federal batteries posted on the left bank of the Antietam Creek. The Confederate guns were inferior in numbers, calibre and range power, and were worsted to such an extent that they were unable to be used effectively later on against the attacking infantry. In cases of this kind our Field Artillery Training, Sec. 158 (3) recommends that the artillery of the attack must not be ignored, but instead of endeavouring to destroy the hostile batteries by an overwhelming concentration of fire, the object of the defence will be to neutralize their fire with as few batteries as possible, so as to free as many as possible to fire on the attacking infantry.

(b) The disadvantage of want of space in rear of a position. The counter-attack which was to have been delivered against the Federal right during the last phase of the battle had to be given up because it was found there was no room to work round between the Potomac and the Federal corps which had formed up north of the West Wood.

On the next day, the 18th, Lee's Army evacuated its position and retreated across the Potomac. The Federals made no attempt to interfere with the first stages of the retirement, but later in the day attacked the rearguard and captured some guns. Lee's Army had become somewhat scattered and demoralized by this time. Jackson saw that the Confederates were in no condition to meet a resolute advance of the Federals, and at once decided to assume the offensive. He therefore sent back Hill's division, which quickly drove back the leading Federal troops to the north side of the Potomac. The best way to delay an enemy is to attack him. Jackson realized this and his

action here is an illustration of the principle laid down in Field Service Regulations (Sec. 114), which states that a delaying force fulfils its rôle in a most effective manner by attacking the enemy's advanced troops and by pushing them back on the main body. There was no other attempt at pursuit on the part of the Federals, and this incident closed the Sharpsburg campaign.

In many ways the battle of Sharpsburg is similar to the battle of Woerth, fought on August 6th, 1870. Some of the points of similarity are as follows:—

(a) At Woerth the French occupied a ridge at the foot of which ran the Sauerbach, corresponding to the Antietam at Sharpsburg. The northern part of the ridge was wooded, the southern more open. On the opposite side of the stream there was another ridge, which offered a suitable position for the whole of the superior artillery of the Germans.

(b) The French had 46,000 against 100,000 Germans. The Confederates had 40,000 against 90,000 Federals.

(c) At Woerth the first phase of the battle consisted of isolated and disjointed attacks delivered by the advanced guards of the Vth and XIth Prussian and IIInd Bavarian Corps against the French position. There was no concentration of effort, with the result that all were repulsed in the same way that the Federal isolated attacks were repulsed at Sharpsburg.

(d) The French artillery fought a duel with the superior artillery of the enemy. In this the French artillery was worsted to such an extent that later on in the day they were unable to oppose the advance of the German infantry with effect. The artillery duel at Sharpsburg had exactly the same results.

(e) The French right occupied open ground; their left wooded ground, and their right was defeated first. Similarly at Sharpsburg the last Federal attack delivered against the open area tried the Confederates more severely than the previous attacks against the wooded area. The cause in both cases was the same, that is the difficulty experienced in providing effective artillery support for the attackers once the defenders had retired to the shelter of the woods.

(f) The Germans, like the Federals, made no use of their cavalry. They were not at hand to take advantage of any opportunity created by the other arms and consequently were not prepared for the pursuit.


The result of the battle of Woerth was, however, quite different from that of Sharpsburg, for when the Crown Prince attacked in front and on both flanks. The advantage of superior All the corps were ordered forward, and the French were attacked in front and on both flanks. The advantage of superior forces thus made itself felt, and the French were defeated.

THE UNITED STATES *versus* MEXICO.

By T. MILLER MAGUIRE, LL.D.

IT is not for me in this Journal to discuss at any length the causes of war; politicians decide the cause and the justification, the finance and the treaties, but soldiers must conduct the operations and bear the blame of strategic and tactical failures.

Whether the present campaign will result in the development of fierce antagonism as between the Latin and Anglo-Saxon populations of the great American continent and neighbouring isles, or be settled by mediation, as is now proposed, or result in future annexation, I do not pretend to say, but that in spite



VERA CRUZ TO MEXICO CITY.

of their enormous superiority by sea and land in every resource to Mexico, the Northern Republic has proved the accuracy of previous warning in this Journal that their Monroe Doctrine, as Captain A. Mahan, United States Navy, has so clearly demonstrated, is only to be justified by force. That they were not likely to gain much moral or strategic reputation by forcing its theories down the throats of their neighbours, is obvious. The whole body of the Mexican Hispano-Indian republicans,

however disunited among themselves, abhor Yankee rule, and would prefer the rule of the worst President since Juarez, or even of a "freebooting" adventurer of Spanish or Indian or mixed descent, to the most refined plutocrat or polished vote-catcher from Washington or New York.

Whether hostilities are protracted till peace is brought about by pure exhaustion or not, these facts are indisputable: that there is no pretence of justice for the attack on Vera Cruz; that the war is not one against a peccant chief in the interest of humanity at large as the matter now stands (April, 1914); and that whatever the bad repute of the chiefs of the civil strife before the North American blockade, they are now hailed as rivals in patriotism of Bolivar, and the enthusiasm of the populace for their independence is unbounded, while myriads of young men would gladly engage in a guerilla war, for which, in topography and materials, in food supply and in the fighting instincts of the women, their opulent country is so well adapted.

If the present generation of Hispano-Indians are true to their history, the invaders, once they get away from their floating citadels, the modern enormous ironclad ships of war, and move on the capital of Mexico, with each day's progress must "drag behind them a lengthening chain"; and the defenders ought to be able to harass and exhaust them, and by flank attacks soon compel retreat or capitulation. Negotiation, procrastination, worry, delay, and even duplicity, are all good strategy for the Mexicans.

The causes of the war against Mexico on the previous occasion were not very profound, and not characterized by honour, or justice; but, nevertheless, they followed necessarily from the annexation of Texas, which was a very doubtful transaction at best, and by the claims of Texas to the territory between the Nueces River and the Rio Grande del Norte.

As I have been accused of prejudice against the United States and their jurisprudence and Monroe Doctrine, and against their arbitrary and severe treatment of other nations and of the native races, I quote the great General U. S. Grant, the most successful Federal General—himself afterwards twice President—he says, "even if the annexation of Texas, 1845, could be justified, the manner in which the war was afterwards forced upon Mexico cannot. Texas as an independent State never had exercised jurisdiction over the territory between the Nueces and the Rio Grande. Mexico had never recognized the independence of Texas, and maintained that even if independent Texas had no claim south of the Nueces."

In taking military possession of Texas after annexation the Army of Occupation under General Z. Taylor was directed to occupy the disputed territory. The army did not stop at the Nueces, was not eager to negotiate for a settlement of the boundary question, but went beyond, apparently to force Mexico to initiate war.

The General goes on to say :—"To us the acquired territory was an empire, and of incalculable value, but it might have been acquired by other means. The southern rebellion was largely the outgrowth of the Mexican War; nations, like individuals, are punished for their transgressions. We got our punishment in the most sanguinary and expensive war of modern times."

The United States West Point-bred officers and the enlisted men were very well trained and equipped up to date. Leaders were eager for glory and promotion and did not discuss the equity of the transaction. Major Steele, in his excellent modern summary, which I follow on the whole, is of this school of thought. But some officers to their last days looked back on the war of 1846-7 as one of the most unjust ever waged by a stronger against a weaker nation.

The army was sent to provoke a fight, but for political purposes it was essential that Mexico should commence, and here follow indications of somewhat "slim and sly" manoeuvring and plotting.

"It was very doubtful whether Congress would declare war, but if Mexico should attack our troops the Executive could announce 'whereas war exists by the acts of, etc.,' and then pursue the contest with vigour, and, once initiated, there were but few public men who would have the courage to oppose it."

In this connection I may point out that my friend the late Colonel Henderson, in his life of Stonewall Jackson, shows how this afterwards celebrated general got brevet rank for his courage in the Mexican War, at Contreras, and was publicly complimented for his services with the guns at Chapultepec by General Scott, the Commander-in-Chief. It will be interesting to officers, who study the American Civil War for Staff College and Promotion Examinations, to learn that most of the generals whose adventures they must follow are celebrated in the records of the Mexican Campaign. Magruder, Hooker, McDowell and A. Hill all served in Jackson's own regiment; McClellan and Beauregard were on the same staff as the still more famous R. Lee; Pope was a staff officer, Shields commanded a brigade, D. H. Hill received the brevets, Longstreet was wounded while carrying the Colours at Chapultepec, and E. Johnson was very distinguished at the same battle.

But much more instructive is Grant's estimation of the remarkable way in which, during the subsequent Civil War, he was able to profit by his Mexican experiences of the capacity, knowledge and readiness of the officers who joined the other side; able men like Jackson, Lee, Longstreet and Ewell made similar use of the knowledge acquired in 1846-7. This gives the clue to many an enterprise apparently so daring as to be rash in 1862-3.

From General Grant, who ultimately took R. Lee and his army captive, I quote another passage, which surely might be the text for a military sermon:—

“All the older officers who became conspicuous in the rebellion I had served with and known in Mexico. The acquaintance thus formed was of immense service to me in the rebellion—I mean what I learned of the characters of those to whom I was afterwards opposed. I do not pretend to say that all my movements were made with especial reference to the characteristics of the commanders against whom they were directed, but my appreciation of my enemy was certainly affected by this knowledge. The natural disposition of most people is to clothe the commander of a large army whom they do not know with almost superhuman abilities. A large part of the National army, for instance, and most of the Press of the country, clothed General Lee with just such qualities, but I had known him personally, and I knew him to be mortal.”

“It was just as well that I felt this,” naively remarks the General.

We have been made well aware of the inefficiency of the United States Army for its responsibilities during the last half century, but things were really scandalous in 1846. Most of the authoritative historians seem to slur over politics; but Grant could speak out in 1885, after he had been President and had experienced all that might and could be attempted by politicians. Not even the worst Czar, or the courtiers of a Bourbon could make more outrageous or baser attacks on the reputation and fortunes of their Generals than the Yankee wire pullers did.

I must not refer to our own history for precedents or analogies, but I quote General Grant, the victor of 1864-5, and elected President in 1869, and again I beg my readers to weigh his words carefully, lest their own turn should come all too soon.

General Grant was only 24 years of age in 1846, and yet he witnessed intrigues in which honour and many lives were sacrificed; and he lived to save his country from ruin by tolerating conduct (in spite of the Secretary of the War Department) on the part of his ablest subordinates, to which our history supplies no parallel, explaining much concerning the war itself, and also proving the right of a General to resign if his plans and views as to the commencement and conduct of a war be either opposed or altered by political superiors.

The Mexican War of 1846 was a political war, and the administration responsible for it wanted it to suit their Party schemes. The head of the army was a Whig, the Government was Democratic. It would not pay to popularize Scott by giving him an army and means of rapid and conclusive victories. The sacrifice of the soldiery was a secondary matter. His plans were not supported by the War Office, and he replied

that "if a soldier's plans were not supported by the administration success was not to be expected." He wrote this on May 27th, 1846, and four days later he was superseded by General Zachary Taylor, a Whig also, strange to say. After his victories on the Rio Grande line of operations, and the fall of Monterey, he began to be nominated as a certain candidate for the Presidency, and was ultimately elected.

I will bring this article to an end by finishing the narrative of how Scott ultimately got command, enabling Grant and other young officers to realize their ambitions, complete the defeat of Mexico, take the capital of Santa Anna, and revel in all the luxuriance of the palaces of old Indian Emperors and Spanish Viceroyes, after a triumphal progress through a country which is a very region of romance, possessing a lovely climate, historic cities and magnificent scenery; and whose story in the glowing pages of Prescott thrilled the imagination of every ardent youth, as Colonel Henderson says, "to follow the path of Cortez, to traverse the golden realms of Montezuma, to look upon the lakes and palaces of Mexico, the most ancient city of America, to encamp among the temples of a vanished race, and to hear, while the fireflies flitted through the perfumed night, the music of the black-eyed maidens of New Spain. Was there ever a more fascinating prospect for a young subaltern?"

Unfortunately, Grant felt keenly that all these glowing visions were based on moral and political wrong doing. But let us deal with the effect of politics on strategy. Grant records that:—

"Something had to be done to neutralize his growing popularity. He could not be relieved from duty in the field where all his battles had been victories; the design would have been too transparent. It was finally decided to send General Scott to Mexico in chief command, and to authorize him to carry out his own original plan; that is, to capture Vera Cruz and march upon the capital of the country. It was, no doubt, supposed that Scott's ambition would lead him to slaughter Taylor or destroy his chances for the Presidency, and yet it was hoped that he would not make sufficient capital himself to secure the prize.

"The administration had, indeed, a most embarrassing problem to solve. It was engaged in a war of conquest which must be carried to a successful issue, or the political object would be unattained. Yet all the capable officers of the requisite rank belonged to the opposition, and the man selected for his lack of political ambition had himself become a prominent candidate for the Presidency. It was necessary to destroy his chances promptly. The problem was to do this without the loss of conquest and without permitting another general of the same political party to acquire like popularity. The fact is, the administration of Mr. Polk made every preparation to disgrace

Scott, or, to speak more correctly, to drive him to such desperation that he would disgrace himself.

"General Scott had opposed conquest by the way of the Rio Grande, Matamoras and Saltillo from the first. Now that he was in command of all the forces in Mexico, he withdrew from Taylor most of his regular troops and left him only enough volunteers, as he thought, to hold the line then in possession of the invading army. Indeed, Scott did not deem it important to hold anything beyond the Rio Grande, and authorized Taylor to fall back to that line if he chose. General Taylor protested against the depletion of his army, and his subsequent movement upon Buena Vista would indicate that he did not share the views of his chief in regard to the unimportance of conquest beyond the Rio Grande.

"Scott had estimated the men and material that would be required to capture Vera Cruz, and to march on the capital of the country, two hundred and sixty miles in the interior. He was promised all he asked, and seemed to have not only the confidence of the President, but his sincere good wishes. The promises were all broken. Only about half the troops were furnished that had been pledged, other war material was withheld, and Scott had scarcely started for Mexico before the President undertook to supersede him."

I may say that the intervention of any Power, Anglo-Saxon, or German, or French, in the affairs of the Mexican Federation has always been bitterly resented, and on the whole these States may be regarded as one political body, and in spite of Punch's satire on the kind of war against Huerta, the National sentiment has been growing since 1846. No really popular movement against the invaders was then apparent, and two States, Vera Cruz and Zacatecas, refused by virtue of their autonomy to take part in the struggle. But the National feeling became much stronger at the time of the French invasion, 1862-3, and the short-lived rule of the Emperor Maximilian. When their country was delivered from these terrible dangers the national pride of victory and strength made Mexico a nation in the true sense of the word, but unfortunately the strong hands and clear heads of men like Diaz have been replaced by short-lived and cruel potentates who have revived civil strife and forgotten the comity of nations. On the other hand, the fact that the United States men have been alternately aggressive and timid, bumptious and conciliatory, has tended to consolidate the aspirations of all the Latin settlers (Ladinos), or descendants of Spanish and old Indians (Mestizoes), and unite the inhabitants, not only of Mexico, already despoiled of half its territory, as it existed before 1840, but of Central and Northern America in one great confederacy against the United States.

AN ACCOUNT OF THE STRANDING AND RE-FLOATING OF THE ITALIAN CRUISER "SAN GIORGIO."

Translated by permission from the *Rivista Nautica*.

By Lieutenant P. KEKEWICH, R.N.

COMMANDED by Captain A. Cacace, and flying the flag of Rear-Admiral V. Cagni, commanding the Second Division of the First Squadron, the cruiser "San Giorgio" went ashore on the evening of November 21st on the coast near Cape Peloro in the Straits of Messina, close to Saint Agatha. The ship was proceeding from Reggio in Calabria to Naples.

Admiral Cagni and Captain A. Cacace are two of our most able officers. The former is widely known and highly esteemed in recognition of his great accomplishments and exceptional merits, and Captain A. Cacace has quite lately confirmed in Libya his reputation as an excellent sailor and able tactician.

It is easy hastily to assign a reason for such an accident, but one should be careful in condemning anyone and in influencing public opinion. We say this, for the work which has been done towards re-floating the "San Giorgio" deserves very high praise, though of course it has been considerably facilitated by the short distance which separates the stranded ship from the shore. To quote a report from a pilot, the first information which came to hand: "We will mention two other spots, suitable as anchorages, to the south of Cape Peloro, one close to the shore of Saint Agatha, slightly to the north-east of the conspicuous fort of Saint Martin, about 2.7 miles from the Cape, the other. . . . A ship lying in this anchorage should lay out her anchors parallel to the shore, for otherwise the anchors will drag when the wind turns to the west." This shows how the coast can be approached with safety to within a very short distance on account of the steepness with which it shelves.

The re-floating operations are in charge of Admiral Cagni. The Ministry has given him every possible facility, but the operations must take several days, as it is necessary to lighten the ship considerably.

In the meanwhile, an enquiry has been ordered to be carried out by Vice-Admiral Amero, Commander-in-Chief of the second squadron.

The Grounding of the "San Giorgio" in the Straits of Messina.

Messina, 22nd.—Another serious accident has befallen our Royal Navy. Yesterday evening, 21st, when the cruiser "San Giorgio" was proceeding through the Straits of Messina at about 16 knots, and had arrived off the beach of Saint Agatha, close to Ganzirri, she went ashore, running up for about a hundred metres of her length; that is as far as the after funnel.

The grounding took place at 6.30 p.m., while it was yet quite light.

Considering the perfectly calm sea and the spring-like clearness of the atmosphere, it is difficult to conjecture the cause of such an accident. The vessel is stranded at a distance of about 25 metres from the beach, bows on, and with her ram about five metres above water and heeling over slightly.

On the spot are the armoured cruiser "Ferruccio," which arrived to-day, the destroyer "Perseo," the tender "Roma," the "Audax" of the Salvage Service, the "Salvator," "Vindex," and other smaller vessels that are to assist in the salvage operations. The re-floating operations are under the direction of Rear-Admiral Cagni, who was on board the "San Giorgio" in the capacity of Commander of the Second Division of the First Squadron. They started to lighten the vessel at 5 p.m., by placing the ammunition in lighters, while waiting for other vessels of the squadron before attempting to re-float the ship.

The "San Giorgio" is commanded by Captain Cav. Adolfo Cacace. She came from Taranto, and had been lying off Reggio, Calabria, for two days, whence she had sailed on the 21st at 5.30 p.m., an hour before she went aground.

Within the memory of man no vessel of war has gone ashore in the Straits, least of all on the shore of Saint Agatha, which is but little exposed to the current.

As it is not yet possible to discover the exact cause of the stranding, any supposition can but be mere guess-work.

Messina, 23rd.—From the investigations carried out by the divers, it is discovered that the "San Giorgio" lies with one portion of her starboard side on a sandbank and part of her port side on a bank, which is called by our seamen "Marmorino."¹ There are two holes, one of which is about two metres in length. They continue to get out the coal into lighters, and those foremost water-tight compartments which were flooded are being repaired.

¹ A deposit of limestone.

The "Filiberto" and the torpedo boat "Orione" arrived to-night to assist in the re-floating. Vice-Admiral Leonardi Cattolica was on board the latter, and on his arrival he at once repaired on board the "San Giorgio." They are expecting the "Brin," "Dandolo," and several tugs and destroyers. A lighter capable of lifting 150 tons has left Taranto, and a tank fitted with a pump has left Naples, both probably arriving to-morrow.

The "Roma," of the Servizi Marittima, after trying to tow her off, and parting several cables, has left for this port.

As far as can be learnt at present, the accident is attributed to the fact that the navigator, Lieutenant Degli Uberti, heard a blast which he attributed to a steamer which was ahead of them and would have meant, "I am altering course to starboard," a manœuvre that would have been fatal to the vessel. It seems that the whistle was that of a steam-tram going from Ganzirri to Messina.

Messina, 24th.—The work of removing the superstructures of the "San Giorgio" progresses apace. Parties are starting on the work of dismounting the turrets of the 254 mm. guns and the midship turrets. The repair ship "Vulcano" has supplied the men to assist in the work of lightening the stranded vessel. Forward, three divers take it in turns to go down to examine the hull, while the firm of Miloro, with powerful shears, is employed in taking off the hoods of the 180 mm. turrets.

As a total result of yesterday's work, the "San Giorgio" was lightened by about 140 tons weight, and they state that it is necessary to remove a few more thousand tons before the work of re-floating can be started.

From official sources it seems certain that at the moment of grounding Rear-Admiral Cagni and Captain Cacace were on the bridge. The navigating officer was Lieutenant Degli Uberti, and the officer of the watch Lieutenant Gamberini.

It is stated to-day that the grounding was due to the fact that the order for the alteration of course was not given at the correct moment when rounding Cape Faro; others say that an abnormal variation of the compass occurred at that moment.

Yesterday's arrivals were the battleship "Vettor Pisani" and several destroyers, all of which have been put under the orders of Rear-Admiral Cagni to assist in the re-floating.

Messina, 25th.—The total extent of the damage has not yet been determined; but divers of the Salvage Company have repaired one of the principal holes by means of baulks of timber secured to the hull by wire hawsers and made watertight by a padding of canvas. The ship's own pumps are being used to keep her clear of water until more powerful means arrive.

The Work of Lightening the "San Giorgio."

Messina, 26th.—The work of lightening the "San Giorgio" is being carried out by the men of the firm of Miloro, who have at their disposal all the latest and best mechanical appliances and the necessary lighters. Already the two guns from the foremost turret have been dismantled, and the roof of the conning tower has been removed. It is calculated that up to now 1,000 tons of material have been taken out of the ship, including coal.

The "Audax," of the Societa Salvataggi, carries a dredging apparatus, to draw the sand from under the hull of the "San Giorgio," while the divers continue the work of stopping the existing holes. Further examination shows that the keel is buckled for an expanse of about five metres in length and three in breadth.

The divers from the dockyard of Naples arrived to-day.

During yesterday, Rear-Admiral Corsi and the captain of the "Varese" visited the ship. Yesterday the battleship "Brin" arrived, flying the flag of Vice-Admiral Amero d'Aste, also the Royal ships "Vulcano," "Titano," and "Ercole," which have taken on board the stores of the "San Giorgio." About 80 hands from the firm of Armstrong, at Pozzuoli, are employed in the work of lightening and re-floating the ship. A 150-ton crane, two tugs, and a supply of wire hawsers are expected from Taranto.

The Enquiry, Messina, 26th.—The Commission of Enquiry into the causes and reason for the stranding of the "San Giorgio" arrived yesterday. It is composed of Vice-Admiral Amero d'Aste, Vice-Admiral Presbitero, and Rear-Admiral Corsi. The Commission commenced its sittings at once, independently of the work of re-floating, in order that they may in no way delay the operations.

The condition of the "San Giorgio" does not change. Yesterday it was very rainy, to-day is cloudy, the sea is calm.

The Approaching Re-Floating.

Messina, 28th.—The latest news is most hopeful of the speedy salvage of the "San Giorgio."

Yesterday evening the two foremost 254 mm. guns were hoisted out by means of the 150-ton crane, the last of the trio being hoisted out after nightfall by illumination of electric light. Part of the reef which has pierced the skin and is holding the ship has been removed by blasting. From reliable intelligence, it seems that only one hole of uncertain size remains to be filled. The work of the divers, being carried on with feverish haste, has been largely concerned with the holes near the bows, and it is expected to get these repaired by the end of another day's work. My informant assured me that in

two or three days, if nothing unforeseen occurred, they would be able to attempt the re-floating. It would be carried out in the simplest manner. After the freeing of the bows, by the placing of caissons to lift the ship, availing themselves also of the rise of the tide and of the help of the torpedo craft and tugs now lying in the spacious waters of Saint Agatha, the ship would slip off as easily as she ran upon the fatal shore.

Cav. Antonio Serra, who worked with so much success to rescue the "San Giorgio" in her first accident, arrived last night from Rome. He has been sent by the Minister of Marine, and will remain while the operations are in progress.

This morning in the early hours there was some rain, which prevented the men from working on the upper deck; all hands were turned to work between decks, especially to the dismantling of the foremost turret. At 8.0 a.m. the big steam crane started to hoist out the midship turrets, which had been unriveted. The furnaces of the ship have been lit up once again.

The Condition of the "San Giorgio."

29th.—The two 254 mm. guns and one 190 mm. casemate gun were hoisted out and placed in the lighter "Bigia." Up to yesterday evening 1,100 tons had been taken out of the ship. The work of repairing the leaks in the skin proceeds. Weather fine. Forecast favourable.

Messina, 29th.—Despite the rainy weather the work of lightening the "San Giorgio" was re-started at 8 a.m. The divers proceeded at once with the clearing away of masses of seaweed and sand, which had been forced into the aperture made in the bows when the ship grounded. During yesterday's work the hood of the after turret, weighing 12 tons, and the last two remaining 190 mm. guns, weighing 45 tons, were hoisted out.

As soon as some more weight has been removed from the after part, Captain Cacace and Admiral Cagni propose to try to get the ship off with her own engines, and to anchor in this port (Messina). After all the holes have been securely stopped and the ship prepared for the passage, they hope to proceed to Naples.

Up to to-day the "San Giorgio" has been lightened by some 1,500 tons, including two 254 mm. guns, two 190-ton casemates, and the foremost 250 mm. turret.

The ship rests on the sandy bottom for about 40 metres of her length, the rest of the hull being quite clear of anything which will prevent her from being re-floated.

Messina, November 30th.—Already the "San Giorgio" is virtually afloat. All to-day the workmen have been removing some armour plates from the bow, and the divers have been repairing a leak found near the bows, which extends for about

fifteen metres; but, though an attempt at re-floating the ship would probably be successful, it would, in fact, not be tried if there were the slightest chance of failure.

The following is the plan of action: the "San Giorgio" will haul herself off the beach, with the help of anchors laid out near the stern, and using her own main engines. The "Benedetto Brin" will stand by ready for any emergency. The ship will remain at Messina for such time as may be necessary to put her in a condition ready for sea, when she will proceed to her destination.

To a question by Deputy Cavagnari on the subject of the re-floating of the "San Giorgio," the Minister of Marine replied in the following terms:—

"The cruiser 'San Giorgio,' at sunset on November 21st last, left the roads of Reggio to return to Naples, passing through the Straits. The captain of the ship intended to take advantage of the passage in doing a trial to train the stokers, and thus the speed was gradually increasing. The night was clear, the navigation was proceeding well.

The courses to be steered were laid off on the chart, and the spot at which the ship should alter from the first course to the second was determined by a bearing of the lighthouse at Point Pezzo, in Calabria.

The navigating officer, whose duty it was to observe the exact instant that the ship arrived on this bearing, mistook the lighthouse of Point Pezzo and observed instead the lighthouse of Cape Peloro, the extreme northern point of Sicily.

The captain, occupied in the meanwhile with avoiding the approach of steamers that were passing through to the south, did not immediately perceive the error of his subordinate; when, after he had passed the second steamer, not thinking he was so far on or so close to the Sicilian coast, he altered course; but it was already too late, and even though he reversed the engines and went astern, the ship ran upon the shore of Saint Agatha, as has happened to several steamers while making this passage.

Default: It appears to me there is; and I will submit for the sanction of the cabinet and the Sovereign the steps necessary to deal with the case; until after the careful examination of the results of the enquiry that I have ordered, I am neither able nor willing to give notice of them.

The ship will be saved, excluding any unforeseen circumstances, very shortly; we expect the news of it any day, but I preferred to sacrifice rapidity to certainty in the operations—and I can assure you that the reports appear to be very satisfactory.

The damage reported is much less than that incurred when she went ashore at Gajola, and in a few months the 'San Giorgio' will be repaired and ready once more to take her

place in our navy in a state of complete efficiency and none the worse for her accident.

The work of salvage, of lightening the ship, and of repairing the holes has been carried out with every care and all despatch. The smoothest running of the operation has prevailed, and even those who might at this time have felt the bitterness of the moment have shown a devotion to duty and a total absence of personal feeling which I have not seen equalled for years.

S. Cavagnari has asked me what steps I intend to take, what modifications I am going to introduce into the regulations to avoid the repetition of a similar disaster. I answer that I do not consider any change necessary.

The regulations in force already provide for all cases, and this second accident of grounding which has occurred to the 'San Giorgio' will remind each one of our seamen of the necessity of never relaxing the utmost care in all that applies to the navigation of our ships, in order that the error of one single man may at once be detected.

I am not going to seek excuses or show extenuating circumstances for the accident; and, as I have already said, I will first make my proposals to those whose duty it is to settle who was to blame, according to the amount of responsibility borne. I only say that those who are accustomed to "go down to the sea in ships" can always remember certain cases when collision or grounding has only been avoided by pure luck, even when they have exercised the greatest care in the performance of their duty."

S. Cavagnari replied shortly:—

"I beg to add that the accident to the 'San Giorgio' at Messina is in no way due to any flaw in the discipline, but to a fatal error. The strictest discipline has always been observed in our fleet, for discipline is the most essential requisite, whether it be the navy or mercantile marine."

The Final Stages.

All the four 254 mm. guns and the eight 190 mm. guns have been hoisted out, and several more armour plates removed.

Two vain attempts to tow the ship off were made on December 6th, but since that time the sea has become so rough that the ships standing by had to shift billet to Paradiso Road.

The Re-Floating.

(Official communication.) Messina, December 10th.—This morning at 11.10 a.m., the "San Giorgio" was got off under her own steam.

Two cylindrical caissons had been placed amidships and two at her bows yesterday, and at 11 a.m. to-day they were pumped out. The bow was thus raised and, the engines being put to full speed astern, the ship drew herself off the beach.

After weighing her anchors she proceeded under her own steam to Messina, where she will be refitted sufficiently to enable her to proceed to Taranto where she will be docked.

* * * * *

As a result of the inquiry Admiral Cagni and Captain Cacace have been placed on the unemployed list, while Lieutenants Uberti and Gamberini have been placed under open arrest.

THE YEAR 1913 IN FOREIGN ARMIES, GERMANY.

ORGANIZATION.

COMPOSITION OF ARMY.—The German Army consists of:—25 army corps, 50 divisions and 55 cavalry brigades. The normal composition of formations and units is:—Two divisions in an army corps, two brigades¹ in a division, two regiments¹ in a brigade, three battalions in a regiment, and four companies in a battalion.

PEACE ESTABLISHMENT.—The peace establishment is approximately as follows:—

Infantry, 505,128;

Cavalry, 85,593;

Artillery: Men, 135,042, field guns, 3,036;

Other arms and departments, 67,515;

Total, 793,278.

MILITARY ESTIMATES.—The military estimates in 1913 were £74,771,117.² (Sums converted at the rate of 20 marks to the Pound sterling.)

The following table shows the military expenditure during the last two years. In both cases the amounts given are those actually voted by the Reichstag. The figures for 1913 include the Supplementary Estimates which were passed on account of the Army Law of 1912.

	1913.	1912.	Increase or Decrease.
	£	£	£
ORDINARY ESTIMATES.			
<i>Recurring Expenditure.</i>			
Army Administration ...	38,769,264	34,420,665	+4,348,599
Imperial Military Tribunals ...	26,715	26,565	+150
General Pension Fund (Army) ...	6,310,141	6,376,368	-66,227
<i>Non-Recurring Expenditure.</i>			
Army Administration ...	29,029,997	7,142,095	+21,886,902
Imperial Military Tribunals ...	—	175	-175
EXTRAORDINARY ESTIMATES.			
Army Administration ...	635,000	838,215	-203,215
Totals ...	74,771,117	48,805,083	+25,966,034

¹ In six divisions there are three brigades and in four brigades there are three regiments.

² This sum includes the supplementary military estimates which were passed on account of the Army Law of 1913. The total amount is made up as follows:—Annual Military Estimates, £51,037,707; Supplementary Military Estimates, £23,733,410.

NOTE.—The expenditure on the Protectorate Troops is dealt with in separate estimates and is not included in the preceding table.

ANALYSIS OF PEACE STRENGTH.—The following is an analysis of the peace strength by units :—

Infantry Battalions	651
Rifle Battalions	18
Machine Gun Batteries	11
Fortress Machine-Gun Batteries	15
Machine-Gun Companies	233 (e)
Cavalry Squadrons	547
Horse and Field Artillery Batteries	633 (f)
Foot Artillery Battalions	48 (g)
Pioneer Battalions	35 (h)

Communication troops :—

Railway Battalions	8 (i)
Telegraph Battalions	9 (k)
Airship Battalions	5 (l)
Flying Battalions	5
Train Battalions	25

REMARKS.

(e) In addition to these there is one Instructional Machine-Gun Company at the Infantry School of Musketry and one Machine-Gun Company attached to the Instructional Battalion.

(f) This does not include nine batteries at the Field Artillery School of Gunnery.

(g) This does not include the Instructional Battalion at the Foot Artillery School of Gunnery.

(h) The two Bavarian Battalions have only three companies each; there are 26 search-light sections.

(i) In addition to these there is a traffic detachment of the Railway Troops, consisting of three companies which include the Saxon and Württemberg detachments.

(k) There are in addition 14 wireless companies, eight fortress telephone companies, and a War Telegraph School.

(l) There is in addition an airship dockyard and a draught horse section.

The communication troops have also a detachment for experiments with an experimental company, and a mechanical transport battalion, consisting of four companies, which include the Saxon and Württemberg detachments.

HIGHER ORGANIZATION AND CONDITIONS OF SERVICE.

THE ARMY BILL OF 1913.—At the commencement of the year a vigorous press campaign was started in favour of a new Army Bill. The forecasts and discussions of the possible provisions of such a Bill increased in volume during February and March till the Draft Bill was eventually laid before the Reichstag. After a good deal of discussion, but no real opposition,

the Reichstag passed the final stages of the Army Bill and of the Financial Bills connected with it, on 30th June. The Federal Council gave its sanction to these Bills on 3rd July, and the Emperor's signature thereto was affixed on 4th July.

No considerable amendments were made to the original military proposals, and even the six cavalry regiments, whose number the Budget Committee reduced to three, were restored at the final reading.

The provisions of the Army Bill included the following:—

(1) Increase of peace establishment by 4,000 officers, 15,000 non-commissioned officers, 117,000 rank and file, and 27,000 horses.

As regards the increases of the rank and file, these entail about 63,000 additional recruits annually, who, with the customary allowance of 8 per cent. for casualties during the year, result in an increase of 58,500 men.

The peace strength now stands at 661,175 men, exclusive of officers, non-commissioned officers, one year volunteers, officials and surplus recruits.

(2) The number of units are to be increased as shown below:—

Infantry	from 651 to 669 battalions.
Cavalry	„ 516 to 550 squadrons.
Field Artillery	„ 633 to 643 batteries.
Foot Artillery	„ 48 to 55 battalions.
Pioneers	„ 33 to 44 battalions.
Communication Troops	„ 18 to 31 battalions.
Train	„ 25 to 26 battalions.

(3) A cyclist and a machine gun company to be added to each of the 18 Jäger (Rifle) Battalions.

(4) Provision of machine-gun companies for fortresses, and creation of further searchlight sections.

(5) The peace establishment of infantry companies, squadrons and batteries to be raised.

INFANTRY.—There are in future to be only two establishments for the infantry of the line—higher and lower—the present higher becomes the new lower and a new higher establishment is created.

CAVALRY.—There is to be only one establishment, and that one higher than the present higher one.

ARTILLERY.—The chief alteration is the increase in horses.

(6) Money (£10,500,000) was asked for in connection with fortifications—chiefly on the eastern frontier.

(7) A new (8th) Army Inspection to be formed.

(8) Large increase in new formations in the Flying Corps are to be made.

(9) Increases to the staff of regiments to provide regular officers on mobilization for Reserve units.

It must be remembered that the ordinary estimates for 1913-14 included provision for two battalions of infantry, 95 machine-gun companies (every regiment now is to have a machine-gun company), one cavalry regiment, 10 field artillery batteries, one foot artillery battalion, one railway battalion, and five train companies.

The whole of the increase enumerated above with the exception of some of the technical troops was carried out on 1st October, 1913.

COST.—The non-recurring sum of 50 millions sterling to be met by a general levy on property. It would seem that when the provisions of the Bill are in working order, the annual increase will amount to £9,500,000.

EFFECT.—The intended effect of this measure is described in the preamble as follows:—"By means of this improved organization of units, the army will receive increased and ever-ready fighting powers, the change from a peace to a war footing will be facilitated, the annual levées of the Reserve and Landwehr will be rejuvenated and re-enforced."

CAVALRY.

NEW CAVALRY REGIMENTS ARMED WITH BAYONET INSTEAD OF SWORD.—The cavalry regiments, which were formed on the 1st October, have been armed with the short bayonet (Mark 84/94) instead of the sword; the bayonet can be fixed on the carbine. This measure is in the nature of an experiment on a large scale, and on the result will depend whether the bayonet will supersede the sword throughout the German cavalry. The new regiments are equipped with the cavalry sabre in addition, but only for use when not on duty.

ARTILLERY.

HOWITZERS FOR EACH DIVISION.—The formation of Howitzer "Abteilungen," by which there is to be one in each division instead of only one in each Army Corps, has been proceeding rapidly during the year under review.

RE-ARMAMENT OF THE ARTILLERY.—Statements have appeared in the Press to the effect that the military authorities are contemplating a re-armament of the artillery. These rumours have been contradicted, and up to date there is no official information to support them. The provisions of the Army Bill contain an item of three and a half millions for artillery ammunition, but no mention is made of a new weapon.

ENGINEERS.

Separation of the Field and Fortress Units of Pioneers.

The Pioneers are being re-organized in two distinct branches, field and fortress. Each army corps will, in future, have one field pioneer battalion, and in addition certain corps will be allotted fortress pioneer regiments. At present these

latter exist only as 2nd battalions in certain corps, but they will be gradually expanded into regiments of six companies by 1915.

INCREASED ALLOTMENT OF SEARCHLIGHT SECTIONS TO PIONEER BATTALIONS.—In the near future each field and fortress pioneer battalion is to be allotted one searchlight division each of two sections.

MEDICAL SERVICES.

The total cost of the provisions made for medical services in the Army Law of 1913 is £700,000.

TRANSPORT.

SUBSIDIZED MOTOR VEHICLES.—The number of motor vehicles which have been subsidized for use on mobilization has now reached approximately 1,000.

VETERINARY SERVICES AND HORSES.

A sum of £1,550,000 was allotted in the Army Law of 1913 for the provision of horses, etc.

MANŒUVRES AND TRAINING.

The Imperial Manœuvres took place in Silesia on September 8th, 9th and 10th, only two Corps, the Vth and VIth, being selected this year to take part in them.

One day's manœuvre in Corps formation against a marked enemy under the direction of a General Inspector of an Army Inspection was held by the Guard, Ist, IIIrd, Xth, XVIth, XVIIIth, XXth and XXIst Army Corps.

All Army Corps except the Vth and VIth, which took part in the Imperial Manœuvres, carried out corps manœuvres for 2 or 3 days.

Attack exercises with blank ammunition were carried out by the IIInd and XIth Army Corps.

The Vth and VIth Army Corps, prior to the Imperial Manœuvres, carried out 2 days' brigade, 2 to 3 days' divisional and 1 to 2 days' corps manœuvres.

The XIth Army Corps carried out a special exercise with a re-enforced Reserve Infantry Brigade.

Seven cavalry divisions were formed for training:—IVth and Xth Army Corps two each, VIIth, XIVth and XVIIth Army Corps one each.

Pioneer exercises on a large scale were carried out near Coblenz and Ulm.

The following special training was carried out by the Communication Troops:—

One telephone exercise by the 1st inspection of the Telegraph Troops.

One wireless exercise by the 1st inspection of the Telegraph Troops.

One wireless exercise by the 2nd inspection of the Telegraph Troops.

An experiment was made in September of holding manoeuvres for Reserve and Landwehr troops, some 7,000 men of the XIth Army Corps being called out for the purpose on September 22nd.

RECRUITING.

Recruiting statistics for 1912. The figures given below were published in November, 1913 :—

The number borne on the recruiting list in 1912 was 1,289,868, which is an increase of 17,484 on the figures of the preceding year, which amounted to 1,271,384. The number borne on the recruiting list was made up as follows :—

Men of 20 years of age	557,608
Men of 21 years of age	385,163
Men of 22 years of age	294,825
Men above 22 years of age	52,272

The following comparative table shows the classification of the numbers given above into the various categories during the years 1911 and 1912 respectively :—

CLASSIFICATION OF RECRUIT CONTINGENT.

—	1911.	1912.	Totals.	
			1911.	1912.
Number excluded from				
Military Service ...	826	916		
Number physically unfit ...	35,500	34,211		
Number posted to the				
"Landsturm" ...	142,307	137,922		
Number posted to the				
"Ersatz" Reserve	92,143	87,706		
			270,776	260,755
Contingent taken from Stand-				
ing Army :—				
(a) Service with arms	207,741	220,610		
(b) " without arms	2,712	2,616		
	210,453	223,226		
Volunteers and men enlisted				
for special purposes such				
as schoolmasters ...	37,528	38,025		
Total for the Standing Army	—	—	247,981	261,251
Number posted to "Ersatz"				
Naval Reserve ...	2,589	2,501		
Contingent taken from the				
Navy ...	13,472	16,491		
Volunteers for the Navy				
(of military age) ...	2,003	2,388		
Total for the Navy ...	—	—	18,064	21,380
Number of men whose				
service was postponed,				
emigrants, and excess				
numbers ...	—	—	734,563	746,482
			1,271,384	1,289,868

In addition to the above the following enlisted as volunteers before reaching the military age (20).

1-year volunteers	1,850
Other volunteers	23,775
Schoolmasters specially enlisted	32
In the Navy	3,125
				<hr/> 28,782

NOTE.—The total number of 1-year volunteers, including those who enlisted before reaching the military age (20), for the Army was 14,308.

The contingent taken compulsorily for the Army and Navy was made up as follows:—

Men of 20 years of age	112,624
Men of 21 years of age	57,757
Men of 22 years of age	67,261
Men above 22 years of age	2,075
			<hr/> Total
	239,717

Of the numbers taken compulsorily for the Army and Navy 148,115 were born in the country and 91,602 in the towns.

It will be observed that the numbers posted to the *Landsturm* and *Ersatz* Reserve were less in the year under review than in the preceding year, and the contingent taken for the Standing Army was larger in 1912 than in 1911. This distribution was necessary in view of the increased establishment provided for by the Army Law of 1912.

There is a slight increase in the number of volunteers in 1912 both for the Army and Navy. The contingent taken compulsorily for the Navy in the year under review shows an increase of 3,019 men.

SHORTAGE OF OFFICERS.—In consequence of the large increase in the establishment of officers introduced on October 1st, 1913, there is at present a considerable deficiency, which the authorities do not expect to make good until the end of 1917. The recruitment of officers is, however, stated to be in a flourishing condition owing to the improved prospects of promotion. The steps taken to meet the increased demand include the formation of new war schools and the introduction of the war school course into the cadet establishments, which will shorten the period of instruction.

UNIFORM AND EQUIPMENT.

THE FIELD SERVICE DRESS.—According to a statement in the Reichstag the whole of the war clothing of field grey material is complete, and a peace outfit of the material would

be ready for the Infantry in 1913, for Cavalry in 1914, for Artillery, Pioneers and Communication Troops in 1915.

Regulations for a field service dress for ordnance and fortress construction officers and a number of other non-commissioned officers, for whom this uniform had not already been prescribed, were published in May, 1913.

Regulations for a field service dress for all the officers of the Prussian Army were published in June, and for chaplains in July.

UNIFORM OF JÄGER REGIMENTE ZU PFERDE.—Some changes were made in the uniform and equipment of the *Jäger Regimente zu Pferde* Nos. 7-13.

MUSKETRY AND SMALL ARMS.

METHOD OF PACKING SMALL ARM AMMUNITION.—It was stated in the press in September that experiments were being made with a different method of packing and transporting small arm ammunition, viz., in belts instead of packages. It was claimed that 25 per cent. more cartridges can be carried in the ammunition wagons. The belts were reported to be made of light canvas, each containing 70 cartridges.

On September 1st the Infantry School of Musketry was permanently moved from Spandau to Wünsdorf.

PERMANENT COMMUNICATIONS.

GERMAN RAILWAY SYSTEM.—A two-days' debate took place during the month of January, in the Reichstag, upon a Socialist interpellation concerning a recent deadlock on the Prussian railways, especially in the Westphalian coal area, due to shortage of trucks. An endeavour was made to connect the deadlock with the possible requirements of mobilization. The Socialists wished to convince the public of the dislocation of business which war would entail. The Government denied that the deadlock had anything to do with war preparation and also that there was any reason to fear that congestion of railways would imperil the interests of national defence.

PRUSSIAN STATE RAILWAYS.—The Prussian Government decided to devote £27,126,000 this year to the development of the State railway system, a large item being for the provision of rolling stock to remedy the shortage referred to above.

The railway bridge over the Eider at Friedrichstadt (Schleswig-Holstein) was widened to allow of another line of rails to be laid.

According to official reports the length of line which was open for traffic on the Prussian, Hessian and Baden-State Railways at the commencement of 1913, was 38,850 kilometres (24,281½ miles). In addition to this, 240 kilometres (150 miles) of narrow gauge line were in use. 366 additional kilometres

(228 $\frac{3}{4}$ miles) of line were constructed during the year under review.

This new construction includes the carrying on of the Remagen-Jünkerath-Weywartz-Malmédy Railway from Malmédy to the frontier towards Stavelot (3.70 km.).

COLONIAL RAILWAYS AND SHIPPING.

GERMAN SOUTH-WEST AFRICA. IMPROVED COMMUNICATION.—An improved passenger steamer service was inaugurated on February 10th. The steamers run monthly, calling only at Boulogne and Teneriffe, and completing the journey from Hamburg to Swakopmund in 21 days.

EAST AFRICA. THE MLAGARASSI BRIDGE.—The bridge to carry the Tanganyika Railway over the Mlagarassi River was completed in June. The main span is 50 metres long, and the 17 smaller flood openings are each 10 metres long.

Preparatory work on the railway west of the river had been in hand for some time and it was, therefore, hoped that the whole line from the Indian Ocean to Kigoma Bay (north of Udjidji), total length 787 miles, would be open for traffic by the end of the year under review.

The progress made was as follows:—The railway was open to traffic in August as far as the Mlagarassi. On July 31st railhead had reached Gottorp, 180 miles beyond Tabora and only about 50 miles from Lake Tanganyika. The earthworks on this line were completed in November to within 30 miles of the lake-side terminus, and it was expected that the line would be open to traffic early in 1914.

FORMATION OF A RAILWAY COMMITTEE.—A railway committee was formed in October by the Governor of the Colony. It was to consist of the "Referent" (technical adviser to the Governor) for railways, two representatives each for agriculture and for industry and commerce, one representative for the Protectorate Troops and the traffic managers of the Usambara and Tanganyika Railways.

NEW STEAMSHIP SERVICE.—The German East Africa Line has inaugurated a new regular steamship service to and from Angola (Portuguese West Africa), commencing in January, 1914.

NAVIGATION OF LAKE KIVU.—A powerful motor boat was being transported in December in loads from Dar-es-Salaam to Lake Kivu, when it will be the first power craft to ply.

CAMEROONS.

RAILWAY CONSTRUCTION.—Local public opinion seems to be strongly in favour of building a railway from the coast at Kribi to the interior. This project was, however, definitely vetoed by Dr. Solf, the Colonial Secretary of State, during his visit to the Colony.

CENTRAL RAILWAY.—It was reported in February that the progress of this line had come to a standstill, as the contractors for the first section (150 km.) are not anxious to contract for the next section. In this section the line will commence its climb up the Central African Plateau, and the real constructional difficulties begin.

CABLES AND TELEGRAPHS.

WIRELESS INSTALLATION AT AACHEN.—A wireless installation was erected in April at Aachen, to receive messages from Norddeich. The station is linked up with the post office and is under the control of the military authorities.

WIRELESS COMMUNICATION WITH GERMAN SOUTH-WEST AFRICA.—The Secretary of State for Posts stated in February that experiments in wireless communication between Nauen and Togo, which had been interrupted through the collapse of the wireless station at Nauen, had been resumed, and that communication with German South-West Africa would be established in 1914.

GERMAN EAST AFRICA. WIRELESS STATION.—The wireless station at Dar-es-Salaam was open for business on the 20th March. It has a range of 1,100 kilometres under the most adverse atmospheric conditions. It is primarily intended for communication with ships at sea, but will be able to keep touch with Muansa on Lake Victoria Nyanza.

GERMAN SOUTH-WEST AFRICA. WIRELESS STATION.—It is proposed to erect a wireless station at Windhuk, to connect with Germany, via the other West African Colonies.

CAMEROONS.—The German Cable to Duala (Cameroons) commenced working in January. This is the first independent German cable connecting the Fatherland with any of its colonies. It is to be continued to South-West Africa by 1916.

By the laying of this cable, from Monrovia, via Lome to Duala, Togoland and the Cameroons are now in communication with Germany by means of German cables, since the new cable joins the cable Emden-Teneriffe-Monrovia at the last-named place.

TOGOLAND. TELEGRAPH LINE.—The telegraph line Rim-bila-Sansane-Mangu was opened on March 1st.

SOUTH SEAS. WIRELESS.—Wireless communication has been established between Jap Island (Caroline Islands) and Nauru (Marshall Group).

TOGOLAND. ROAD MOTOR SERVICE.—A motor service was started in May between Palime and Kpandu, 35 miles, for the transport of palm oil, cotton, etc., to the railway. The journey takes one day to perform and there are on an average four services each way weekly.

FORTRESSES AND DEFENCES.

The fortress of Graudenz was provisionally divided up in March into two independent commands; Graudenz North and Graudenz South.

Since June 15th the fortress of Posen has been separated into two independent commands, Posen East and Posen West.

ISLAND OF SYLT.—The railway from the mainland to the island was finished in October. A new base for torpedo craft has been planned and will be situated near List, in the extreme north. Fortifications for the protection of this base are in course of construction.

ARMY LAW OF 1913.—The Army Law of 1913 made provision for the expenditure up to 1915 of a sum of £10,500,000 on fortifications. Very little information is, however, available as to the manner in which this money is to be spent. Official publications only vouchsafed the following details regarding this matter:—

Restoration and enlargement of the land fortifications, etc., and experiments in the domain of fortifications, £3,425,000.

Restoration and enlargement of the fortress of Germersheim, etc., £75,000.

MILITARY OPERATIONS.

In the Cameroons disturbances were reported early in the year in the territory lately ceded to Germany by France, but according to official telegraphic despatches these were at an end in November.

In German South-West Africa, too, there was a certain amount of unrest among the Ovambo natives, on the Portuguese frontier. None of the disturbances were, however, of sufficient importance to demand the organization of expeditionary forces.

MISCELLANEOUS.

FREE FURLOUGH PASSES.—In accordance with a Cabinet Order dated July 4th, 1913, non-commissioned officers, from sergeant-major downwards, and privates may be allowed annually a free pass on German railways, when proceeding on furlough to their homes.

IMPORTANT MILITARY LITERATURE.

Official Publications.

Heeresverpflegung. Great General Staff.

Kraftfahrtruppen im Felde.

Vorschrift für die Instandhaltung usw. des Geräts bei den Maschinengewehrtruppen.

Garnison-Verwaltungsordnung.

Addendum II. (Seuchenvorschrift) zur Militär-Veterinärordnung.

Dienstvorschrift für die Kavallerie-Telegraphenschule.

Dienstvorschrift für die Arbeiter-Abteilung.

Vorschrift für die Verwaltung der Truppenküchen.

Ausführliches Verzeichniss der den Militäranwärtern usw. im Reichs- und Preussischen Staatsdienst vorbehaltenen Stellen.

Unofficial Publications.

Be-trachtungen über das russ. jap. Krieg. (2 volumes), by Freytag Loringhoven.

Gedanken über Ausbildung und Truppenübungen. By Beseler.

Meine Führung im Balkankrieg. By Mukhtar Pasha.

Der Balkankrieg. (4 volumes). By Immanuel.

Kriegspiel und Uebungsritt. By Balck.

Taktische Aufgaben. By Immanuel.

Taktik und Technik bei Flussübergangen. By Nertens.

Taschenbuch des Verpflegungsoffiziers. By Hummel.

Kampf der verbundenen Waffen. By Hoppenstedt.

Führung des Armeekorps.

Führungstechnik der Artillerie. By Hohn.

Published by the Great General Staff.

Die französische Armee.

Die russische Armee.

BERNADOTTE IN OCTOBER, 1813.

Translated by permission from the *Militär Wochenblatt*.

OF all the commanders engaged in the War of Liberation none possessed a more variform character than did Bernadotte, Crown Prince John of Sweden. On this account his actions have been very widely called in question. It was mainly by reason of his being a Marshal of France, and at the instance of the Emperor Alexander of Russia, that he obtained the command of the Northern Army, and from him action of great importance was awaited. To what extent these expectations were or were not fulfilled, to what degree reality was concealed by make-believe, what were the bases for the actions of Bernadotte—these and kindred questions led to verdicts of widely varying character, verdicts pronounced in the autumn campaign of 1813, and which have continued to be repeated even up to our own days.

Our own opinion—founded upon contemporary sources of information and on the military events of the period—is that Bernadotte was an especially good judge of men and an able strategist, but, being cautious and reserved, there was a want in him of the impulse to bold and decisive action—particularly when opposed to Napoleon. Moreover, these stifling characteristics were strengthened by motives of policy. The Franco-Swede was quite indifferent in regard to Germany. He felt that he was the future King of Sweden, and was also anxious to seat himself upon the throne of France. On this account Napoleon must be overthrown, but the French people must not be set against Bernadotte; that is, a French Army could not be defeated by the former French Marshal, since victory as a hostile commander could not ensure him the throne of France. Again, he was anxious to acquire Norway for Sweden, and did not feel himself sufficiently secure in his position as Crown Prince to effect this purpose. This also led him to spare his Swedish troops as much as possible. A victory would outweigh the sacrifice which it must entail, and a reverse or a defeat would cause him even more anxiety than success, since either would injure his position and reputation equally in Stockholm and in Paris. Thus the conduct of Bernadotte as a leader in the field may be fully explained by the characteristics and political leanings of the man. It is really wonderful with what skill he played his difficult part, but it had the effect of practically separating him from his allies as one of the responsible leaders of their forces. Outwardly, however, appearances were kept up.

This view is supported by a letter which was written by General Stewart, the military plenipotentiary in Germany, to his brother, Lord Castlereagh, who at that time directed the foreign policy of England. His report deals with the events concerning the Northern and Silesian Armies on the 14th, 15th and 16th October, 1813, and bears unquestionably the impression of having been written on the 17th of that month. Like other Foreign Office papers of that period, it is preserved in the Record Office in London and may be found under the number F.O.64.90. No.115; it runs as follows¹ :—

“ MY LORD,

“ I consider it my bounden duty towards the Government of the Prince Regent to put your Lordship in possession of my candid opinion concerning the recent operations of the Crown Prince of Sweden, and also in regard to the personal share which I considered it my duty to take in them. Your Lordship must decide for yourself whether I have exceeded the instructions which were given to me. But a zealous onlooker, who earnestly desires the success of the common cause, cannot maintain silence when he is honoured, as I am, by the confidence of his own Government, of the King of Prussia, and of the Emperor of Russia. I do not hesitate to tell your Lordship, that it can be proved by military authority that had the Crown Prince only done what duty demanded of him, the French Army which opposed General Blücher on the 16th October *must* have been destroyed. Your Lordship is in possession of a knowledge of the main facts and events through the medium of my private letters; of the passage of the Saal by the Crown Prince, his expressed wishes to General Blücher to cross in front of him—an operation which that General carried out on the right—the general dispositions and *ordre de bataille*, his constant efforts to push Blücher to the left, and finally his persistent consideration for and saving of his Swedish troops. Of all these matters I will say no more.

“ I will commence my observations with our position near Cöthen on the 14th October, when General Blücher was at Halle. As soon as the report was verified that the enemy's corps, which had crossed the Elbe, had retired towards Leipzig, I waited as usual on the Crown Prince and pressed him to make a forced march on the evening of the 14th and concentrate at Zörbig, with his advanced troops towards Bitterfeld, Delitzsch and Düben. I gave full expression to my opinion that from the disposition of the main army and the movements of General Blücher, his Royal Highness could not take any part in the battle

¹ This letter, having been translated from the German, does not pretend to be as worded in the original.—Translator.

then impending unless he covered that General's left flank. The Prince replied: 'So long as the French were defeated, it was all the same to him whether his army took part in the action or not, and that for his part he would rather stand aside.' This statement was made in the presence of several military men in Cöthen, and was repeated on the following day at Halle before Baron Wetterstedt and General Adlerkreutz, who here, as on every other occasion, have proved themselves to be the most loyal of colleagues. His Royal Highness declared I wished him to undertake a flank march in the presence of the enemy, as at Eylau. I expressed my humble opinion and views as follows: 'Your Royal Highness has informed me that all the bridges over the Mulde having been destroyed, the passage of the river has been thus rendered so difficult that you are unable to take measures to attack the enemy; under the same circumstances the enemy, even were he in position to do so, can hardly attempt anything against your movement—particularly in view of the presence of General Blücher and the main army in the immediate vicinity.' His Royal Highness had 60,000 men and a river to flank his march; further, if it seemed necessary, he could attach an additional body of troops to his advanced guard. But as we now were fully aware that the enemy was withdrawing towards Leipzig, there could be no risk in such a movement. After a long discussion in which I engaged with deep respect, His Royal Highness made up his mind to march on Halle. Vainly I protested that he would thus be in rear of Blücher, and that if *he* were engaged, His Royal Highness could not possibly arrive in time to support him in the action. He replied that he would be in the second line and could assist him should it become necessary. In his orders of the day following (about which I shall have more to say) he directed his army to hold itself in readiness to pursue the enemy should he be defeated and inflict as much loss upon him as possible during his retreat, from which it was apparent that he did not contemplate taking part in the battle itself. I quitted the presence of the Prince that evening with the promise that, when his troops were on the march the following morning, he would change the direction of march from Halle to the left—towards Zörbig.

"I would beg your Lordship to notice that my pressing proposition was that Zörbig should be reached on the 14th October, which seemed easy of accomplishment, as we spent two days in Cöthen. At all events, I thought, *something* would be gained if the army reached the neighbourhood of that place on the 14th. Accordingly I left Cöthen in company with the Prince on the morning of the 15th. Your Lordship will appreciate my astonishment when none of his troops turned to the left in the direction of Zörbig,

as he had promised, nor even towards Halle, but he directed the Swedes towards Wettin by Krosigk behind the Petersberg, the Prussians to Oppen, and the Russian corps with the left on Zörbig. The army had concentrated on the 14th at Cöthen. For any possible military purpose its march should have been to the left and front, but his Royal Highness ordered it to the right (in rear of General Blücher) and back, thus making two sides of a triangle to the rear, whereby the distance was almost doubled. When, in order to issue directions to his troops, the Prince halted at Sylbitz, I pointed out respectfully but firmly that the other armies, especially that under General Blücher, might have good reason to complain of our movement. However, I must unfortunately admit that the Russian General, Suchetelen, appeared to support the Crown Prince in his views, or rather in certain principles which he laid down, and the gist of which appeared to be that anybody who was to order the march to be directed to the left on Zörbig would be a *sot*. I expressed my views and said that I remained unconvinced. After some little time I had the satisfaction of hearing the Russian corps ordered off to Zörbig. Baron Wetterstedt and General Adlerkreutz were both present at these proceedings, and can confirm what I have stated to have taken place.

"I must here remark that on this date the orders of the Crown Prince were purposely so framed—since they can hardly have been so given to the different corps from ignorance—that the brigades were to form in the direction of the Elbe, clearly to give the impression that the enemy was to be expected in that direction. And it should not be forgotten that the report of the Colonel of the French General Staff—forwarded in my despatch No. 113, had been handed to the Crown Prince by me in Cöthen at 3 p.m. on the 14th October. I attach a copy of the orders of the day, and beg that your Lordship will compare them with the contents of the despatch.

"Being very dissatisfied with the behaviour of the Prince, I went to General Blücher on the morning of the 16th October. All that I had succeeded in effecting by the utmost persuasion was the dispatch of the Russians to Zörbig. General Blücher was—as he had every reason to be—very greatly irritated. The Prince could not make ignorance any excuse; plainly he was holding back his own troops from jealousy of General Blücher, or for some other reason. I cannot omit mentioning that the Crown Prince promised me in Sylbitz that, if Blücher attacked on the next day, I might give that General his word that he would be ready to support him about Delitzsch and Eilenburg with 10,000 cavalry and light artillery, even if his infantry were unable to reach that neighbourhood. In the same terms that this

promise was made to me, I repeated it to General Blücher when I met him.

"When Blücher made his dispositions for the attack, I wrote the enclosed¹ on the spot to His Royal Highness, and sent it to him by an aide-de-camp. Immediately afterwards General Blücher begged me to go myself to the Prince in order that the matter might be expedited. I went off at once and met an aide-de-camp from his Royal Highness, who brought me a letter from General Adlerkreutz to acquaint me, as I had particularly requested might be done, that the Prince had agreed on this day to draw off to the left of Landsberg with his advanced guard, the Russians. The Prussians were one march in rear, and the Swedes another march behind them. Vainly I sought the Prince in all directions; I could not find him. I explained to General Adlerkreutz, who was then in Landsberg, how especially necessary it was that the Russian cavalry and light guns should at once move forward in the direction on Taucha. To this the word of the Prince was pledged. The General said that if I could arrange the matter with General Wintzingerode, he would represent it to the Prince. I at once went to this General, but learnt from him that 'the orders of his Emperor were explicit, that he was only to act on the direct order of the Crown Prince—that he did not dare to move. But still he could send forward 3,000 cavalry at once or 8,000 on the following morning, if I could procure the necessary order.' In despair I returned to General Blücher, but learnt *en route* that 3,000 cavalry had been thrown forward yesterday evening after General Adlerkreutz had seen the Prince. They appeared this morning on Blücher's left flank.

"After I had been present at General Blücher's engagement, uncertain where I should find the Prince, I rode late at night to Halle, and there found Baron Wetterstedt. I induced him to send an express to his Royal Highness with a letter, a copy of which I enclose.² It contained an urgent request at once to break up his camp and move forward with all immediately available troops, without waiting for his advanced guard. I attach Baron Wetterstedt's reply,³ which gave me the assurance that the main body of the Northern Army would at 12 o'clock to-day be on the spot where an attack might be expected to take place.

"I have, I think, said enough whatever the future may bring. I am sure that I can abundantly prove that had the Prince only done no more than his duty, the corps under Marmont, Ney and Bertrand would have been completely

¹ See Appendix A.

² See Appendix B.

³ See Appendix C.

overthrown, while his timely intervention would have prevented the heavy losses of Yorck's corps. A glance at the map, and the details of the positions, will convince your Lordship that had an army only marched to Zörbig on the 14th, or even on the 15th October, with its advanced troops towards Delitzsch, which place the enemy evacuated on that day, it could have engaged Marshal Ney's force, which defiled from the vicinity of Düben and Delitzsch during General Langeron's attack and covered Marmont's right flank. And had an advance been made and carried on to Parthe, simultaneously with General Blücher's attack, the whole of the enemy's force must have been destroyed. I guarantee the correctness of the events herewith detailed."

Let us now consider the contents of this despatch. It was not pleasant for Stewart to have to write all that was really necessary to the representative of England's foreign policy, for the reason that Sweden was allied with England. The Crown Prince directed Swedish policy, was closely allied with the Czar, and occupied a position of importance as the leader of the Northern Army. But truth is truth. On this account Stewart relates openly but confidentially all that passes as he witnessed it and understood it. First and foremost he says: "that if the Crown Prince had done his duty the whole French Army would have been destroyed with which Blücher was engaged on the 16th October." This is the immediate and deepest impression received by the English Minister. The justice of the heavy, in fact the gravest, charge which can be made against a commander, will now be proved in detail.

Everything was tending towards a great and decisive battle. Napoleon was threatened on the north by Blücher, on the south by Schwarzenberg. He was drawing his forces towards Leipzig. The dispositions for the attack by the Allies were entrusted to Schwarzenberg. In the north, Blücher, the nearest to the enemy, was at Halle, further in rear, near Cöthen, was the Crown Prince. It seemed to be clearly indicated from the manner of concentration of the main army, the expressed wishes of Blücher, and the requirements of the military situation, that Bernadotte should push forward to the left in line with the Army of Silesia, when a threatening front would have been made.¹ Stewart was then with the Crown Prince. He warned him that if he did not carry out this movement, the decisive battle would in all probability be fought without his assistance. But the Gascon was an obstinate man, and made reply that: "so long as the French were beaten, it was all one to him whether he took part in their defeat or not—in fact he would prefer *not* to assist in their undoing."² This view colours all Bernadotte's ideas throughout the whole campaign. He was desirous that

¹ Quistorp, "History of the Northern Army in 1813," vol. II., p. 203

² *Ibid.*, vol. II., p. 256.

Napoleon should fall from power, but without the aid of him (Bernadotte) who secretly aspired to the throne. In vain did Stewart point out the absence of any danger in the march to the left; the Crown Prince preferred that which he held to be even more safe, and decided to march on Halle—thus remaining in rear of and being covered by Blücher. Stewart pointed out that by this procedure the Army of Silesia would be committed to a battle without any support from the Northern Army. The Crown Prince replied that he would be in the second line ready to assist should his help be required. Blücher was therefore merely to hold the scales even, until the Crown Prince should appear and throw his weight on one side—the saviour of the situation! The Gascon therefore reserved to himself the same rôle as he had played at Grossbeeren and Dennewitz, where equally he left the Prussians to their fate—in that he only came to their aid at the last possible moment. It is clear that there is here no question of anything of the nature of an accident, but of a carefully arranged plan. But even then the Crown Prince did no more than use a mere form of speech, when in his orders dated the 15th he directed that his troops should hold themselves in readiness to pursue the enemy *when he should be defeated*. And these were only idle words, for, as we shall see, he led his troops in such a direction that any pursuit was out of the question. Afterwards, and by means of insistent pressure, Stewart succeeded in obtaining the Prince's agreement to march from Halle to the left on Zörbig. By this the Northern Army would cover Blücher's left flank to some extent, even though well to the rear. But the Crown Prince did not abide by the terms of his agreement, but began to move on the 15th in the line Wettin—Zörbig. Instead of moving his main body to the left, he sent it to the right and kept it in rear of Blücher and at some distance from him, whereby it seemed wholly debarred from any timely intervention in the battle. The Russian General Suchetelen supported the views of the Crown Prince—declaring that any further extension to the left of Zörbig would be absurd, although the Russian corps was, at any rate, sent as far as Zörbig. To Stewart it seemed an extraordinary thing that part of the force did not face to the south-east in the direction of Leipzig, but due east towards the Elbe, as though to create the impression that the enemy was expected from that direction. According to the evidence of a colonel of the French General Staff who was captured, this fear—so Stewart maintains—was wholly unfounded.

But the situation was not quite so clear as from the above it might appear. The Crown Prince possessed no really reliable information whether and in what strength the enemy held Düben, or even whether an attempt by the enemy against Bernburg were not to be feared. Delitzsch remained until the 15th in the occupation of the French, although certainly but weakly held. It was from dread of a possible flank attack that

the Crown Prince faced his troops to the east and pushed out his cavalry to the left.¹ The action of Bernadotte may appear reasonable from the point of view of the security of the Northern Army, but it does not affect the main question—the decisive battle at Leipzig, towards which all the movements of the Allies should have been subordinated and directed. At all costs every man had to be brought on to the field at that point. But such views were not shared by Bernadotte; on the contrary, as we have seen, he felt that he would prefer not to take a part in the action.

He may have felt that in his attitude of aloofness he was supported by Schwarzenberg's dispositions for the 15th and 16th. Without special information, and diffident about giving to the Crown Prince definite orders such as he gave Blücher, Schwarzenberg really only counted upon the co-operation of the latter in the battle at Leipzig. He permitted the Crown Prince a free hand on the 15th—if he crossed the Elbe he could not be counted upon for an immediate offensive against Leipzig, if he remained on the near bank of the river, he would, at most, assist operations by a demonstration. As regards the 16th, he was particularly requested, if he had *not* already crossed the Elbe, to demonstrate on the Mulde and thus attract the enemy's attention in that direction, and offer a strong support to Blücher's left flank. At 7 a.m. punctually on the 16th the Army of Silesia was to advance on the enemy from Skeuditz. These orders were based on such reports as had come in and which announced strong hostile forces as being on the Mulde. But they contained the suggestion of a desire that Blücher's left should be strongly supported in his operations about Skeuditz. Blücher took no notice of all that was faulty in Schwarzenberg's dispositions, and kept the main issue only in view—to seek out the enemy. Bernadotte, who had been given an almost entirely free hand, might easily have assisted his initial movements—could at least, had he so wished, have covered his left—but he *did not* so wish, and left his Prussian comrades to their fate. As early as the 14th Blücher had suspected some such action.

He begged him not to march to Halle, but to move more to the left, to clear up the situation in that direction, and, at need, move against any enemy who might there be met with, while the representatives in Halle of the Allied Powers—Thornton, Vincent, Pozzo di Borgo, Krusemarck and Stewart—drew up a general protest against the orders issued, and sent a joint letter to the Crown Prince wherein they drew attention to the attack to be made next morning by the main army, and to Blücher's advance. "We all join in earnestly beseeching Your Royal Highness to make such a disposition of your troops as will enable you to take part in events decisive of the fate of Europe. Your own conspicuous talents and the allied forces

¹ "Austrian Official History," vol. V., p. 420.

which have been placed at your disposal can surely achieve great results." These expressions contain the views of several different men, but they themselves and the most unusual step they had taken remained without effect. Bernadotte considered himself only, and not the common weal. Actually the advice given was justified, for with an army, which in every way was stronger than that of the enemy, no commander can well abstain from action.

Utterly discontented, Stewart betook himself on the morning of the 16th to Blücher, who was furious over the conduct of the Crown Prince, who had assured the Englishman that he might tell Blücher if he attacked on the 16th, from 8,000 to 10,000 cavalry and light troops of the Northern Army would be ready to support him about Delitzsch and Eilenburg. Blücher accepted battle, but the Crown Prince was not in his place. Stewart, hoping to urge him forward, wrote to him that the enemy had evacuated Delitzsch, and that it was important that the Prince should repair thither, and from thence still more to the left, in order to join in the action. Stewart used all the powers of his pen, but Blücher knew his man better, and induced Stewart to ride over himself to Bernadotte to try and achieve his object. On the way Stewart learnt that the Crown Prince had arranged that on this day his advanced guard, the Russian corps, should reach the left of Landsberg. This was not quite so far as Blücher wished, while the army was thus widely separated, the Prussians being one and the Swedes two marches in rear. It might therefore be accepted that even now Bernadotte had no serious intentions. Stewart, anxious to speak to him, sought him everywhere, but in vain, though his Chief of the Staff was in Landsberg. It may here be mentioned, that it seems to have been a peculiarity of the Prince to disappear for a while, whenever he feared that he was likely to be approached on any unpleasant topic. He did the same thing during the battle of Dennewitz. General Adlerkreutz notified Stewart that he might open communication with General Wintzingerode to obtain authority for pushing forward the promised cavalry and artillery. Stewart then went to him and learnt that he was quite ready to co-operate, but could only do so on the order of the Crown Prince. In despair the Englishman returned to Blücher, and only on the following morning did 3,000 cavalymen make their appearance on Blücher's left—the bloody struggle at Möckern had in the meantime been fought out.

As we have seen, it was arranged that Blücher should advance to the attack early on the 16th, and he was already in such close proximity to the enemy that he could come to grips with him after but a short march. Two things, however, made him hesitate: the aloofness of the Crown Prince and the anxiety about his left caused by the delaying tactics of the Swedes. If he ventured to advance nearer to Leipzig, he might have to look

for an attack on his flank. In order to clear up the situation, he sent forward a strong cavalry reconnaissance on the morning of the 16th, and learnt therefrom that French infantry and artillery were still on his left in Lindenthal and Radefeld. But what made his situation worse was that the position of these troops prevented the reconnaissance being pushed further, so that it was not until 5 p.m. that Blücher learnt that there was no enemy on the Hohen Ossig—Düben Road.¹ Consequently, in the morning, the Prussian command was in great uncertainty and waited, in vain, for any assistance from the Crown Prince. When this utterly failed him, and the sound of guns was heard ever louder from the Leipzig direction, Blücher at 10 o'clock gave orders for the infantry to march. His situation was not reassuring; it might easily, under certain circumstances, become dangerous; in front, and possibly on his flank, was an enemy whose strength he did not know. It required all the strength of character of the old hero to drive him forward. He transferred all three Russian corps to the left—Langeron in front, Sacken behind him, and St. Priest still further in rear. The two latter were to serve as flank and rear guard; consequently, as far as Leipzig only Yorck and Langeron were at his disposal. As Ney was no longer on the left, but had marched away, Blücher's dispositions were very faulty, and were only redeemed in some degree by the bravery and endurance of his Prussian corps; it is, however, not he, but Bernadotte, who must bear the blame for this. Had Bernadotte only taken over the protection of the left, Blücher could have employed his whole force in front, and the Northern Army might have well effected much against so comparatively weak an enemy. At the end of his letter Stewart sums up what might have happened had the Crown Prince only done his duty—the corps of Marmont, Bertrand and Ney would have been destroyed.

On the 17th and 18th also, Bernadotte persisted as long as he could in his disinclination to fight. First he required that Blücher should take up a position more to the right, which appeared to him more secure;² and then he suggested that two corps, the half of Blücher's shattered army, should be transferred to the Northern Army, which, with the exception of the Prussian corps, had suffered no casualties. This meant that the victorious old hero was to increase the forces of this procrastinator by so weakening himself that he became of secondary importance when it should come to decisive action. In view of the importance of the end to be attained, Blücher complied with this extraordinary request, and thus at last compelled the Crown Prince to act in earnest. Bernadotte certainly delayed action as long as he could; he was the last who came into action on the 18th at "The Battle of the Nations."

¹ Friederich, "The Autumn Campaign," vol. III., p. 100.

² Friederich, "The War of Liberation of 1813 and 1814," vol. II., p. 328.

In our judgment Stewart's view was the right one. Bernadotte permitted his conduct to be coloured by political exigencies; he acted as Crown Prince of Sweden and as pretender to the French throne, and in no sense as the commander of a great allied army. General Stewart has earned high praise for his services towards the common end, rendered, though unsuccessfully, on the 15th and 16th. With one who, under no circumstances, means to attack, all efforts, all obligations, all threats, are vain. How Stewart carried out what he conceived to be his duty is shown by the fact that on the 16th he rode no less than 100 kilometres (rather over 62 English miles).

Very different was the Crown Prince, for with him duty and honour were not so highly developed as love of self.

APPENDIX A.

From General Stewart to the Crown Prince.

Near Skeuditz, 16th October, 9.15 a.m.

Your Highness,

According to General Blücher's report the enemy has evacuated Delitzsch. In his opinion it is of the first importance that the army under command of Your Royal Highness should move to the left in rear of Delitzsch. The morasses and defiles make its position there absolutely secure, and Your Royal Highness will be in position for the action which Your Royal Highness's army and personal skill must make more decisive. As the whole force of the enemy is concentrated in and about Leipzig, permit me to point out that every moment is of importance. The English nation looks to us, and it is therefore my duty to speak out: England will never believe that, so long as the enemy is defeated, it is immaterial to you whether you were engaged or not. Should you remain in the second line, I venture to request that you will send Captain Boge with his Rocket Brigade to act in conjunction with General Blücher's cavalry.

APPENDIX B.

From General Stewart to the Crown Prince.

Halle, 16th October, 9.30 p.m.

Your Highness,

I have just come from the scene of General Blücher's action, and give myself the honour of sending you details of the affair. I urgently beseech you, the moment you receive this letter, to set out on the march and make for Taucha. Not a moment is to be lost. Your Royal Highness has accorded me permission to address you as a friend. I now speak as a soldier; if you do not march at once, you will regret it.

APPENDIX C.

From Baron Wetterstedt to General Stewart.

My Dear General,

At this moment Adlerkreutz has informed me that the troops under his command have just started on their march, after he had received your letter this night between 1 and 2 o'clock. In order to save time the Russians and Prussians have not thought it necessary to wait for the Swedes. Adlerkreutz is in hopes that these 45,000 will arrive in time to engage to-morrow morning at 10 o'clock. The Swedish Army, which is doubtless hastening its march, should come up one or two hours later.

17th October, 1813.

The importance of this information is clear. Stewart's letter is marked "Most Secret," and must be accepted as trustworthy. Its contents and part of the preliminary portion have already been published by Stewart as Marquis of Londonderry in his "Narrative of the War in Germany and France in 1813 and 1814."

THE RUSSIAN ARMY IN A FUTURE WAR.

Translated by LIEUTENANT B. M. B. BATEMAN, R.A.,

by permission from the *Revue des Francais*,

20th May, 1913.

DAY by day, events, by bringing the diplomacy of the Triple Alliance face to face with that of the Triple Entente and by inciting the majority of the Powers to improve their war machines, the clearest support of their policies, give a peculiar importance to the power of Russia.

Since the Russian Army is capable of intervening more rapidly than formerly in case of conflict, Germany has found herself obliged to modify her arrangements. If, for the future, the Russian Army is the principal support of Slav aspirations in opposition to German claims, it remains actually, for us French, an ally whose effective support will become more and more important as time goes on.

However, with us very little is yet known of this army; polemics have been raised about it, inspired either by an unreasoning enthusiasm or by a feeling of mistrust aroused in due course by certain modifications which our ally had thought fit to make. So, at a time when the European groupings are engaged in counting their forces, it appears to us an opportune moment to show what is really the strength of the Russian Army, particulars of its organization, and the eventual character of its co-operation in a European conflict.

When, in October, 1910, the St. Petersburg General Staff adopted a new distribution of the army corps over the Empire's territory, this proceeding had a considerable effect in the press of France as well as abroad.

Forgetting the increase of power which resulted from it, some, uneasy at the reduction of the troops in Poland, cried out in alarm, almost accusing Russia of forgetting her obligations as an ally. On the other hand, Pan-German journals exulted. "The fact that Russia has withdrawn her troops from her western frontier to the great annoyance of the French," said the *National Zeitung*, of February 18th, 1911, "proves that she wishes to display a greater energy on her eastern frontier; Russian diplomacy now abandons the policy which it adopted in error." "As a mere member of the Triple Entente," added the *Voss Gazette*, on its part, after the interview at Potsdam between the Czar and Kaiser, "Russia is deplorably weak, while she knows at once how to act when she becomes more friendly with Germany."

It was a case of forming a too biased and hasty conclusion ; in fact, it was a case on the part of both of looking at only one side of the question, not taking sufficient account of the extraordinary development which had occurred in the railways of the Empire during the last 15 years ; everyone knows the importance of railways in a modern war ; mobilization, concentration and even active operations depend especially on them. To put to the test "this simple optical effect" to which General Soukhomlinoff, Minister of War, lately referred, to be able to come to a conclusion based on a knowledge of all the facts, it is necessary to make a comparative study of the former and new organizations of the Russian forces, to determine the rôle destined for our ally in case of a European conflict, and finally to see if the measures adopted allow this rôle to be successfully performed.

In the early days of the alliance, the lack of means of communication obliged Russia to mass her active European troops in proximity to their eventual theatre of operations, in order to expedite their taking the field, their mission consisting essentially of taking the offensive against Germany at the earliest possible opportunity. So the army corps at this period were disposed to the west of the line St. Petersburg—Moscow—Simferopol ; to the east of this line there were only skeleton cadres, which will be dealt with later on.

However, the forward march of the Russian troops could only be begun once the mobilization and concentration were complete ; the following are the means by which these operations were brought about. The units along the western frontier, those of the Warsaw district and some of the Wilna and Kiev districts, already with large peace strengths, drew their reservists from the same part of the country ; they could, therefore, be ready to take the field about the 8th day after declaration of war.

The other regiments of the interior received their balance of reservists from all the other provinces of Russia in Europe. Hampered by the scarcity of railways, the mechanism of mobilization was as follows : the reservists, on being warned by means of notices, repaired to a prescribed rendezvous ; gradually as they arrived, they were sent off in batches by the commanding officers of the recruiting districts, and according to the numbers required to complete regiments ; these detachments were at once despatched by rail to their respective garrisons. The units then proceeded with their mobilization, completing their equipment and supplies ; at this stage they were forwarded to their concentration zones, where they only arrived complete between the 35th and 40th day. Apart from its complication, this system had the inconvenience of distributing amongst the active companies, and that at the last moment, reservists of all ages, of uneven physical resistance, and in the majority of cases unknown to the officers ; the cohesion of units must have been specially affected by it. Once the active corps had been mobilized, there remained a notable surplus of reservists to use.

Consequently there existed in time of peace special units called reserve cadres, from which second line formations were expanded; as a rule eight battalion cadres mobilized 32 reserve battalions, according to the same rules as those described above.

To sum up, formerly the Russian system of mobilization was analogous in its form to that employed in France in 1870, when our northern reservists went to mobilize in the centre or the south, to be at once moved into Lorraine; as is well known delays, disorders, mistakes, and unwelcome disillusion resulted from this method! If it is added that in addition to this the start obtained in the German and Austrian mobilizations exposed the Russian advanced-guard army in Poland to be crushed before being supported by the armies of the interior, it is clear that an improvement was indicated as necessary. And so it was inevitable that, as soon as the feasibility of it was evident, Russia thought of remodelling a system so defective.

During the last twenty years, the agricultural, commercial and industrial progress of the Russian Empire has necessitated the development of rail communication; moreover, the loans raised in France were to a large extent devoted to this purpose; and so as soon as in 1910 the Russian railway system admitted, the military re-organization on more rational lines became possible and was successfully realized.

At present, the increase in railways allows the reservists to rejoin their garrisons sooner and makes mobilization much less difficult than before. Besides, the lines of communication leading from the centre and the east of the Empire to the western frontier are more numerous and capable of a more dense traffic. Where not long ago there were only six concentration lines, of which three are double, there are now available eight lines, of which six are double, without even counting certain branch lines which would accelerate the concentration. Russia who, fifteen years ago, was less well provided than Austria, is now better off, since her neighbour, for the concentration of her army in Galicia, would only have at her disposal seven lines, of which only two are double.

For the former system, which grouped the Russian active troops in the western provinces and left the greater part of the reserves in the eastern districts, it has been possible to substitute in 1910 a new organization, analogous to that at present adopted by all the greater military Powers, by distributing corps in conscriptions where they recruit the majority of their young soldiers, and the whole of their reservists. The regiments, scattered over the whole of the area, so as to exploit the immense resources in men more judiciously, each possessed their own recruiting sub-division. On mobilization, the reservists proceed direct to their unit; thus precious time is saved, which was formerly taken up in forming batches at the recruiting collecting points, and by their despatch to their garrisons. Further, the reservists, as in France, will return as a

rule to the company in which they did their Colour service; they will be more reliable, better known by their officers, and the value of units will be enhanced. In addition to which, the proportion of reservists in the mobilized companies is practically the same as in France and Germany, *i.e.*, 34 per cent. in the covering regiments and 52 per cent. in those of the interior; the squadrons are entirely formed of men serving with the Colours.

These new arrangements will probably enable mobilization to be completed on the 6th day and the concentration to be begun on the 7th. This was, in fact, the time taken at the time of the Russo-Japanese War by some eastern frontier units who filled up with reservists on the spot; some managed even to mobilize in three days.

Naturally, this organization has involved the suppression of the reserve cadres referred to above; henceforth, as with most of the other Powers, the regular corps will mobilize the corresponding second line units.

Formerly, in each reserve regiment placed on a war footing there were on the average nine officers and fifteen non-commissioned officers of the regular cadre; to-day this proportion would be twelve officers and twenty-four non-commissioned officers, that is to say, practically the same as the French and German reserve units.

Moreover, the reserve divisions, sent against Japan in the Far East were responsible for grave mistakes. At that time, troops held to be almost as sound as regular corps, were in reality only second line units. The dearth of reserve officers as well as their professional incompetency contributed much towards making these troops only mediocre fighting material; the few regular elements forming the skeleton were swamped by the mass of reservists; so, as a result of this experience it was deemed better to strengthen the establishments of the regular regiments, and on mobilization to use the more numerous regular cadres, and better trained reserve cadres to constitute reserve formations for the army corps of the first line.

This reorganization not only produces a distinct acceleration in mobilization and an improvement in the value of the first line troops, destined to bear the first shock, but it presents still more valuable advantages.

In the first place, it leads to a fairer distribution of the military burdens over the provinces. Thus it satisfied the wishes of the Duma who, on account of the increase of the population in the centre of the Empire had firmly demanded larger garrisons in the Moscow and Kazan districts. The establishment of a staff for recruiting, which had not existed before, insured its proper administration. Further, three years' service, substituted for five years in 1906, helps to keep the reserves rather younger and improves the energy of the mobilized army,

by reducing exemptions considerably, and, by forcing young men of education into the ranks, ensures the recruiting of reserve officers who, up till then, left much to be desired on the score of quantity as well as quality.

The suppression of the reserve and fortress cadres allowed fresh army corps to be formed from the officers, non-commissioned officers, and men available, and to dispose, in the centre of the Empire, in the Moscow and Kazan districts, of a mass of seven army corps, ready to be thrown in support into a European or an Asiatic theatre of war. The orientation of Russian policy towards Constantinople or Poland, towards Asia Minor or Persia, or even towards China, made this central grouping necessary; it has been managed without ignoring the requirements of the alliance, as will be clear later.

The general economy of the system, as regards Russia in Europe and the Caucasus, is summed up in the following table:—

I.—DISTRIBUTION OF THE RUSSIAN ARMY CORPS IN EUROPE AND THE CAUCASUS.

Periods.		St. Petersburg.	Wilna.	Warsaw.	Kiev.	Odessa.	Moscow.	Kazan.	Caucasus.	Totals.	Observations.
Before 1910.	Army Corps ...	4	5	5	5	2	3	—	2	26	In Asia, there were, before 1910, 5 Army Corps with 12 divisions of infantry and 3 of cavalry instead of 7 Army Corps with 14 divisions of infantry and 3 of cavalry since 1910.
	Infantry Divns	7½	10½	12	10½	4½	7	—	5	57	
	Cavalry Divns...	2	2½	9	5	1	1½	—	3	24	
Since 1910.	Army Corps ...	4	4	5	5	2	5	2	3	30	
	Infantry Divns	9	8½	10	10½	4½	10	5	7	64½	
	Cavalry Divns...	2	2½	7½	5	1	2	1	4	25	

The result is that, in Europe alone, without counting the Caucasus, Russia has increased her army by three strategical units (27 corps instead of 24); and the importance is obvious of numerous large units from the point of view of tactics.

So it is possibly because of this Russian re-organization that Germany, finding the military situation had changed, thought it necessary to form recently two new army corps, and that Austria also has turned her military district of Zara into a XVIth Army Corps.

The diminution of the Russian covering force in the districts of Wilna and Warsaw might have caused some uneasiness; but in the first place the length of the concentration having been

reduced, this covering force had no longer the same significance, interfering with the whole organization as it did; again, it still remains stronger than in the neighbouring countries, for it possesses an average strength of 24 squadrons, 30 battalions, and 118 guns for 60 miles of frontier, while in Germany this strength is only 12 squadrons, 16 battalions and 90 guns, and in Austria four squadrons, eight battalions and 16 guns.

The new formations by increasing the number of army corps have, in fact, re-established between the two great groups of European Powers an equilibrium which gave signs of tottering; peace was ensured by the balance of forces as indicated in the table below:—

II.—COMPARISON OF THE 1st LINE FORCES OF THE TRIPLE ENTENTE AND THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE.

Formations.	Triple Entente.				Triple Alliance.				Observations.
	France (a)	Russia (b)	England.	Totals.	Germany.	Austria.	Italy.	Totals.	
Army Corps ..	21	28	3	52	25	16	12	53	(a) Including Colonial troops.
Infantry Divisions ...	50	59	6	115	50	49	25	124	(b) 27 European corps and the 3rd Caucasus which is on the Northern slope of the Chain, at the end of the double line of rail Vladikavkaz — Tagaurog—Ekaterinodar. The 1st and 2nd Caucasus remain facing Asia Minor.
Cavalry Divisions ...	10	22	1	33	11	8	3	22	Russian batteries have 8 guns; others have 6, except the French with 4.
Battalions ...	669	950	79	1698	669	683	346	1698	
Squadrons ...	374	555	42	971	550	353	144	1047	
Batteries ...	721	498	83	1302	633	510	241	1384	

It is not, however, sufficient that the Russian Army should fulfil its obligations as an ally in organization, in valour, and in numbers; can it be ready in time to enable it to play its part in the international drama? To answer this vital question it is above all necessary to define what this part can be; its feasibility can then be gauged.

Even if her railway system was as dense as in France or Germany, Russia could not think of being the first to take the offensive; the huge extent of her territory prevents her from mustering all her resources in time.

What was true before 1910 remains true even now, but in proportion much less. Germany, then, had the power of overwhelming France with the majority of her army corps while guarding herself against Russia. However, she would be obliged to leave at least four army corps on her Polish frontier. This appears, at least, to be the significance of the recent organization of her army inspections, her First Inspection in Eastern

Prussia consisting of the Ist (Koenigsburg), IInd (Stettin), XVIIth (Danzig), and XXth (Allenstein) Corps. But, if the Russian attack must be deferred, it will not be less effective. All military writers agree in estimating that the German Army, after finishing its concentration, will be ready to advance ten days after the declaration of war; the great battle of the campaign will be in full swing from the 12th to the 16th day, very probably. If, as formerly, Germany wishes to mass against France the whole of her active forces, and if this bold project insured the victory for her, it could only be after a decisive result had been obtained, that is to say, on the 17th or 18th day, that she would be free to move against Russia the majority of her army corps, which, moreover, would have been thoroughly put to the test. The transport of the troops would require at least six full days, the grouping of the armies would take one or two days, so that Germany would only be able to assume the offensive in Poland about the 24th or 26th day, and very probably not until the 27th day.

This manœuvre will be made impossible, if the Russian Armies can be concentrated about the 20th or 22nd day in Poland; their menace will at the same time forbid the movement into Alsace of the Austrian corps bordering on Bavaria. If, therefore, the Russian organization admits of an assumption of the offensive in the aforesaid time, the Germans will be obliged to divert several army corps, four at least, from their principal objective, the French Army; every little gain of time will benefit besides the interests of the Entente, by keeping a greater number of German corps in Eastern Prussia. By drawing away four German corps from the first encounter on the Meuse, our allies will allow us to fight, on even terms, if we rely only on our own forces, and with a superiority, in the event of a British intervention.

On the other hand, Russia will also be ranged against Austria, as well as Roumania, which is attached to the Triplice. But the first of these Powers would have to employ three at least of her 16 army corps to observe Servia, while the second, obliged to oppose Bulgaria, would probably not muster more than three corps against Russia.


In short, the mechanism of the Russian concentration as shown by the present article can be summarized as follows:—

First.—To a German Army of two cavalry divisions, four army corps, and some reserve divisions, comprising 76 squadrons, 101 battalions, 102 batteries, and 612 guns, concentrated between the 2nd and 10th day in East Poland, she could oppose her Wilna Army reinforced by the VIth Bielostock corps, concentrated near Grodno between the 2nd and 12th day, and consisting of three divisions of cavalry and five army corps, with 84 squadrons, 168 battalions, and 87 batteries (642 guns).

Second.—To an Austrian Army of eight army corps concentrated between the 3rd and 20th day about Jaroslav, with

two corps detached towards Cracow, she could oppose 13 corps of her Warsaw Armies, less the VIth Corps of St. Petersburg and Moscow, concentrated between the 3rd and 22nd day about Brest-Littowski. There would be 271 squadrons, 430 battalions, and 226 batteries (1,674 guns) against 206 squadrons, 338 battalions, and 264 batteries (1,584 guns) of Austria.

HYPOTHETICAL CONCENTRATIONS OF THE RUSSIAN ARMIES.



Third.—To an Austrian right wing of five corps mustered between the 3rd and 20th day about Lemberg, with 132 squadrons, 220 battalions, and 165 batteries (980 guns) she could oppose between the 3rd and 23rd day her Armies of Kiev and Kazan, consisting of seven army corps, with 146 squadrons, 248 battalions, and 132 batteries (972 guns).

Fourth.—To the Roumanian Army of three corps ready to fight on the 20th day about Jassy, with 48 squadrons, 84 battalions, and 70 four-gun batteries, she could oppose her Odessa Army, reinforced by the IIIrd Caucasus Corps, numbering in all 60 squadrons, 104 battalions, and 51 eight-gun batteries, concentrated in the same period.

It is worthy of note that if on certain fronts the Russian concentration is only complete some days after the hostile concentration, the superiority of the effectives can easily be set off against this inconvenience. At any point the Russian Army would be prepared to accept, if not to prosecute, a struggle with advantage.

Moreover, we have only referred in all that has been written above to the mobilized peace effectives, constituting what is called first line troops. It should be borne in mind that Russia can similarly mobilize as second line troops 30 strong divisions each of 32 battalions.

The uneasiness which the reorganization of the Russian Army in 1910 aroused can consequently be set at rest. A more rational distribution, more rapid mobilization and concentration, an army increased in value and numbers henceforth will allow Russia to discharge her obligations as an ally more effectively; better than in the past, she will be ready at the required moment with an army of the first rank, more soundly constituted; to determine the nature of this offensive co-operation, is the secret of the periodical conferences between the respective General Staffs.

THE CALL FOR HIGHER EFFICIENCY IN MUSKETRY.

By MAJOR G. S. TWEEDIE, The Royal Scots.

THERE is an old saying that "it takes a ton of lead to kill a man in battle." Probably this was more than true in former days when weapons were rude in manufacture, inaccurate in fire and limited in range. It is the purpose of this article to inquire into how far the truth of this old saying applies to the present day, if at all.

Let us begin by first ascertaining what a ton of lead, or rather metal, actually means when expressed in military terms. A ton is equalled in weight by 30 boxes of Mark VII. S.A. ammunition, or is the equivalent of the total ammunition carried in the field for 55 infantrymen. If then, we find that the combined results attained by 55 men firing the whole of their available ammunition is but to cause a single casualty, it will, I fancy, be at once admitted that some very serious faults must lie at the root of modern musketry teaching. That the modern magazine rifle has been brought to a very high pitch of accuracy is universally conceded, and were proof of this required, it is but necessary to glance at the scores returned by the leading competitors at the Bisley meetings, when "possibles" occur with monotonous regularity, even at long ranges. We then at once see that with the latest type of magazine rifle in the hands of a well-trained infantryman the bare idea of his requiring a ton of metal or 30,000 rounds of ammunition to kill a single foe would be utterly ludicrous. But is it so ludicrous? Let us see!

Statistics, although notoriously unreliable and conveniently capable of manipulation, are yet, if drawn from reliable sources, sufficiently accurate to serve as a basis of argument. The last great European war—that of the Balkan States—has as yet unfortunately failed to furnish any reliable data, and we must turn to the Official (War Office) History of the Russo-Japanese War, yet vivid in all recollections, for some illustrative figures. In the battle of Nan-Shan, May 26th, 1904, the 5th Eastern Siberian Regiment expended no less than 738,000 rounds of ball cartridge. The total Japanese losses amounted to 4,504. *Excluding* the ammunition fired by the other Russian infantry engaged and all casualties caused by the Russian artillery and machine gun fire, the percentage of hits works out at one hit to every 164 rounds fired.

Far more striking are the figures derived from the fierce engagement at Te-li-ssu, which took place on June 17th, 1904. In this battle, three Japanese Divisions were hotly engaged and suffered more or less similar losses. One of these Divisions, the 3rd, expended an average of 521.8 rounds per rifle, or approximately one and three-quarter million rounds of ammunition. The Russians admitted casualties amounting to 3,774, but independent witnesses give the figure at 6,000 as a more accurate computation. Ignoring the losses caused by the two other Japanese Divisions and by the Japanese artillery and machine gun fire, the results of the ammunition fired by the 3rd Division alone work out approximately at one hit to every 312 rounds fired; including the ammunition expended by the infantry disregarded in arriving at this percentage, it will, I think, not be unreasonable to conclude that the percentage for the whole of the Japanese infantry engaged cannot work out at a much better result than one hit to every 1,000 rounds fired, or 74 lbs. weight of ammunition. When the weight of metal fired by the Japanese artillery is included, it may fairly be presumed that three or four times this weight was required to bring about a single Russian casualty—a truly astonishing result. My critics will probably retort that the Japanese standard of marksmanship was at this time admittedly poor from the European standpoint. This is to some extent true, but it does not alter the fact that in a modern battle in which a great European Power was worsted no less than a tenth of a ton of metal was fired by the victor to obtain a single casualty.

Nor can we ourselves claim any improvement on this result if we draw upon our somewhat bitter experiences during the recent South African War. At Driefontein, where our 6th Division was partly engaged, a British battalion in the centre of the attack on the Boer position exhausted the whole of its ammunition within three hours, and was unable to advance on the assault being ordered; yet the Boer losses on this occasion did not by any means repay the expenditure of ammunition of this one regiment alone. To multiply examples is unnecessary, and it would seem that, notwithstanding difficulties in modern warfare which are detrimental to accurate shooting, such as the invisibility of targets, hostile fire, nerves, fatigue and wear and tear of rifles, there is something seriously wrong with our present system of musketry teaching, when no better results in warfare can be obtained.

I propose, therefore, briefly to examine our system of musketry instruction and point out where I think the failure clearly lies.

No fault can be found with the elementary instruction of the recruit. His instructors are thoroughly competent; Table "A" is satisfactory; the ammunition at his disposal sufficient, and the recruit in almost every case passes into his company officer's hands a fair shot and sufficiently grounded in the theory

of musketry. His next stage—and that of the trained man—is, up to a certain point, all that can be desired; he fires his annual course, Table “B,” expends some 250 rounds of ammunition, and is well grounded during the remainder of the year in theory and in the supplementary aids to shooting, such as the standard tests, sub-target, miniature and 30 yards range, judging distance, etc. As far as the man is concerned, a more or less skilled shot is evolved. During the year just passed the use of the wind-gauge and fine adjustment was prohibited in Table “B,” a practical step in the right direction. We see, then, that the men in the ranks have become fairly skilled shots, at least within 600 yards range, and that the appallingly poor results of rifle fire in battle cannot lie with the shooting of the soldiers individually, but must be directly attributable to their insufficiently-trained commanders and to faulty fire direction and control. Here, then, lies the root of the evil and the cause of the waste of so much metal in modern warfare—*simply the inability of the fire unit commanders to apply collectively to a given target the individual skill of highly-trained men.*

In the Boer War, it was said by the man in the street, that the Boers were natural shots and far excelled “Tommy Atkins” in the use of the rifle. Now, every Boer, old and young—and there were many young boys in the Boer commandos—could not *ipso facto* have been a skilled rifle shot; far more probable is the explanation that the Boers were unhampered by fire control and free to fire as they pleased, thus making the most of the skill they possessed, whilst the collective fire of the British soldiers was mostly wasted by the fatally bad direction of zealous but ill-trained fire unit commanders.

The following quotations from our Musketry Regulations are of great interest in this connection (*Section 96, Musketry Regulations*):—“The percentage of hits to rounds fired is an index to the steadiness of the firing only if the fire direction has been proved to be satisfactory; if the fire direction fails the more accurate the shooting the fewer will be the hits recorded.” Again, “It has been found that under certain conditions not uncommon in war as many as 75 per cent. of rounds fired at ranges beyond 400 yards are aimed at the wrong target or no target at all. This loss of fire-effect may be almost entirely avoided by skilful use of field glasses, reconnaissance, reservation of fire and clear description of aiming points; it is evident, therefore, that fire direction and discipline mean much more than correct sighting and steady shooting.” It is thus clear that our efforts must be directed towards the better training of the fire unit commanders and, although the Musketry Regulations are clear and comprehensive on the points to which attention should be paid, I propose to touch briefly on some of the chief points in which, generally speaking, sufficient instruction is not given. Let me first say that as an infantry officer of more than 20 years’ experience, I fully appreciate the difficulties

confronting the company officer in properly training his non-commissioned officers in their musketry duties, but his responsibility in this, the very essence of infantry's being, is so tremendous that time and opportunity must be found, even to the exclusion of other subjects if necessary. The weapon of the infantry is the rifle, and to obtain the utmost power and effect therefrom is the primary *raison d'être* of that arm.

The chief difficulties and failings of the fire unit commanders lie in the following category :—

(1) SELECTION OF TARGETS.—The choice of a suitable tactical target is seldom understood. During field operations it is common to find commanders opening fire indifferently on hostile scouts at long range, firing lines, supports, etc., often without in the least comprehending the value or importance of any of the objectives. During the advance in an attack fire is constantly directed on certain prominent objects merely because they are easy to indicate in fire orders. Thus concentrated fire is liable to be directed at certain bushes, trees, houses, etc., by all the fire commanders in a company, while the remainder of the ground remains unsearched by fire.

(2) DESCRIPTION OF TARGETS.—This subject presents a constant difficulty to all fire commanders, and nothing is more difficult or requires more practice. The eye must be trained to recognize and the mind to describe a target. Unless orders can instantly be given by a commander so that all the men can lay their rifles on the point indicated the training is at fault and fire is wasted.

(3) RANGES.—The fire unit commander must learn to rely chiefly on his own ability to judge distance, and unquestionably errors are unavoidable. Every effort must therefore be made to compensate for this by close observation of fire, and in this the chief duty of the commander's observer lies. Trial shots and brackets should be employed when the ground is suitable. It should occasionally be possible to ascertain a range from the company range-finder or from neighbouring troops, and key ranges should be prepared before commencing an attack. This is seldom done, although in the defence range-cards are always drawn up, as generally time is lacking, for it is usually the misfortune of the company officer to be hurried into action on field days and manœuvres without the necessary time to issue more than the most sketchy orders to his subordinates, much less to make use of his Marindin in preparing key ranges, and it is to this lack of preparation that the majority of the subsequent mistakes of the fire unit commanders are due. Commanding officers fear to be told that their battalions are "sticky," and confusion is the result.

(4) APPLICATION OF FIRE.—The employment of "concentrated" as opposed to "distributed" fire appears to present much difficulty, and in consequence concentrated fire only is

almost universally used. A Hythe memorandum throws much light on this question, and I quote two extracts therefrom:—"The two chief uses of fire are to facilitate and prevent movement. These are the determining agents in the choice of objectives and as to whether fire is to be concentrated or distributed." Again, "Generally speaking, in the attack, fire is concentrated for decisive and distributed for moral effect, and in the defence in close country it is concentrated on avenues of approach, and in open country it is distributed by the agency of sectors and descriptive points."

It is evident that in different circumstances fire must be differently employed, and that the concentrated fire directed on an aiming point to catch a body of troops issuing through a gateway is utterly unsuited for use against a firing line in extended order. This subject is frequently misunderstood even by many officers.

(5) KNOWLEDGE OF FIRE EFFECT.—So frequently is fire misapplied that a wider grasp of fire effect amongst fire commanders is essential. Generally speaking, the value of long range fire is apt to be exaggerated and the Regulations lay down that collective fire at over 1,000 yards with one sighting will be ineffective. In the South African War the crux of the attack began within 800 yards. Yet it is common to find fire commanders directing fire on a target which cannot by any stretch of imagination repay them for the ammunition expended.

I am strongly opposed to much theoretical teaching, such as zones of fire and so forth, to non-commissioned officers who are plain men of simple education and not mathematical professors, but they must be imbued with sufficient knowledge to realize what the bullets of their men are likely to do on their order to fire, otherwise they are obviously unfit to give such orders.

(6) RATE OF FIRE.—The importance of good fire control is self-evident. Ammunition is rapidly used up. Replenishment is difficult, often impossible. Not a round more than is necessary should be fired. In war, casualties will determine this; in peace, judgment takes the place of hostile fire. Unfortunately, at present, there is a fetish for rapid fire, and fire commanders almost invariably make use of this rate of fire, and frequently give the command "So many rounds, Rapid fire" in the presence of a superior officer merely to show they are doing something. The maxim "No movement without fire" entails a great danger, that of inculcating the use of rapid bursts of fire regardless of the circumstances of the moment or the limited supply of ammunition in the pouches. Our Regulations emphasize the value of surprise in rapid bursts of fire; this element must, however, be entirely lacking in our present method of using this rate of fire, to the exclusion of slow fire.

In criticizing some of the common failings of the fire unit commanders, I have not forgotten the fact that various difficulties

beset them, apart from the fact that many are employed in regimental and garrison duties and thus miss frequent opportunities of command. Recruits join the company at all times during the year, many of whom have not undergone company training; junior non-commissioned officers and observers are frequently changing; the commander himself may be young and inexperienced. These difficulties, however, fade into utter insignificance when it is remembered that on mobilization the ranks will be filled with reservists, the majority practically ignorant of up-to-date methods, and themselves unknown to their commanders.

I have referred earlier in this article to the average man in the ranks as being a more or less skilled shot up to 600 yards. Control should, however, not be relaxed merely because the firing line is within this distance of the enemy's position. It is essential that control of fire should be persevered in to the very last, even with small groups of three or four men, to prevent the shooting from becoming wild and unaimed. This entails yet further responsibility on fire commanders, and if my readers have followed the sequence of the foregoing remarks and are perchance in agreement with their obvious conclusion, namely, that much more practice in collective firing with ball cartridge is essential for both fire unit commanders and men than they can at present obtain, it will be apparent that drastic changes are required in the present musketry course, Table "B." Under the present conditions, the pay of the soldier is to a great degree directly dependent on his individual skill in shooting, and this fact has a most injurious effect on the musketry course, for as soon as the soldier has classified in Part III., and thereby secured his rate of proficiency pay, his interest in the remainder of the course is dead, and he merely goes through his part in the field practices in a perfunctory and apathetic manner. Many a man has been heard to exclaim as he wiped out his rifle after firing the last shot in practice 25, "Thank goodness, I've finished for this year!" Small wonder is it that however carefully the practices in Parts IV. and VI. may be framed the 85 rounds per man therein expended are for the most part absolutely thrown away.

I would urge a radical change in the present musketry course, and have endeavoured to draw up suggestions for a new Table on the following lines:—The course to consist of three parts. Part I. to consist of the present Part III., which is a good all-round test, but to be considered a qualifying course only; non-commissioned officers and men failing to obtain 80 points under the present marking to repeat all or any of the practices until the company commander be satisfied with their progress. Part II. to consist of individual field practices, and 50 rounds to be allotted for this. Private soldiers who have succeeded in qualifying in Part I. at the first attempt, to be classified on their performances in Part II. only on the

percentage of hits made. Non-commissioned officers to qualify only in this part. Individual targets to be exposed between 200 and 600 yards at unknown distances.

Part III. to consist of collective field practices, 100 rounds per man being available. In this Part the non-commissioned officers would be classified according to the results they succeeded in obtaining by direction of the fire of their squads. Targets to be shown at unknown ranges between 400 and 1,000 yards for varying periods.

The remaining 50 rounds per head of the present annual allowance of ammunition would be at the disposal of commanding officers as at present (*Musketry Regulations, para. 139.*)

It may be urged that to classify the non-commissioned officers on the above system would be unjust, as a certain non-commissioned officer might be unpopular or have worse shots in his squad than another non-commissioned officer. This may be so, but the average man in the ranks is sufficient of a sportsman to wish for fair play, and in any case we have to think of war training and not the grievances of an isolated case, and, furthermore, the private soldier's pocket does not suffer whatever be the result.

I am inclined to believe that the necessity of the highest possible efficiency in infantry fire is being lost sight of in the modern cult of the bayonet. Every infantry officer recognizes that fire is but the means to the ultimate employment of the bayonet, but too high a price may be paid in attempting to effect this, and the importance of securing the greatest possible results from rifle fire is vital. The Russians paid heavily in their last war for trusting too much to the bayonet, and their leaders must have regretted before the close of the campaign their dogged belief in those words of Souvaroff, "The bullet is a mad thing; the bayonet only knows what it is about."

It is natural that the officers of the infantry, who have already suffered heavily from the demands of "Specialism," should regard with dislike the idea of devoting too much attention to one subject, and there is a tendency to consider the teaching at the School of Musketry too theoretical and academic, yet I would urge that the infantry have yet much to learn and much progress to make in the study of its own arm. As long as attention be paid solely to the perfection of the individual marksman, and but cold indifference and utter lack of interest displayed to all that appertains to field firing and the more advanced branches of musketry instruction, so long will we invite utter disaster in the day of trial, no matter how highly scientific in other respects our infantry training may be.

A few years ago the navy was fortunate enough to find in Admiral Sir Percy Scott a reformer in naval gunnery methods; let us sincerely hope that those responsible for the musketry training of the army will not be behindhand in placing it on a higher level than it now stands.

SUBTLETY IN NATURE AND WAR.

By FLEET-SURGEON C. MARSH BEADNELL, R.N.

SEVERAL of the stratagems witnessed in modern war have their analogues in the multitudinous wiles and devices resorted to in that ever-waging war between lower animals known as the "struggle for existence." The cat, in stalking its prey, takes every advantage of stealth and covert and makes use of a flank or rear attack; the hungry thrush, simulating the scratching of the mole, beguiles the unfortunate earthworm to the surface of the garden lawn by the application of a stratagem. The military instincts of certain ants are notorious; an army of these insects march across country clearing the ground of all animal matter, dead or alive. The African driver ant, when on the war path, crosses broad streams by forming "animated bridges." Lateral columns, five to six deep, are thrown out to forage on the flanks of the main army, and, should a rich food supply be discovered, a general halt is called and a sufficient force detached and concentrated on it. Spiders and all active insects take to flight directly the vanguard of the army is sighted, for any insects unlucky enough to lie in the path of the marauders are at once seized and devoured. Skirmishing parties are sent up trees and bushes, and even young birds in their nests fall victims to these ruthless destroyers. When a foreign tribe of ants is encountered, the slaughter on either side is terrific, no quarter is asked or given, all prisoners being immediately decapitated.

Every schoolboy who has indulged in bird's-nesting—an ideal pastime for the training of the young scout, as it teaches him how to observe without being observed—has probably been duped by the common plover, who, when disturbed on her nest, runs away, tumbling about and flapping as if she had a broken wing, thereby tempting the intruder to give chase and so miss the nest. "Shamming wounded" was the artifice that enabled the celebrated scout Burnham to escape from the toils of that arch-strategist De Wet. Seeing capture to be inevitable, the wily scout tied a blood-stained bandage round his leg, and, as the enemy came up, pretended to limp painfully. Thus it came about that instead of being placed with the rest of the prisoners under escort, he was relegated to a wagon in which were some genuinely wounded men guarded solely by a Kaffir. After dark the wagon stuck in a culvert, and the Kaffir going forward to bear a hand with the mules, Burnham seized the chance for which he had been patiently waiting. When the

coloured sentry returned to his charges he found one was missing.

There is an arboreal lizard in America known as the Iguana, whose natural enemy is the Coati. The Coatis work in two sections, one climbs through the tree tops, the other, slightly in the rear, runs along the ground; when the Iguanas see the Coatis coming towards them through the branches of the trees, they drop to the ground only, however, to be killed by those below. The following incident of the American-Filipino campaign will bear comparison with the above:—Some insurgents occupying a stretch of sparsely-wooded ground had for a long time defied the American shrapnel. As a final resort General Wheaton aligned his infantry in such a manner that it commanded the edges of the wood. The cavalry then charged through the centre and drove out the Filipinos, who, endeavouring to double back along the outskirts, were at once picked off by the infantrymen.

Several animals, notably the skunk, when in danger protect themselves by a stench of such penetration and persistence that the unfortunate recipient is unable to rid himself of the effluvium for days. "I never happened to know but one feller," says David Harem, anent the skunk, "as set out to kill one o' them creeturs with a club, an' he put in most o' his time for a week or two up in the woods hatin' himself." It is not so very long ago since a man-of-war had a most unpleasant experience of a Chinese stink-bomb, and was compelled to retire to the open seas for purification. The stink-bomb was only one of the many crude machinations of war made use of by the Celestials; in their earlier wars the soldiers used to carry small bags of pepper about their person, the contents of which were flung into the faces of their adversaries when at close quarters, and—well, no man can fight when his eyes are streaming and his body is doubled up in a paroxysm of sneezing. Such a device reminds one of the protective means adopted by a certain beetle known as the "Bombardier," who, when attacked, makes in rapid succession a series of explosive discharges of acrid and pungent vapours from which its natural enemies flee in terror.

The ant-lion digs pitfalls and preys upon the luckless insects that tumble into it, and we may read in Genesis how the ancient soldiers used to decoy their enemies over pitfalls and slime-pits.

The cuttlefish when pursued by a foe ejects a cloud of inky fluid into the surrounding water, under cover of which it makes good its escape. On several occasions did the Boers resort to a similar device; for instance, on May 25th, 1900, a commando of Boers finding themselves hard pressed by Rundle's men set fire to the grass between Senekal and the Biddulphsberg kopjes and were lost sight of behind impenetrable clouds of smoke; again, on June 8th, 1900, when Buller

shelled the enemy out of Laing's Nek and a running fight ensued, they fired the veldt in their rear, thus embarrassing their pursuers and masking their own line of flight.

Many animals feign death in order to escape detection; "playing 'possum" is a well-known trick of savage warfare; even our late war at the Cape was not without an example: when the Dublin Fusiliers, having gained the enemy's trenches after the fight at Bridle Drift, were employed after sundown in burying the dead Boers, one of the seeming corpses was seen to jump up and run away.

Shouting out words of command in the language of the foe can only, for obvious reasons, be resorted to during night attacks. On January 5th, 1900, Colonel Watson and a battalion of the Suffolk Regiment were climbing the hill overlooking Colesberg, the summit of which was known to contain some entrenched Boers. The enemy did not discover the attack until the English were well nigh on top of them; then they opened fire and a fierce duel at close quarters ensued. All had gone well but for a Dutchman calling out in English "Retire." Instantly chaos reigned, the Colonel was killed, seven officers and 70 men were taken prisoners. Curiously enough the next day a similar ruse was carried out on Wagon Hill. This time, however, it was the Boers, who, barefooted, clambered up the hill. As they neared the summit the stereotyped challenge "Who goes there?" rang out. "Friend!" was the answer, as the sentry fell back dead in his tracks; then ensued that terrific duel in which so many brave lives were sacrificed. At Magersfontein it is said that a Dutchman in one of the foremost trenches threw the Highlanders into confusion by calling out "Retire!" Another incident of the same kind occurred on the night of December 7th, 1899, when Colonel Edwardes and 200 men sallied forth from Ladysmith for the express purpose of silencing the "Long Tom" on Gun Hill. By 2 a.m. the little force had reached the foot of the hill and begun the ascent. Suddenly came from out the stilly darkness the "Wie da?" of the Dutch outpost. No response. Then a Boer called out excitedly in Dutch, "William! Redcoats! Shoot!" but an English officer of the Light Horse who could speak Dutch shouted out, "William! Redcoats with bayonets! Run!" Major Karri Davies followed this up with, "Now boys, fix bayonets and let them have it with cold steel!" This proved too much for the Dutchmen, who fled, leaving the six-inch Creusot and a Maxim in our hands, the former was promptly put out of action and the latter carried back to Ladysmith by the jubilant Tommies. The Boers would have been still more mortified had they known that our men were armed with carbines, which, of course, are not fitted with the bayonet.

An amusing incident is related of Mafeking. A megaphone was constructed, and on a dark, still night the Boers

were startled by hearing a voice, apparently at their very feet, give the order "Fix bayonets, Charge." The result was a prolonged rifle fire whilst our men lay convulsed with laughter in the fastnesses of their trenches. Another little piece of *plaisanterie* indulged in by the Mafekingites at the expense of their besiegers was the erection of some dummy forts. These the Boers conscientiously shelled for a week, and on October 1st, 1899, to the huge delight of the British, they made a rush upon them, only to discover how they had been duped. The disgusted Dutchmen sat tight for a while after this meditating over the vagaries of the besieged; they were not long left unmolested, however, for their commandant, Snyman, shortly received a communication which made that worthy individual stamp with rage. "We may as well inform you," it read, "that Mafeking cannot be taken by sitting down and looking at it." The fact that the Boers were so chary of attacking this town was in great measure due to a rumour, which Baden-Powell caused to be circulated, that all approaches to the town were mined, each being in electrical communication with the Colonel's office.

The way in which the inhabitants of Mafeking received warning of the approach of a shell was unique. A monkey belonging to the Protectorate Regiment used to watch the big Boer gun from the summit of his perch, and when he saw the puff of the gun would slide down the pole and crawl under his box. After the shell burst the intelligent animal would sally forth from his shelter, reclimb his lookout and watch for the next shot. So trustworthy were the ape's movements, that women and children and even the cats and dogs would fly for shelter directly they saw it shinning down the pole. The Boers generally made use of black powder, and owing to the long ranges at which their heavy field pieces were fired, the sound of the gun arrived many seconds before the projectile. On a calm, still day, December 30th, 1899, I timed the flight of some segment shell that were fired from the Magersfontein kopjes, about 5,500 yards distant, and which fell around our bivouac. The following is a mean of six shots:—

- | | |
|--------------------------------|---|
| (1) Saw smoke of gun | 0 seconds after gun was fired. ¹ |
| (2) Heard sound of gun...15 | " " " " " |
| (3) Heard sound of shell...22 | " " " " " |
| (4) Shell struck the ground 24 | " " " " " |

From this it will be seen that, granting the actual firing of the gun to have been observed, there were 24 seconds in which to run for our "funk holes," by which sobriquet the little scooped-out shelters were known, and even when for any reason the smoke escaped notice, an ample nine seconds warning was afforded us by the sound of the gun. For a similar reason

¹ The interval between the flash and its recognition by an observer is, of course, so small as to be inappreciable.

the Boers always disappeared for a few seconds before the bursting of our lyddite shell; once only were they outwitted. It was on a memorable Sunday, and two of our 4.7-inch guns trained upon a group of them, were fired, not simultaneously, but with a five seconds interval; down when the Dutchmen into their trenches directly they heard the first gun, leaping out again, as had been their wont, after the shell explosion, only to be greeted by the explosion, in their very midst, of the second shell. The sound of the second gun had been drowned by the bursting of the first shell.

On another occasion four guns loaded with lyddite shell were trained on the enemy's position just before nightfall; about 11 p.m. they were simultaneously fired. The four shell explosions were immediately followed by lines upon lines of sparkling fire jets from the rifles of hundreds of entrenched Boers, and this hysterical firing lasted fully 15 minutes. However, they must have benefited by the experience, for on another occasion when we tried to make them waste more ammunition by the same ruse, not a rifle was fired.

The psychological effect upon an enemy of such night firing is of no small moment; the continual nervous tension, the restless, broken sleep, induce in even the strongest constitutions a condition of mental collapse. The breaking up of the nervous system of an enemy is in modern war brought to a fine art. The modern strategist cannot afford to ignore this psychological factor, for through it an end is often gained that would otherwise be unattainable without considerable sacrifice of life. The night of January 13th, 1900, will be memorable to many of the naval brigade under Lord Methuen; about 11 p.m. some of the enemy who had managed to crawl up close to our lines, fired two rockets. A night attack was thought to be imminent and every one stood to arms until the break of day exposed the trick.

The surprise volley was a favourite ruse of the Boers. They would not fire for hours, "Then suddenly," writes an officer in the *United Service Magazine*, "and for no apparent cause they would empty their clips into one of our sangars as fast as they could, no doubt on the chance of catching one of our men who had grown a bit careless and was exposing himself."

Most of our big successes in the late war may be traced to well-conceived and vigorously executed flank attacks coupled with a feint at an opposite point. For instance, when Yule's column was retreating south from Dundee, great fear was entertained lest he should be cut off by the enemy, who were powerfully entrenched in the Tinta Inyoni Hills. To obviate such a catastrophe, White left Ladysmith and made a demonstration in front of the enemy's position, thus forcing his entire attention while Yule's column slipped by, after which White

withdrew his feint into Ladysmith. Again, in January, Buller brought off a successful coup by means of a ruse. Feigning that he desired to capture Potgieter's Drift by making an overt demonstration with one brigade in that neighbourhood, he secretly sent three brigades to Trichardt's Drift, five miles westward. The enemy, thrown off their guard, concentrated all their energies on the bogus attack while the three brigades forded the Tugela at Trichardt's Drift.

Lord Roberts once said "Always outflank an Asiatic." The hero of Kandahar was not the man to preach what he did not practise, and the way in which he outmanœuvred Cronje at Magersfontein by the feint under Hector Macdonald at Koodoosberg Drift proves this. Far-reaching consequences had this feint, for it enabled our troops to steal a march upon the Dutchmen, and hampered their movements to such an extent that they were trapped in the Paardeburg loop of the Modder like birds in a fowler's snare.

Into the lines :—

He who fights and runs away,
Lives to fight another day,

we may read either cowardice, discretion or cunning. There was something in the Boer's method of conducting hostilities that savoured very much of Old Testament tactics. Compare the two following. In 1406 B.C., the Israelites and Benjamites were at war. The Israelites concealed 10,000 men just outside the town of Gibeah, in which were the Benjamites. The remainder of the army then demonstrated in front of the main gates and so lured the Benjamites out to try conclusions. The battle had scarcely begun when the Jewish General gave the order to retire; the Benjamites gave chase, but were no sooner well clear of the city than the 10,000 "liers in wait" rushed into it and set it in flames. When the Benjamites saw this they turned back, but found themselves inclosed by the Children of Israel, who "chased them and trod them down with ease over against Gibeah towards the sunrising. . . so that all which fell that day of the Children of Benjamin were 25,000 men that drew the sword." Exactly 3,306 years later three squadrons of the 18th Hussars were engaged by a force of Boers, the latter suddenly fled, hotly pursued by the cavalymen. After about a mile, the Hussars found a heavy fire directed at them from a large body of the enemy concealed in a near kopje, they wheeled about, sought cover, and began to reply, but their carbines were mere toys pitted against the long-range Mausers. Fortunately, the opportune arrival of Major Stewart with some M.I. and a couple of "pom-poms" prevented what might have been an ignominious disaster. Again, in March, 1902, our infantry chased the enemy at Graskop for two miles, "when suddenly 200 Boers who were concealed behind a hillock rushed out upon them, a running fight ensued, our men being scattered and four of them taken prisoners."

The following is a specimen of native strategy I witnessed in the Philippines. Saturday, March 25th, 1899, had been spent by General Wheaton in shelling some field forts on the Tuliajan River. One of these forts was erected on a railway bridge which spanned the river and the other two were on the far bank, the capture of this bridge with the forts was imperative, as it was the only means offered the General of getting his transport across the water. On Sunday morning, wreaths of blue smoke could be seen rising from the forts, so the Yanks "guessed" that the rebels were cooking their food and meant to stay. Wheaton, seeing a frontal attack to be out of the question, determined to try a lateral one. Colonel Egbert was detailed with about 150 men to undertake this. Compass in hand, the gallant Colonel led the way through the jungle and after about a couple of hours struck the river well above the forts, a raft was improvized to ferry over the arms and ammunition, and then commenced the march down stream on the opposite side of the river. Wheaton's guns got louder and louder as the little force wended their way through the thick bush. Slowly and cautiously Egbert advanced his men, well deployed, in the direction of the forts. Wheaton's shells now ceased to screech overhead, a sign that the little band of men were getting close to the forts. Pht!—a man lurches forward and drops dead. Pht! Pht! Pht! the Colonel and 20 other braves fall. "By God! we are ambushed!" is the anguished cry, "down on your bellies every man and crawl for shelter!" For ten minutes, which seemed like hours, the flankers grovelled while the "phtting" Mausers and brass-sheathed Remingtons ripped up the soil around. Then came the boom! burrRRH! bang! of Wheaton's shell as they whizzed overhead and burst amongst the enemy. Heads were gingerly raised, and there, less than 500 yards off were the Filipinos in full retreat. The railway bridge was now captured, but with the sacrifice of a gallant Colonel and a score of men. It was in this move that the unfortunate Prince Löwenstein was shot. There were only two forts, for it was discovered that the one on the bridge was a dummy. The cunning little Filipinos, knowing that the Americans would try and outflank, had, during the night, made a countermove and outflanked the would-be outflankers, leaving smouldering fires of damp wood and pitch in the forts to give them the appearance of being still occupied.

One more incident to show the refined cunning of the erstwhile despised Filipino. A small gunboat was making a reconnaissance of the Rio Grande River, but the followers of Aguinaldo had winded the expedition and set a trap. A wire hawser was laid diagonally across the river in such a way that it lay on the bottom but could at a moment's notice be tautened up so as to lie just below the surface. When the gunboat had passed over the hawser and reached a point about a mile above, a heavy fire from one of the Filipino field forts compelled it to

retire full speed down stream; the hawser, meanwhile raised, was struck at an acute angle and the gunboat beached herself on the mud banks.

The use of apparel as a guise in war dates from the earliest times (Joshua ix. 4), and its use, or rather abuse, by the Boers was extremely frequent. On one occasion in the neighbourhood of Clanwilliam, four Boers dressed in British uniform rode boldly up to within 200 yards of one of our blockhouses, and with consummate imperturbability dismounted and proceeded to tie up their horses. Three of them, ostentatiously leaving their rifles leaning against the barbed-wire fence, strolled up to the house and in perfect English asked for a drink of water. The fourth Boer, who had dallied behind pretending to have some little difficulty in tying up his restive steed, now sauntered up with his rifle and levelling it at the sentry's head held him up while the three Dutchmen inside appropriated the other men's rifles. Of what avail was the ingenueness of Jacob the "plain man dwelling in tents" pitted against the duplicity of Esau the "cunning hunter, a man of the field?" I do not know whether there were any authentic instances of Boer women masquerading in men's clothes during the late war, though they certainly accompanied the commandos, and were invaluable, carrying ammunition and loading rifles, but in the American-Filipino campaign women fought in men's clothing and boys dressed as females were constantly employed as spies and runners by the Insurgents.

It was a case of diamond cut diamond when General—then Colonel—Funston set himself the task of capturing Aguinaldo. Funston, with the assistance of some Filipinos in the pay of the Americans, concocted a letter, which was written on some notepaper obtained from another Filipino General, then a prisoner in Manila. The letter stated that certain reinforcements, for which Aguinaldo had asked, were being sent to him, and that with them were five American prisoners, the latter being, of course, Funston and his officers, while the reinforcements were personated by a party of Macabebes rigged out for the occasion in the uniform of Aguinaldo's soldiers. The expedition got through to Aguinaldo's headquarters, and he and all his staff were taken prisoners.

I can vouch for the accuracy of the following episode as it was related to me by no less a person than the principal hero himself. Major Hennessy, D.S.O., and Captain Turner had been ordered to take over a certain piece of railway. From one of the employes they learnt that the line was clear as far as Springfontein, but that a Boer rear-guard was occupying the railway station. Procuring a trolley they set out after dark in the direction of Springfontein, whither they eventually arrived without incident. Boots were removed, the trolley was silently derailed and they crept up to the station. In the waiting room they discovered eight slumbering Boers with their bandoliers and rifles by their sides. While Turner stood at the door with

a revolver in each hand Hennessy crept in amongst the sleepers and removed every rifle. This done, the sleepers were awakened with "You are our prisoners." The look of amazement that crept over the Dutchmen's faces as they stretched out their hands for their weapons baffles description. "Oh, you are unarmed," the Major informed them, "and if you do not quietly enter the truck awaiting you on the platform we shall be under the painful necessity of shooting you."

It is not often that a whole town is taken from an enemy by six men and "bluff," yet this feat was accomplished on March 30th, 1900, when Colonel Hughes and five men captured the town of Uppington on the Orange River. The Colonel so spread out four of his men that they extended over half a mile of country, and could thus fire from points widely apart; he and the remaining man then seized the ferry boat. The Boers fired a few shots, but the covering party began to empty their magazines with such rapidity that the Dutchmen, never dreaming that six men would have the impudence to attack the town, jumped to the conclusion that a large body of British was upon them, and took to their heels, leaving the town in the undisputed possession of the valiant six.

A recent writer on the war said, "There is only one thing that wins a battle, and that is straight shooting." He might have added correct range finding, for this is a most important preliminary to straight shooting. I have seen American soldiers find the range to a distant point by firing at oxen which happened to be grazing near the spot. In the same way Boers would obtain a range by firing successive shots at a distant flock of vultures feeding on some carrion. At Modder River and Graspan the Boers had actually measured off various ranges before the commencement of the battle, as evidenced by the whitewashed anthills.

I will not vouch for the verity of the following yarn related by an American in connection with the Filipino war, but if it impresses the reader with the value of straight shooting combined with accurate and quick range finding it will have fulfilled its purpose:—A Filipino prisoner had escaped and was running for dear life across the open. Two long-legged Tennesseans were on guard duty. They knelt to fire. "I don't guess it's more'n 300 yards," said one quietly. "I reckon it's most 500," said the other, as if he were discussing the weather. The escaping prisoner was running like a hare and rapidly approaching some undergrowth skirting the jungle where he would be safe. "Call it 400," suggested the first Tennessean, in a conciliatory tone. They adjusted their sights, aimed and fired. The fugitive fell and the two Tennesseans sauntered forth to bring in what was left of him. "If he's hit in the head, it's my shot," said one. "I aimed low accordin' to Army Regulations," drawled the other. The Filipino was found with one bullet through the back of his head and another through the lower end of his spine.

NAVAL NOTES.

BRITISH EMPIRE.

APPOINTMENTS, PROMOTIONS AND RETIREMENTS.—The following were the chief of these events during April:—

Appointments.—Captains the Hon. Stanhope Hawke to "Irresistible"; J. W. L. McClintock to "Lord Nelson" and as Flag-Captain to Vice-Admiral Sir Cecil Burney; S. A. Hickley to "Talbot"; R. Y. Tyrwhitt (commanding Destroyer Flotillas of First Fleet) to be Commodore, 2nd Class. Commanders H. H. Smith to "Zealandia"; J. H. Woodbridge to "Cochrane"; G. M. Keane to be Naval Member of Admiralty Volunteer Committee; W. E. Woodward to "Commonwealth"; F. P. Loder-Symonds to "Forward"; W. J. B. Law to "Topaze"; N. F. Osborne to command of Kingsnorth Airship Station; A. M. Peck to "St. George"; W. L. Allen to "Achates"; Q. C. A. Craufurd to "Rother"; C. A. W. Wrightson to command of Nore Defence Flotilla; A. B. Hughes to "Ocean"; M. H. H. Nelson to "Donegal"; W. C. G. Ruxton to command of Mechanical Training Establishment, Chatham; B. W. L. Nicholson to "Cressy"; S. G. R. Neville to "Hecla"; A. D. P. R. Pound to "St. Vincent"; R. A. Richards to Sheerness Dockyard; D. T. Brown to be King's Harbour Master at Bermuda and in charge of Naval Establishments; E. R. Morant to "Iphigenia"; G. P. Ross and J. C. W. Henley to "Lord Nelson"; R. F. White to "Queen"; R. E. Chilcott to "Carnarvon"; A. W. Lewis to "Sphinx."

Promotions.—Commander A. K. Macrorie to be Captain (April 24th); Lieutenant D. St. A. P. Weston (retired) to be Commander (retired) (April 20th).

Retirements.—Lieutenant-Commander T. E. Harrison (April 14th). Lieutenants R. J. Shee, with rank of Commander (April 1st); S. J. Portbury (April 6th); K. Mackenzie (April 9th); A. E. S. Tanner (April 19th); E. S. Ray, transferred to Emergency List (April 22nd).

FLEET MOVEMENTS.—For the ships in home waters, Easter leave was given from their own ports, the squadrons being dispersed in rotation and not all at the same time. The First and Third Battle Squadrons gave leave from April 3rd to 14th, and on April 16th left for Lamlash and for Loch Ewe respectively. They were to be absent from Portland for practices until late in June, and the Third Battle Squadron will move to Bantry by May 17th. The Second Battle Squadron gave leave after April 15th, and remains in the Channel during May and June, with headquarters at Portland. The Fourth Battle Squadron arrived home from Gibraltar on April 7th to give Easter leave, and at the end of the month proceeded to Queensferry and St. Andrews, from which places it was to go on to Cromarty about May 15th. The four fully-manned battle squadrons are therefore now distributed, two on the west coast, one on the south, and one on the east. As regards the cruiser squadrons, the First Battle-Cruiser Squadron and Second Cruiser Squadron dispersed to their ports for leave before April 15th, on which day

they left for Cromarty. These squadrons are to make a series of visits to east coast ports and to Margate, Deal, Brighton, etc., before the end of June. The Third Cruiser Squadron was the last to give Easter leave, remaining at Cromarty during April and returning to its home ports on the 27th. After leave, it was ordered to visit Bantry, Portland, Margate and Dover. The Fourth Cruiser Squadron, of course, is still detached for duty off the coast of Mexico. The First Light Cruiser Squadron came south from Queensferry on April 6th for Easter leave, and has since gone to Lamlash, Colonsay, Oban, Lough Swilly and Belfast, being due to return to Portland with the other squadrons by June 24th. In regard to the destroyer flotillas of the First Fleet, the First Flotilla has been moved to Queensferry, from which base it will exercise until the end of June, when it returns to Harwich; the Second Flotilla remains at Portland; the Third Flotilla has gone to Invergordon and Cromarty Firth, from which it will return to Harwich on July 1st; and the Fourth Flotilla, from Southampton, proceeded to Brodick, Isle of Arran, in April, and will be absent from Southampton until July 1st. It was the Fourth Flotilla which was ordered to the Ulster coast at the end of April, and divisions of it arrived at Bangor, Dundrum and Ballycastle on the 29th.

MUSCAT ARMS TRAFFIC.—In reply to a question in Parliament, the First Lord has stated that no reduction is at present proposed in the strength of the British squadron in the Persian Gulf on account of the recent agreement with France concerning the gun traffic from Muscat. The efforts of the naval officers and men engaged in blockading the Oman and Arabian coasts have reduced the traffic to a hazardous and dangerous one, and it is now moribund. Hopes are entertained that as a result of the recent agreement with France, under which the privileges and immunities conceded in the Treaty of 1844 are abandoned so far as they conflict with the regulations in regard to the arms traffic, it will disappear entirely. Two vessels of the East Indies squadron have recently found it necessary to use their guns to preserve order along the Muscat coast. The "Fox," Captain F. W. Caulfeild, which has been acting in support of the Sultan of Muscat and protecting the British and Indian residents, drove out from the coast town and fort of Barka on April 16th the rebels from Muscat who had captured the place. The "Fox" shelled and demolished the fort at Barka. A few days later it was reported that the "Dartmouth," Captain Judge D'Arcy, had relieved the situation by shelling and driving off the rebels attacking Quyrat.

TARGET PRACTICE RESULTS.—The "Result of Battle Practice in His Majesty's Fleet, 1913," was issued by the Admiralty for general information in the last week of April (Gunnery Branch, No. 545). A preliminary note stated that "the results of the 1913 Battle Practice are considered satisfactory." In Class I., battleships of the "Dreadnought" and later classes and battle-cruisers, the two first ships were the "King George V." and "Princess Royal." In Class II., battleships prior to the "Dreadnought" class, the first two were the "King Edward V." and "Dominion." In Class III., cruisers, the first two were the "Roxburgh" and "Achilles"; while in Class IV., light cruisers, the "Amphion" and "Chatham" headed the list. The result from destroyers and ex-coastal torpedo boats were also given. There has also been issued the "Result of Test of Gunlayers from Torpedo Boat Destroyers and Torpedo Boats of His Majesty's Fleet, 1913" (Gunnery Branch, No. 546). This is prefaced by a note stating that "The results of tests of gunlayers for 1913 are considered satisfactory. Further improvement would result if officers of quarters paid more attention to their

observation of fire." With the 4-in. B.L. gun, the "Pincher" and "Fire-drake" were the best vessels; the "Wolverine" and "Foxhound," torpedo boat No. 30, "Welland" and "Chelmer," and "Recruit" and "Cygnet" were at the top of their respective lists with the different kinds of 12-pounder and 6-pounder guns.

"UNDAUNTED" LAUNCHED.—The light cruiser "Undaunted" was launched from the yard of the Fairfield Shipbuilding Co., at Govan, on April 28th. She was the first of the new light armoured cruisers of the "Arethusa" type to be put afloat from a private yard. The naming ceremony was performed by Lady Alice Shaw-Stewart, and among those present was Admiral Sir R. S. Lowry, Senior Officer on the Coast of Scotland, who recalled the fact that he was commander of the last "Undaunted," an armoured cruiser of 5,600 tons, launched in 1886, during the three years that Lord Charles Beresford was her captain in the Mediterranean. The new "Undaunted" has a displacement of about 3,500 tons, a length of 410ft., beam of 39ft., and draught of 12½ft. With turbine engines of 30,000 horse-power, she has a designed speed of 29 knots, which it is expected she will exceed on trial. Her propelling machinery, according to the *Glasgow Herald*, will consist of four independent turbines of the Brown-Curtis type, each driving its own propeller, and arranged in two separate watertight compartments, so that each pair of turbines will form a complete and independent propelling installation. There will be an astern turbine incorporated with each of the ahead turbines in the same casing, so that all four propellers will be available for going astern—a very important feature for manœuvring purposes. Steam will be supplied by eight water-tube Yarrow boilers, arranged in two watertight compartments, and adapted for burning oil fuel only. There will also be a very complete installation of auxiliary machinery, arranged so that each engine-room or each boiler-room is entirely independent. The armament will include two 6-in. and eight 4-in. guns, with two twin torpedo tubes, and will therefore be more powerful than the ten 4-in. guns of the later cruisers of the "Boadicea" type. The "Undaunted," moreover, will be protected by a belt of 3-in. armour extending to both ends, and being only slightly reduced at bow and stern.

ARMED MERCHANTMEN.—A further step in the scheme for providing selected merchant vessels with guns for the purpose of self-defence, if necessary, was made on April 17th, when the Admiralty appointed a lieutenant of the Royal Naval Reserve as Inspecting Officer of Armed Merchantmen for the port of Liverpool. The officer chosen was Lieutenant Sidney S. Richardson, R.N.R., formerly first officer on board the White Star liner "Baltic," and he was seconded from the service of the company during the currency of his Admiralty appointment. Lieutenant Richardson has completed nearly twenty years as a Royal Naval Reserve Officer, has undergone twelve months' training in the Royal Navy, and holds first-class certificates in gunnery and torpedo work. It is understood that Inspecting Officers are also to be appointed for London and Southampton. Referring to the question of the arming of merchant ships in his speech on March 17th, the First Lord said that forty ships had been armed up to that date, each with two 4.7-in. guns, and by the end of 1914-15 70 ships will have been so armed. They are armed solely for defensive purposes. The guns are mounted in the stern and can only fire on a pursuer. Vessels so armed have nothing in common with merchant vessels taken over by the Admiralty and converted into commissioned auxiliary cruisers, nor are these vessels privateers or commerce destroyers in any sense. They are exclusively ships

which carry food to this country. They are not allowed to fight with any ships of war. Enemies' ships of war will be dealt with by the Navy, and the instructions to these armed merchant vessels will direct them to surrender if overtaken by ships of war. They are, however, thoroughly capable of self-defence against an enemy's armed merchantman. The fact of their being so armed will probably prove an effective deterrent alone on the depredations of armed merchantmen and an effective protection for these ships and for the vital supplies that they carry.

PRINCE OF WALES'S CRUISE.—H.R.H. the Prince of Wales embarked in the battleship "Collingwood," at Devonport, on April 18th, for a few days' cruise in the vessel with his brother, Prince Albert, who is serving in her as a midshipman. The "Collingwood" left Devonport on the 20th to meet the other battleships of the First Battle Squadron in the Channel for tactical exercises, and afterwards proceeded to Lamlash. Here the Prince of Wales and Prince Albert went ashore for golf. From the 24th to the 27th, the "Collingwood" visited Campbelltown, afterwards returning to Lamlash. His Royal Highness left the vessel in time to proceed to London to visit his parents on their return from France, and left on April 30th for Oxford to resume his studies. This cruise in the "Collingwood" was the first the Prince had made since he became a lieutenant in the Navy on March 17th, 1913.

KEYHAM COLLEGE RE-OPENED.—On April 1st the Royal Naval College at Keyham, Devonport, was re-opened for the training of lieutenants entered under the Selborne-Fisher scheme of education and training, who are to specialize in engineering. The building had been out of use since July 31st, 1910, when the last officers of the old engineering branch, for which the college had been the training establishment since 1880, passed out. The sum of £21,000 is taken in the current Navy Estimates for equipment and maintenance charges connected with the re-opening. Of this sum, £10,300 is for naval stores and machinery. The staff numbers 75 altogether, and is under the command of Engineer-Captain Charles G. Taylor, who has had a long connection with the engineering education of cadets at the Osborne and Dartmouth Colleges. Engineer-Commander W. R. Parnall is the second-in-command. The first term of officers to specialize as lieutenants (E) joined for training on April 14th, and numbered seventeen.

FOREIGN POWERS.

ARGENTINA.

"RIVADAVIA'S" TRIALS.—The battleship "Rivadavia" returned to Boston on March 14th and reported that her final tests had been satisfactorily completed. She went on to her builder's yard at Quincy, Massachusetts, to receive some finishing touches, which were expected to take about two months, on the conclusion of which she was to be turned over to Argentina. By the time she is commissioned for service, therefore, the "Rivadavia" will have been four years in hand, as she was laid down on May 25th, 1910.

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY.

NAVY ESTIMATES.—On April 28th, the Common Budget of the Dual Monarchy for the period from July 1st, 1914, to June 30th, 1915, was laid before the Delegations. It included a total for the Navy Estimates

of £7,386,083, in addition to which £2,000,000 was set apart as the first instalment of a new naval programme, to be completed in five years at a total estimated cost of £17,784,830. Under the heading of "Naval Credits" it is stated that "The highly important changes which have taken place in the Near East make considerable alterations in the balance of power in the Mediterranean probable. Therefore, it seems urgently necessary in good time to take the measures unconditionally necessary for preserving this Monarchy's naval efficiency in the Mediterranean. Our fleet has been enlarged in the last few years, but the considerable increase in the naval strength, not only of the great, but also of the small Mediterranean States, makes it necessary that we increase the rate of progress in our naval armaments, and by no means retard it."

NEW PROGRAMME.—The programme for which the first credits are included in the new estimates provides for four Dreadnoughts, which are to have a displacement of 24,500 tons each, and to cost altogether £13,700,000. Three are expected to be laid down this year. Next there are three cruisers of 4,800 tons displacement, to cost £1,940,000. They are to replace the three cruisers of the "Zenta" class, of 1897, in the same way that the new battleships will replace the "Monarch" class and the "Hapsburg." The third item consists of six torpedo-boats or destroyers, of 800 tons displacement, to cost £835,000. Two gunboats for the Danube, extension of the wireless system, further provision of and equipment for aircraft, development of the dockyard and arsenal at Pola, and of the new naval base at Sebenico, are among the other items in the estimates. The development of the base at Sebenico is held to be supported by the events of the recent Balkan War, which showed the need for a partial decentralization of the fleet.

FRANCE.

THE 1915 PROGRAMME.—According to the Paris correspondent of *The Naval and Military Record*, the programme of construction for 1915 has been partly settled. Two 29,700-ton battleships are to be laid down on April 1st in the Brittany arsenals, both to be constructed in dry dock. Rochefort is to begin two destroyers of 1,200 tons, and a group of 1,100-ton submarines will be put in hand at Cherbourg and Toulon. In regard to the battleships, it has been stated that they will have a length of about 620 feet, and will be armed with 16 guns in four quadruple turrets.

TORPEDO TUBES.—In common with other navies, notably the Japanese, whose new battle-cruiser, the "Kongo," has no less than eight torpedo tubes, the French naval authorities are increasing the number of torpedo tubes in their new battleships. The "Danton" class, completed in 1911, and all earlier battleships had only two tubes. The seven vessels of the "Jean Bart" and "Bretagne" type each have four, and in the "Normandie" class, begun last year, there are six. The 18-inch (450-mm.) torpedo which is now in general use in the French Fleet is expected to be followed shortly by one of 21-inch diameter.

NAVAL MANŒUVRES.—In the naval manœuvres arranged to take place between May 14th and 31st, two squadrons of the line, two light divisions, and a number of torpedo and submarine flotillas were ordered to take part. A statement in the *Excelsior* gave the numbers taking part as 85 battleships and large cruisers, 50 torpedo-boat destroyers, six commanding officers,

800 subordinate officers, and 30,000 men. Admiral Boué de Lapéyrère is taking charge of the manoeuvres for the last time before his retirement from the post of Commander-in-Chief on completing the term of three years. The coast defences have also been ordered to mobilize, and were to be manned and used as in time of war.

TORPEDO-BOAT LOST.—Torpedo-boat No. 358 struck a rock opposite Lardier, west of St. Tropez, between Hyères and Fréjus, on the afternoon of April 1st. The force of the impact stove in a plate and the vessel sank rapidly. The crew was taken off by another torpedo-boat. The flotilla was engaged in exercises at the time. Ten years ago the "Escadrille" sank at the same spot.

GERMANY.

"REGENSBURG" LAUNCHED.—The light cruiser "Regensburg," built under the name of "Ersatz-Irene," was launched at Bremen on April 25th. She is the second of the two light cruisers of the 1912 programme, the first being the "Graudenz," which was launched at Kiel, on October 25th. Later information makes it clear that these cruisers will not, as at one time reported, mount heavier guns than their predecessors. They will each carry twelve 4.1-inch guns, but these will be 45-calibre weapons, as compared with the 40-calibre guns of earlier vessels. The designed speed is 27½ knots.

NEW DESTROYERS.—The expeditious manner in which torpedo craft construction is carried on in Germany is illustrated by the launch of some of the destroyers of the 1913 programme. Of the 12 boats in the programme, "V 25" was launched at Stettin in January; "V 26" was launched there on February 21st; and "S 32" at Elbing on February 28th. The advantage of the German system is that boats are begun without delay as soon as the credits for their construction have been voted. Of the 1912 programme, "S 23" was said to have attained a speed of 37.02 knots, with 35,678 horse-power, during her trials.

SUBMARINE PROGRESS.—The number of submarines in the current German programme is stated to be six, and all are understood to have been ordered. As regards the types of German submarines, a new class was begun with "U 21," one of the vessels passed into service last year. This type has a length of 213 feet 3 inches, and a beam of 20 feet, which shows a considerable advance upon the early boats, which were 128 feet long, with a beam of 8 feet 10 inches. The number of completed German submarines being, according to the latest information, 27, there are presumably seven vessels in service of the new type. As regards the submarines building, there is further development to be noted. It is stated that the surface displacement has been increased to 900 tons, and that the speed on the surface will be 20 knots. The radius of action on the surface is given as 2,000 knots. It is reported that two calibres of guns are mounted in each boat, one a 14-pounder, on a disappearing mounting, and the other a 1-pounder, on a fixed pedestal, experience having shown that it is possible to expose this gun to the sea water without serious disadvantage.

GREECE.

NEW SHIPS.—Greece has been in the market for new vessels recently, but has been unable to acquire up to the present time anything more than a light cruiser. The negotiations for the purchase of a battleship failed,

because neither the Argentine nor Chilean Governments were inclined to sell their new vessels, and the only ship available was the "Rio de Janeiro," building for Brazil, which has now been acquired by Turkey. It is understood, however, that Greece is about to invite contracts for the building of two battleships or battle-cruisers, one of which is likely to be constructed in France. They have already one ship, the "Salamis," building in Germany, and would thus have three vessels of the biggest class. In addition, a Press Agency states that contracts have been entered into for the construction in Great Britain of one cruiser and several destroyers. The cruiser, as stated in the JOURNAL for December, will have a displacement of about 5,600 tons. The small cruiser which the Greek Government has purchased from China is the "Fei Hung," of 2,600 tons, launched at Camden, New Jersey, U.S.A., in 1912. She has an Elswick armament of two 6-inch, four 4-inch, two 12-pounder, and six 3-pounder guns, and her gunnery trials have recently been carried out in American waters under the supervision of representatives of Messrs. Armstrong, Whitworth & Co., Ltd. The "Fei Hung," with turbines of 6,500 horsepower, was designed for 22 knots. She was bought for £240,000.

ITALY.

MINISTER OF MARINE.—In the new Cabinet formed by Signor Salandra in March, the portfolio of Minister of Marine was retained by Rear-Admiral Millo. The Ministers took the oath to the King on March 21st. Rear-Admiral Millo was reported to have met at San Remo on April 11th the German Naval Secretary of State, Grand Admiral von Tirpitz, and to have had a conference with him. According to the Berlin correspondent of the *Daily Mail*, the discussion concerned "the Mediterranean naval interests of the Triple Alliance."

"GIULIO CESARE'S" GUN TRIALS.—The Rome correspondent of the New York Herald (European Edition) writing on March 30th, gave particulars of some gun firing trials carried out off Spezia by the battleship "Giulio Cesare." The trials were made in order to test the vessel's solidity of construction. The five ships of the "Giulio Cesare" type are fitted fore and aft with a two-gun turret superimposed on a three-gun turret, and these ten heavy guns, trained along the vessel's longitudinal axis, were fired simultaneously by electricity. The "Giulio Cesare" stood the shock admirably. Animals which had been placed inside the turrets and all around them were uninjured.

DESTROYER TRIALS.—Following on the successful trials of the "Audace," referred to in the JOURNAL for March, her sister ship, the "Animoso," has completed all her tests with satisfactory results and has now gone into commission. The "Animoso" attained a speed in excess of 37 knots during a full-power run, although the weather was bad. She is the last of four destroyers ordered from the Orlando firm at Leghorn and launched in 1912-13. The "Audace" and "Animoso" are fitted with Zoelly turbines, and the "Ardante" and "Ardito" with Parsons turbines. The two last-named boats did over 35 knots on their trials, although the designed speed of the group was only 30 knots. The boats are fitted to burn oil fuel only.

JAPAN.

NEW CABINET.—The names of the members of the new Cabinet formed by Count Okuma were submitted to the Throne on April 15th. They

included Admiral Yashiro as Minister for the Navy. The appointment has not called forth any comment. In the course of his statement at the installation of the new Ministry, Count Okuma said that the details of his new policy must be decided upon after careful consideration with his colleagues. Increased unity among the Departments, especially those of the Army, Navy, and Finance, was absolutely necessary.

DESTROYERS AT YARROW'S.—As recorded in the JOURNAL for November last, two destroyers are building for Japan by Messrs. Yarrow on the Clyde. They will, it is now stated, have a displacement of 955 tons and be armed with two 4-inch and five 12-pounder guns, with three torpedo tubes. The full speed will be 35 knots. At cruising speeds, however (that is 13 knots and under), they will be propelled by Diesel engines, the power being transmitted through a Föttinger hydraulic transformer. The vessels are to run their trials later in the year.

ROUMANIA.

NEW SHIPS.—The Roumanian naval force is about to be considerably strengthened by the addition of four large destroyers now building at the works of the Pattison Company at Naples. These boats have a displacement of 1,450 tons, a length of 312 feet, a beam of 30 feet, a draught of 9 feet 10 inches, and a speed of 30 knots. The armament includes three 4.7-inch and seven 12-pounder guns, as well as two torpedo tubes. A programme of construction which has been recommended by a commission comprises 12 destroyers similar to those just described, six cruisers of 3,500 tons for the Black Sea, and 12 monitors of 600 tons for the Danube. According to one report, four vessels of the new programme—presumably river monitors—have been decided upon. Another report states that Roumania intends to purchase two armoured cruisers in Germany for delivery in the autumn.

RUSSIA.

"IMPERATOR ALEXANDER III." LAUNCHED.—The battleship "Imperator Alexander III.," the second of the three Dreadnoughts building for the Black Sea, was launched at Nikolaieff on April 15th. She took the name of one of the vessels sunk during the Russo-Japanese War. The yard at Nikolaieff from which the ship went afloat, which is also that from which the "Imperatritsa Maria" was launched on November 1st, 1913, is under the direction of the British firm of Messrs. John Brown & Co., of Clydebank. The third ship of the class is the "Ekaterina II.," building at another Nikolaieff yard, in the technical management of which Messrs. Vickers are interested.

"MURAVIEV AMURSKI" LAUNCHED.—The first of the eight light cruisers in hand to be launched is the "Muraviev Amurski." This vessel was put afloat from the Schichau yard, Danzig, on April 11th. She is of 4,300 tons displacement, with a length of 401 feet 9 inches, and an armament of eight 5-inch and four 9-pounder guns, with five 18-inch torpedo tubes. The designed speed, with turbines of 27,400 horse-power, is 27½ knots. The Schichau firm has also in hand a sister ship, the "Admiral Nevelskoi," which is to be launched almost immediately. Both these vessels are intended for service in the Far East.

UNITED STATES.

PROHIBITION OF INTOXICANTS.—Mr. Josephus Daniels, Secretary of the Navy, issued on April 4th an order abolishing the wine mess on board all ships and stations in the United States Navy. The order takes effect on July 1st, and is as follows:—"The use or introduction for drinking purposes of alcoholic liquors on board any naval vessel, or within any navy yard or station is strictly prohibited, and commanding officers will be held directly responsible for the enforcement of this order." A letter has been published which Surgeon-General W. C. Braisted, U.S.N., has written to the Secretary, giving reasons why he believes the rule of excluding intoxicants, which has long prevailed in regard to the enlisted men, should be extended also to the officers. In the course of this letter, the Surgeon-General says:—"To assume that even the moderate use of alcohol will better equip them (the commissioned officers) physically for 40 years of active service, or mentally, to meet responsibilities of the gravest import, or intellectually, to solve problems which may involve our national existence, or morally, to represent this country at home or abroad, is against all reason. . . It is probable that upon certain special occasions international courtesy might render it advisable to temporarily modify such a regulation; this could readily be done by Departmental order. At the same time, efforts might be made to obtain an appropriation for the entertainment of our foreign guests in a manner which would avoid the possible appearance of criticizing their own customs and regulations." Commenting on this letter, Mr. Daniels says:—"There should not be on shipboard, with reference to intoxicants, one rule for officers and another and a different rule for the enlisted personnel. . . If there is one profession more than any other that calls for a clear head and a steady hand it is the naval profession. Experience has shown the wisdom of having no intoxicants on our ships for the young men who enlist. I believe experience has demonstrated that a uniform rule should prevail in the Navy for all who enlist in the Service, and that the abolition of the wine mess will be justified."

DESTROYER EXPLOSION.—An explosion occurred on April 6th in the forward boiler of the destroyer "Aylwin," off the Diamond Shoals lightship. The "Aylwin" was docked at Norfolk next day, when it was stated that three of her side plates were blown out on the starboard side from the deck to below the waterline, while plates in the forward deck were blown up and the funnels wrenched out of place. One man was killed and two others injured. Three months, it is said, will be required to repair the "Aylwin."

COST OF ORDNANCE AND PROJECTILES.—In reply to a correspondent, Mr. Daniels states that the cost of firing one round with the 14-inch guns of the battleship "Texas" in target practice is 329.99 dollars, or about £66. If fired with armour-piercing projectiles the cost is 777.19 dollars, or about £155. The gun cost, however, in the case of big battleships is considerably less than it was for older types, as to obtain the same destructive power the modern battleship employs fewer guns.

MILITARY NOTES.

BRITISH EMPIRE.

APPOINTMENTS, PROMOTIONS AND RETIREMENTS.—The following were the chief of these events during April:—Major-General James Charles Young, General Officer Commanding Home Counties Division, Eastern Command, to be Colonel The Royal Sussex Regiment, vice Lieutenant-General Sir W. F. Kelly, K.C.B., deceased; dated 28th March, 1914. General Sir Charles W. H. Douglas, G.C.B., from Inspector-General of the Home Forces, to be Chief of the Imperial General Staff, vice Field-Marshal Sir J. D. P. French G.C.B., G.C.V.O., K.C.M.G.; dated 6th April, 1914. Major-General Sir Edward O. F. Hamilton, K.C.B., retires on retired pay; dated 8th April, 1914. Colonel George V. Kemball, C.B., D.S.O., half pay list, to be Major-General, vice Sir E. O. F. Hamilton, K.C.B.; dated 8th April, 1914. Lieutenant-General Sir Henry C. Sclater, K.C.B., to be Adjutant-General to the Forces, vice Lieutenant-General Sir J. S. Ewart, K.C.B.; dated 9th April, 1914. Major-General Richard Lloyd Payne, C.B., D.S.O., Commander 5th (Mhow) Division, East Indies, to be Colonel The Prince Albert's (Somerset Light Infantry), vice Major-General Sir H. H. Parr, K.C.B., C.M.G., deceased; dated 5th April, 1914. Major-General Thomas David Pilcher, C.B., Commander Burma Division, East Indies, to be Colonel The Bedfordshire Regiment, vice Major-General R. L. W. Curteis, resigned; dated 22nd April, 1914. Major-General Vesey J. Dawson, C.V.O., retires on retired pay; dated 22nd April, 1914. Colonel Walter C. Hunter-Blair to be Major-General, vice V. J. Dawson, C.V.O.; dated 22nd April, 1914.

BELGIUM.

THE ARMY ON A WAR FOOTING.—*Le Soir*, Brussels, of April 17th, gives the following statement of the composition of the field army according to the *tableaux définitifs* lately published. The field army will consist of six infantry divisions and a cavalry division. The Headquarters Staff will contain 99 officers, 740 other ranks, 205 horses and 21 vehicles, including seven motor cars. Each infantry division will be composed of (a) three brigades (four brigades in the 3rd and 4th Divisions); each brigade will comprise two regiments each of three battalions and a machine gun company, an artillery brigade of three field batteries and a section of military police; (b) a regiment of divisional cavalry of four squadrons; (c) a divisional artillery regiment of three batteries of field and six batteries of howitzers—a total of 36 guns; (d) a pioneer or engineer battalion of two companies; (e) a field telegraph section; and (f) a train of 600 vehicles of which 237 will be mechanically propelled.

The cavalry division will be composed of three brigades each of two regiments, each containing four squadrons; a cyclist battalion; a horse artillery brigade of three batteries; a cyclist section of telegraphists; and a train of 128 vehicles, of which 98 will be motors. The total effectives are stated at 4,630 officers, 173,301 other ranks, 37,549 horses, 4,482

horsed and 1,554 mechanically propelled vehicles; with the reserves the total effective strength for war of the field army—to be attained by 1917—is reckoned at 200,000 men of all ranks.

FRANCE.

THE THREE YEARS' PERIOD OF ARMY SERVICE.—In the report published in March last by the Deputy Bénazet drawing attention to the advantages secured to France by the re-introduction of the three years' period of army service, he points out the following:—had the two years' system been retained the French Army must have remained at the comparatively weak peace strength of 570,000, and the covering troops on the eastern frontier could not have been reinforced to the desired extent. It is now, however, possible, with the levies of three years all present together under the Colours, to bring the metropolitan army up to a peace strength of 700,000, to which may further be added 48,000 men stationed in Tunis and Algiers. The covering troops can now be increased by 97,000 men. Up to the present time only four corps—the VIth, VIIth, XXth, and IInd—totalling no more than 145,000 men were available on the frontier for service against Germany, and these corps were neither sufficiently strong properly to cover the ground or to provide the necessary *depth* of defensive troops. Now, with nearly 100,000 more troops at disposal for reinforcement of the *troupes de couverture*, these four corps are not only very appreciably strengthened, but it has further been found possible to create another army corps—No. XXI. Matters have now been so rearranged that the IInd Corps has taken over part of the frontier region formerly held by the VIth Corps, which has pushed its 2nd Division up into the first line and watches the border from Luxemburg to beyond Briey. The zone of the VIth Corps now embraces the region from Briey to Pont-à-Mousson, that of the XXth Corps from Nomény to Badonviller. Hitherto the XXth and VIIth Corps safeguarded the wide expanse of frontier up to the Swiss border, but the new XXIst corps has now been inserted between them and has taken over the guarding of the zone from Blamont to Gérardmer, the VIIth Corps here joining on and taking over the small extent of ground up to Belfort. According to the Bénazet report the five corps composing the *troupes de couverture* will now have a total strength of 242,000, against the former number of 145,000—each infantry company on the border will be 218 strong. M. Bénazet further claims that the resources in soldiers of France are by no means exhausted even with this important accession of numbers, for there are, he states, still from 38,000-40,000 men available for service *extra* to those now called up. This last statement has, however, been questioned, some writers declaring that these numbers do not at most exceed 20,000.

ITALY.

THE ARMY BUDGET.—The increase in the Army Estimates for 1914-15 has been designed to bring the establishment for peace up to 275,000 men, or an increase of 25,000. When in February of last year the War Minister, General Spingardi, announced that he had succeeded in raising the peace establishment from 205,000 to 250,000, he then stated that he had by no means reached the limit he hoped to attain, since 250,000 did

not suffice either for the needs of peace or of mobilization. He pointed out that the paper strength of infantry companies remained at 90, but that this number was seldom reached, and he was making every endeavour to fix and keep it at 100. If, however, the companies were to be raised to and maintained at 90 men, then a total peace establishment of 292,000 would be necessary, while if they were to be raised to 100 men each, an establishment of 306,000 would be required. By various measures the recruit contingent has lately been raised by 27,000, but it is considered that the authorities blundered in striking out a paragraph in the draft of the Bill brought forward in May, 1913, which prescribed 12 months' instead of six months' training for men of the second category. Had this been retained it would have been possible to have fixed the establishment at 306,000, companies at 100 each, to have raised the strength of companies in border districts, and the establishment of the mobile militia. The percentage of young men accepted for service is still lower than in other countries. Libya will require for some years to come, it is estimated, to be garrisoned by from 25,000-30,000 men of the metropolitan army.

UNITED STATES.

NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN MEXICO.—On Thursday, April 9th, a whale boat from the "Dolphin," one of the American warships lying off Tampico, and carrying a crew of one officer and nine men, all unarmed, put in to a point called the Bridge of Iturbide, for the purpose of obtaining a supply of kerosine. The accounts as to whether the launch was flying the American flag are conflicting, the Americans declaring that the boat carried the flag, while Señor Rojas, the Mexican Foreign Minister, states that it did not. A Colonel Hinojosa, who was in command at that particular point arrested the whole of the boat's crew, even going so far as to take out of the boat—which was, of course, to be regarded as United States territory—some men who had not landed, and marched the whole party through the streets as prisoners to the presence of General Zaragoza. This officer appears to have wasted no time in investigating the case and releasing the whole party, the colonel responsible for the outrage was placed under arrest, and apologies and explanations were made. These, Rear-Admiral Mayo, commanding the United States squadron, refused to accept, and demanded that the American flag be set up in a public place in Tampico and saluted by 21 guns; the demand to be complied with within 24 hours. Admiral Mayo's action being approved by the Government at Washington, the President of Mexico proposed that the flags of the two nations should be hoisted and saluted reciprocally and simultaneously, but this suggestion did not find favour with the United States Government, which insisted upon compliance with the Admiral's demands, although giving way so far as to give an assurance that the salute would be returned after the salute to the American flag. This was not accepted by President Huerta, and on the 13th the whole of the United States Atlantic Fleet, under Admiral Badger, was ordered to Tampico, the time-limit imposed upon the Mexican Government having been several times renewed in the belief, which seems to have rested upon slight foundation, that the Mexican President intended to yield.

On the 16th the political outlook at Washington was described as being "much brighter"; on the 17th it was said to be "encouraging but

unsettled," the difficulty being that while the Americans insisted that the Mexicans must fire their salute of 21 guns first, President Huerta was equally firm in demanding that any salute must be replied to gun by gun, and there followed a period described by Dr. Wilson as one of "watchful waiting." One small concession seems at this time to have been accorded by Rear-Admiral Mayo, *viz.*, that the American Colours need not be saluted on shore, but on the gunboat "Dolphin." Then the United States Government determined that the *pourparlers* should be ended by a final decision by President Huerta within a term which expired at 6 p.m. on the 19th, announcing that if by that time he did not agree to salute the American flag as demanded, the affair would be presented to the American Congress for decision. On their side the Mexican Government proposed the signing of a protocol, but this the United States declined, insisting upon the unconditional salute of the flag, which in their turn the Mexicans refused to do.

Meanwhile the United States Government had been preparing for all possible eventualities; in addition to the naval movements relating to the strengthening of the Atlantic fleet, the War Department nominated General Leonard Wood, the present Chief of the Staff, to the command of the troops in the field should war be decided upon, and he was ordered to proceed to Texas City to command the frontier forces. On the afternoon of the 20th, Dr. Wilson, in a special message to Congress, asked for sanction to employ the armed forces of the United States against General Huerta, and late the same evening the House of Representatives passed the resolution approving President Wilson's policy towards General Huerta by a vote of 337 to 37. But while the Senate was still debating upon the terms of the resolution by which the President should be authorized to use force, words were being translated into deeds, and American marines had seized the Custom House at Vera Cruz. Early on the 21st Rear-Admiral Fletcher landed parties from the battleships "Utah" and "Florida," and from the transport "Prairie," and seized the Custom House, incurring a loss of four killed and 20 wounded. The Mexican forces do not appear to have offered any opposition to the landing, but opened fire from the house-tops and the streets. By the evening of the 22nd the Americans had practically got complete possession of Vera Cruz; they had prevented a German ship carrying munitions of war for General Huerta from entering the harbour, and had captured a considerable quantity of rolling stock.

On the night of the 22nd news of an exceedingly disquieting character reached Washington in the shape of a note from General Carranza, chief of the northern rebel army, demanding that the Americans should at once evacuate Vera Cruz, and threatening that in the event of this not being done he would lend the assistance of his party to General Huerta in expelling the invaders. Later advices, however, describe this message as not being intentionally hostile in tone or spirit, but as being intended as the basis of negotiations for the recognition of General Carranza as *de facto* President, or at least as a belligerent—one who would be responsible for the due punishment of Huerta and for any necessary apology for the acts committed by one whom he, Carranza, regarded as a traitor. On the 24th troops began embarking at Galveston for Vera Cruz; these comprised the 5th Infantry Brigade, and with artillery and other details numbered 4,000. This reinforcement brought the force at Vera Cruz up to some 10,000 men.

On April 25th matters assumed a more peaceful complexion, for on this day the Governments of Argentina, Brazil and Chile offered their "good offices for the peaceful and friendly settlement of the conflict between the United States and Mexico." The offer of mediation was accepted, subject to certain conditions, by the United States Government, and on the 27th General Huerta's official agreement to the same was received at Washington. On the 28th General Funston arrived at Vera Cruz with four transports conveying some 5,000 troops, intended to take the place of the sailors and marines who had up to then been employed ashore. On the 30th General Carranza accepted the proposal for mediation, and the month closed with the representatives of Argentina, Brazil and Chile continuing their efforts to find a settlement of the quarrel which should be satisfactory to all parties.

AERONAUTICAL NOTES.

BRITISH EMPIRE.

BRITISH ALTITUDE RECORD.—The Royal Aero Club has granted the British altitude record for pilot alone to Engineer-Lieutenant E. F. Briggs, R.N., who attained a height of 14,920 ft. at Eastchurch on March 11th last.

ARMY AEROPLANES FOR COAST.—It is stated that the Army Council has definitely decided to station a squadron of the Royal Flying Corps at Portsmouth, and that No. 3 Squadron, now at Netheravon, has been selected. Fort Grange is to be set aside for conversion into barracks, and preparations are to be made at once to receive the squadron. It is expected that the Royal Flying Corps will take over their new quarters immediately after the summer training.

GERMAN AEROPLANES FOR ENGLAND.—The Berlin newspapers announce that the German Albatross Aeroplane Works have sold 12 aeroplanes to the British Admiralty, each fitted with a complete boat for use at sea. They have Mercédès motors developing a speed of 60 miles an hour. It is added that the Albatross Works are negotiating with a British firm with a view to the sale of their patents.

According to another report, the British Admiralty have bought 18 biplanes from a German aeroplane works at Leipzig.

FRANCE.

MILITARY AVIATION IN 1913.

AERONAUTICS: General Remarks.—A great many changes have taken place in the aeronautical service during the year, and more are under consideration. The present organization may be described in general terms as follows:—

The French aeronautical service consists of: One group of aerostation (dirigibles and balloons) based on Versailles close to the capital; one group

of aviation based on Reims, for the northern portion of France; one group of aviation based, temporarily on Lyon, but ultimately on Dijon, for the southern portion of France, inclusive of North Africa. In other words, in the event of mobilization the dirigibles would probably be under the direct control of the Generalissimo; the northern (Reims) group of aviators are organized with a view to the defence of the north-eastern frontier, and the southern group (Dijon) for the defence of the eastern frontier.

General Hirschauer, who had been Inspector-General ever since the formation of the aeronautical corps, was given a rise in the Legion of Honour, but has ceased to be Inspector-General; under the newly-proposed organization the chief of the service will be a Director-General in all probability.

Organization.

The following is the present organization :—

Article 1st.—The Military aeronautics consist of : (a) navigating personnel; (b) troops; (c) establishments.

Article 2nd.—The Navigating personnel consists of : (a) An instructed personnel, *e.g.*, pilots, mechanics, who have obtained the prescribed certificates; (b) an uninstructed personnel, *i.e.*, those undergoing instruction as pilots or mechanics.

Note.—Officers and men who belong to the navigating personnel are attached to units or establishments.

Article 3rd.—The Aeronautical troops are organized in : (a) companies; (b) sections; in principle the companies are companies of aerostation and the sections are sections of aviation.

Aerostation Companies.—These companies are responsible for the correct working of the port d'attache, for the manœuvring of balloons and dirigibles consigned to them and the upkeep of aerostatic matériel.

The company is responsible for the instruction of the personnel with the exception of certain specialists.

The crews of dirigibles (pilots, mechanics, and aspirant pilots and mechanics) are attached to an aerostatic company.

The commander of a dirigible is responsible for the matériel confided to his care in conjunction with the crew of the dirigible and the personnel provided by the company in conformity with the orders of the commander of the port d'attache.

Aviation Sections.—Each section is divided into "escadrilles" (squadrons) for the purpose of command, interior service and instruction.

The section is responsible for the instruction of its personnel with the exception of certain specialists.

The section is responsible for the upkeep of the matériel confided to its care.

Article 4th.—The establishments consist of : (a) the schools of instruction; (b) the special establishments; (c) the "directions"; (d) the dépôts and workshops.

(a) The schools : these are for the purpose of turning out efficient navigating personnel and also specialists; each school consists of a cadre (permanent staff) and students; it consists of one section of

aeronautics; the schools also act as dépôts and have workshops attached to them.

(b) The special establishments: these are responsible for the construction and purchase of matériel, the carrying out of certain repairs, and the study of aeronautical questions; they comprise the "direction du matériel aéronautique militaire," subordinate to which are (1) the central establishment of military aeronautics and (2) the laboratories.

(c) The "directions": these are organized on the principle of one to each army corps in which there are one or more establishments of aeronautics; they are responsible for the proper administration of technical matériel.

(d) The dépôts with workshops are concerned with the upkeep and administration of the matériel in use and that in reserve.

Note.—Each establishment has a cadre (staff) of its own, the strength being laid down by the Minister for War.

Grouping of the portions:—

Article 5th—The relation of one more unit with the dépôt is as follows: (a) port d'attache for aerostation; (b) centre d'aviation for aviation;

(a) A port d'attache consists of: the crews of the dirigibles; a company of aerostation; a dépôt of matériel and workshop.

(b) A centre of aviation consists of: One or more sections of aviation; a dépôt of matériel with workshop.

Article 6th—The commanders of the ports d'attache and of the centres of aviation perform the duties of chiefs of dépôts.

Article 7th—The ports d'attache; centres of aviation; schools and special establishments of France itself and of North Africa are formed in three groups forming a corps, each group being under a colonel or lieutenant-colonel as under:—

No. 1 Group (Aerostation) at Versailles—

(a) Aerostation units, both those which are existing and those which are under contemplation.

(b) The 2nd Section of aeronautics which is at Chalais Meudon, near Versailles.

2nd Group of Aviation, centre at Reims—

(a) Units already existing or under contemplation in the military government of Paris and in the regions of the Army Corps Nos. 1st, IInd, IIIrd, IVth, Vth, VIth, IXth, Xth, and XIth.

(b) With the exception that the 13th Section of aeronautics at present at Etampes is transferred to the 1st Group of Aviation.

1st Group of Aviation, centre at Lyon, ultimately at Dijon,

Units for Army Corps Nos. VIIth, XIIth, XIIIth, XIVth, XVth, XVIth, XVIIth, XVIIIth, XXth and North Africa.

II.—Superior Command and Inspection.

Article 8th—The units of the aeronautical service are placed under the control of: (a) the military governors; (b) the commanders of army corps.

The commanders of army corps exercise direct authority as regards the discipline, the service, and the tactical instruction of the officers and units which are in their command, paying attention to any special ministerial instructions that may from time to time be issued.

They exercise their authority through the intermediary of the commandants of the groups as regards interior discipline, administration of units and mobilization, and through the intermediary of the directors for the administration of matériel as provided by Article 10.

They cannot expend any money over and above the credits allotted them by the Minister for War.

They exercise only a general supervision over special establishments and the schools.

The governors of fortresses have, under the authority of the commandants of army corps, the same powers as army corps commanders as regards units specially attached to the fortress.

Article 9th—This Article deals with the Inspecteur Permanent de l'Aéronautique, but as a Bill is now before the Chamber (December, 1913)¹ with a view to the reorganization of the Permanent Inspection, a summary of the proposals is here given :—

"Annexe No. 3009 of the Chamber."—The permanent Inspectorate of Aeronautics created by decree of October 22nd, 1910, has not sufficient elasticity for the future, though it has performed arduous duties in the past.

It is of the utmost importance to reorganize the military aeronautical service from bottom to top and to replace the permanent inspection by an organization capable of repairing the faults made in the past and to give to this young service further vitality.

What is required is a responsible chief who is in close touch with the Minister for War and who has a directorate to help him and an inspectorate subordinate to him.

The directorate proposed is as follows :—

Direction de l'Aéronautique Militaire.—One Director, one Field Officer (personnel); three captains charged with: (a) mobilization, buildings; (b) schools of instruction; (c) aerostation generally; one administrative officer, one *redacteur*, one *expeditionnaire*.

1st Bureau (aerostation matériel).—One Field Officer, *chef de bureau*, two captains, one administrative officer, one *expeditionnaire*.

2nd Bureau (aviation matériel).—One Field Officer, *chef de bureau*, two captains, one administrative officer, one *expeditionnaire*.

Accounts and Budget Section.—One captain, eight others.

Present Situation of the Aeronautical Service as regards Matériel, etc.

Aerostation.—The following dirigibles are in service as far as is known: "Adjudant Vincenot," "Adjudant Reau," "Capitaine Ferber," "Selle de Beauchamp," "Dupuy de Lôme," "Fleurue," "Spiess," "Commandant Coutelle," "Lieutenant Chaure," "Colonel Renard," "Capitaine Marechal," "Conté," "Temps," "Liberté" (temporarily out of order), "Astra-Torres I," "Transaerien," "Zodiac" (these last three believed to be in hands of the Government), "Clement Bayard II" (purchased by Russia), "Astra-Torres" (purchased by England).

¹ Since passed into law.

AVIATION.—It is estimated that there are about 600 aeroplanes in good order.

The following centres are reported to be in working order, though some of them are equipped only provisionally :—Versailles, St. Cyr, Buc (provisional), Chateaufort (provisional), Etampes, Villacoublay (provisional), Nancy, Toul, Vincennes, Corbeaulieu, Reims, Châlons, Douai, Verdun, Maubeuge, Le Crotoy, Lyon, Amberieu, Belfort, Camp d'Avor, Epinal, Pau, Biskra, Casablanca, Fez, Mailly (temporary), Poitiers (temporary), Sissonne (temporary), Les Causses (temporary); Chalais Meudon, near Paris, is the dépôt for matériel and the laboratory, etc.

General Notes.—Exercises in mobilizing the various escadrilles were carried out during the year, the general system being that an escadrille complete with its land transport was sent from one place to another, the aeroplane by air and the land transport by road.

Perhaps the best reliability test was performed by Monsieur Brindejonc des Moulinais, who is about 20 years of age; on June 10th he left Paris and travelling via Warsaw, Dvinsk, St. Petersburg, Revel, Stockholm, Copenhagen, Hamburg and the Hague, he re-arrived in Paris on July 1st, having performed an aerial tour of over 3,000 miles.

Monsieur Pégoud was the first man to "loop the loop" in an aeroplane, but many men have followed his example.

Owing to regrettable incidents, the French issued special instructions prohibiting aviators of foreign nations to fly near the frontiers in bad or foggy weather.

The Commission which was established in 1894 for the purpose of examining inventions likely to be useful to the army or navy was reconstituted so as to embrace among the members one military officer versed in aeronautical matters.

A great deal of controversy has been carried on in the Press with regard to how the voluntary subscriptions for the purpose of presenting aeroplanes to the Government have been expended. General Bernard, the new Director-General of Aeronautics, has asserted in a letter to the Press that the subscriptions amount to over two million francs, which have been expended as follows :—

Subscriptions received	2,434,130 francs.
154 avions bought in 1912-13	2,310,000 "
Money in hand	124,130 "

If to the above avions a further 21 are added which were given to the Government, it works out that there are 175 avions in possession of the Government which have been subscribed for.

The price of an avion works out at 15,000 francs, or £600, but it must be remembered that though this may have been a fair price for a monoplane a few years ago, that description of avion is no longer suitable for military purposes, as all avions will to a certainty in the future be biplanes (two seaters, or even three-seaters), will be armour-plated, and will probably cost, when fully equipped, something like £2,000.

The question of how the private subscriptions have been expended will be officially solved shortly by means of a Parliamentary question.

Directorate-General.—The Bill for the creation of the "Direction de l'Aéronautique Militaire," referred to after Article 9th of this Section, was finally adopted on the 29th day of December.

During the final interpellation in the Senate on the subject of aeronautics, the Minister for War gave out that the following was the state of aeroplanes and pilots :—

Pilots (military) in January, 1914 : 330 pilots of aeroplanes belonging to the active army; 130 young men undergoing training as pilots.

Aeroplanes : 577 aeroplanes were purchased and received during 1912-1913; 100 under construction; 175 supplied by private subscription.

GERMANY.

NEW GERMAN ARMY AIRSHIP.—The new Schütte-Lanz airship "SL II." has lately been undergoing trials, and will probably be stationed at Cologne. With three motors the airship can attain a speed of 77 kilometres an hour, and with four, a speed of 87 kilometres.

The unsuccessful airship constructed by the inventor Veeh, whose death was recorded a short time ago, will be sold by auction at Düsseldorf.

CORRESPONDENCE.

The Irish Brigade in the Service of France.

To the Editor of the Royal United Service Institution.

DEAR SIR,

I have read Mr. Skrine's very valuable lecture on "The Irish Brigade in the Service of France," and if I may be permitted I would like to note on two points in connection therewith which, I think, will be of interest to members of the Institution. I possess a detail of the regiments composing the French Army in 1730, containing the names of the field officers, colour of uniforms and facings, and woodcuts of the standards, guidons and flags.

The following were the Irish Regiments, with their colonels' names :—

Infantry.

Regiment and Colonel's Name.	Colour of Uniform.	Facings.
Mr. D'Leé	* Red	Green
Milord de Clare	* Red	Yellow
Mr. D'Illon	* Red	Blue
Mr. de L'Eslee de Rooth	* Red	Blue
Milord Edouard Comte de Fitzjames Berwick	* Red	White

Cavalry.

Mr. Le Marquis de Nugent	* Red	Red
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* All these are red colour and not scarlet.

(This bears out Captain Dillon's statement that there was no "de" before the name, but the French managed to get in the sign of nobility another way.)

Dillon's regiment was the Royal Regiment of Ireland, and de Rooth's was the Irish Guards, and so these two had royal blue facings. There were no regiments with black facings, but royal blue is often mistaken for black by non-military observers.

Besides the Irish Regiments, all the Swiss Regiments, ten in number, wore red coats, and many of the Maison du Roi were clothed in *scarlet*, so also many of the dragoons, so the colour *red* was not uncommon in the French service.

The other point I would remark on is: Mr. Skrine, speaking of Lally surrendering Pondicherry, says, "He hung out the white flag." This he could hardly have done as a token of a desire to parley, because the white flag was the flag he was fighting under.

In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries it was customary, I believe, for the British and French to hoist the enemy's flag as a flag of truce and to express the desire to hold communication.

I am, Dear Sir, yours truly,

J. G. Downing,

Great Bealings, 19th April, 1914.

late Lt.-Col. Ind. Army.

P.S.—Mr. Skrine calls the 3rd Buffs "Marlborough's Own Regiment." Lieut.-General Charles Churchill, Colonel of the 3rd Buffs, was not the Duke of Marlborough.

Mr. Skrine writes with reference to the above letter:—

It is impossible to describe eighteenth century facings with scientific accuracy. In the first place jet black was unknown until the year 1834 or thereabouts; the colours popularly styled "black" were previously dark shades of brown, blue or green. The term "red" also covered a multitude of shades, from *garance*, or Turkey-red, produced by the action of madder, to *scarlet*, or *écarlate*, in which cochineal was the agent employed. Colonel Downing is probably right in thinking that the *particule nobiliaire* was given to the Dillons by eliding a suppositious "e" after the first letter in their patronymic. In narrating the surrender of Pondicherry I used the words "he hung out the white flag" symbolically. The Bourbon standard was, of course, white, but being *fleurdelisé*, or embroidered with golden lilies, it would not be mistaken for a flag of truce. I am not sufficiently versed in the minutiae of eighteenth century warfare to state the instrument used when a French commandant wished to throw up the sponge. The expression *arborer le drapeau blanc* was, however quite common in contemporary angals. It is probable that a sheet was employed on such a melancholy occasion. I accept Colonel Downing's correction regarding the colonelcy of the Buffs in Marlborough's campaigns. Knowing that it was then styled "Churchill's," I assumed the great Duke to have been its sponsor. The constant changes in regimental nomenclature before the use of numbers is a terrible stumbling block in the historian's path.

The Regiments of Roll and Dillon.

In the paper published in the March number of the JOURNAL on "The Foreign Element in the British Army, 1793-1815," mention was made of the fact that when de Roll's Swiss regiment was serving on the east coast of Spain in 1812-1814, it was apparently united with another of the foreign regiments in the British service, that raised by Colonel Edward Dillon, formerly an officer of the famous Irish Brigade in the French Army. General Tyrrell in his remarks at the end of the paper (p. 320) quotes the Swiss history of de Roll's regiment as saying that in the Peninsula the remains of Dillon's were drafted into de Roll's and the regiment thereafter went by the name of Roll-Dillon. In working through various papers in the Public Record Office lately I have been able to obtain definite information on the point. The two regiments were never amalgamated, but the portions of them serving in Spain were formed temporarily into a single unit, known as the "Roll-Dillon" regiment, which was broken up again in April, 1814, when the British force then in Catalonia dispersed.

In the embarkation return of the force taken to Alicante from Sicily in June, 1812, by General Maitland [cf. War Office, Secretary of State's Original Correspondence, Series I., Vol. 311, Sicily], de Roll's is given as 11 officers and 320 N.C.O.'s and men, Dillon's as 18 and 536. The total strength of Dillon's regiment at the time was over 1,300, excluding officers [cf. the regiment's pay-rolls for 1812, War Office, XVII., 11,704], and de Roll's had still 19 officers and 879 men in the garrison of Sicily in October, 1812 [W.O.I. 312, Sicily]. From de Roll's pay-lists for 1813 [W.O., XVII., 11,997] it appears that the detachment in Spain consisted of four companies, the 1st, 2nd, 5th (a rifle company) and 11th. Three companies, the 7th, 9th and 10th, were in garrison at Malta all through 1813, one—the 4th—in the Ionian Islands, the headquarters of the battalion, and the remaining four companies being in Sicily, one company having been recalled from Zante to Sicily in December, 1812, when Bentinck sent off the 2nd battalion of the 27th Foot and a battalion of the Anglo-Italian levy to Alicante. On April 25th, 1814, the companies in Spain embarked at Tarragona, landing at Messina on May 18th; they then mustered 12 officers and 302 N.C.O.'s and men, having suffered rather heavily in the action at Ordell on September 13th, 1813. It may be mentioned that though the rank and file were drawn from all nations the majority of the non-commissioned officers were still Swiss, and that Lord William Bentinck classified the regiment as "good" in a letter of May 27th, 1813. [W.O.I., 313, Sicily].

The detachment of Dillon's originally sent to Spain had amounted to five companies, the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 6th and 8th. They suffered seriously from desertion, losing 36 men before September 24th, 1812, and an additional 35 in the next quarter. The Light company—the 5th—was also sent to Spain in November, it being part of a Light Infantry battalion in the reinforcement brought out by General Campbell. This Light Battalion was soon broken up and the company of Dillon's added to the detachment of the regiment¹ [cf. Schwertfeger's history of the King's German Legion, I., 980]. The remaining six companies of the regiment, about 670 of all ranks, sailed from Palermo on April 2nd, 1813, and landed

¹ It was then that the rifle company of de Roll's came out, the original detachment having consisted of three companies.

at Cartagena a fortnight later, relieving the 2nd battalion 67th Foot, which joined the field army for Murray's attack on Tarragona, where it and the battalion of Roll-Dillon were employed in the one successful operation of the expedition, the reduction of Fort St. Felipe in the Col de Balaguer. When the operations on the east coast came to an end the whole of Dillon's were re-united at Cartagena, whence they proceeded to Gibraltar, being disbanded in December, 1814. De Roll's were not disbanded till after Waterloo.

C. T. ATKINSON.

NOTICES OF BOOKS.

The Principles of War Historically Illustrated. By Major-General E. A. Altham, C.B., C.M.G., with an introduction by General Sir Horace L. Smith Dorrien, G.C.B., D.S.O., A.D.C.-General. Vol. 1. Macmillan & Co., Limited. Price 10s. 6d. net.

Our Field Service Regulations in their present form are not ten years old. The fact that in that time they have attained to such a position of authority as they now hold is proof that they supplied an urgent need, yet, with all their weight of authority, they are not, and can never be, complete in themselves. The foreword to Part I. of the Field Service Regulations, with which we are now concerned, tells us that the manual deals with the general principles which govern the leading in war of the army; Section 1 tells us "the fundamental principles of war are neither very numerous nor in themselves very abstruse, but the application of them is difficult and cannot be made subject to rules. The correct application of principles to circumstances is the outcome of sound military knowledge built by study and practice until it has become an instinct." Obviously then it is not enough to know the principles, and we shall not find all that comprises sound military knowledge within the covers of the Regulations. Study of military history is one means of gaining this sound military knowledge, but it must be the right kind of study. It will not help us "to know all about the war and what they killed each other for." What we want to get at is, how these principles which are to guide us in the future were applied to circumstances in the past, what advantage was gained by applying them correctly, what penalties incurred by applying them incorrectly? This is what General Altham has begun to give us, and his book supplies a need as great as that supplied by the Field Service Regulations themselves when they first appeared. The accepted principles of the General Staff, principles upon which we must all be agreed if our army is to be inspired by a uniform doctrine of war, are here explained and illustrated by a profusion of examples from military history. General Altham has wisely taken the majority of these illustrations from the most recent wars of which we have authentic records, and has put them in so clear and readable a form that his meaning can always be grasped without effort. The volume before us deals only with the first four chapters of Field Service Regulations, Part I., and at

least two-thirds of it is concerned with a detailed study of the characteristics and tactics of the various arms. As it is marked vol. I., we assume and hope that it is to be followed by what should be an even more valuable volume dealing with the work of the parts of an army in combination.

Where there is so much that is admirable, it is perhaps captious to cavil at detail, but we cannot help regretting that General Altham will spell *moral* with an "e." The statement that "the Russo-Turkish War of 1877 throws but little light on the use of cavalry" is somewhat sweeping when we recall the fact that Gourko's handling of his squadrons during his passage of the Balkans and his operations south of those mountains remains the best model of cavalry work of this nature. Nor can we agree that Lieutenant Green, U.S.A., is the best historian of that campaign. This is an honour we should unhesitatingly award to Kuropatkin.

We are, however, in complete agreement with Sir Horace Smith Dorrien, who in his introduction earnestly recommends this book to the careful study of officers of all ranks. The volume, which is uniform with Messrs. Macmillan's admirable series of military text books, is provided with an adequate index and an excellent set of maps in a separate volume.

Memoir of Major-General Sir Henry Tombs, V.C., K.C.B., R.A. By Brig.-General A. E. A. Holland, M.V.O., D.S.O. Woolwich, 1913.

This brief memoir, to which Field-Marshal Lord Roberts, an old comrade and friend of "Harry" Tombs, contributes an appreciative introduction, is dedicated by the Commandant of the Royal Military College to all winners of the Tombs' Memorial Scholarship, providing thus a record to be treasured and an incentive to the performance of good service. Henry Tombs came of a Gloucestershire family, and his father had served in India in the Bengal Cavalry for something over 50 years, taking part in the campaigns under Lords Lake and Combermere, and dying at Malta in 1848 when on his way home. Henry was the youngest of a family of eight, and was born in 1824, and after spending two years at Addiscombe he was appointed second lieutenant in that splendid corps, the Bengal Horse Artillery, in June, 1841, arriving in India in November of the same year. Exactly two years from this date, attached to the 16th Light Field Battery, he joined the "Army of Gwalior," and was present under General Grey at Punniar. In January, 1844, he was promoted first lieutenant and posted to the 1st Troop, 1st Brigade, Bengal Horse Artillery, then stationed at Ludhiana; and from here, on the outbreak of the First Sikh War, he marched with four guns to join Lord Gough's force, being engaged at Moodki and Ferozeshah, and, under Sir Harry Smith, at Buddiwal and Aliwal. When in the autumn of 1848 the Sikhs again took the field against us, Tombs was appointed D.A.-Q.M.G. of Artillery and served at Ramnugger, Sadulapur, Chillianwallah and Goojerat, but though he had been favourably mentioned in despatches in each of the three campaigns in which he had taken part, it was not until August, 1854, on obtaining his promotion to captain, that he was gazetted brevet-major. In November, 1855—on return from furlough to England—he assumed command of the 2nd Troop, 1st Brigade, at Jullundur—a troop which, already distinguished, was to become even more famous for its great services under Tombs during the Indian Mutiny campaign. Early in 1857 this troop was transferred to Meerut, witnessing the actual

outbreak of the Mutiny on May 10th, and marching with Archdale Wilson to Delhi, there to join the force under the Commander-in-Chief. All that Tombs did at Delhi, in that siege which was no siege in the ordinarily accepted meaning of the word, is part of the story of the reality and romance of the taking of the city, written in histories and memoirs which abound, and which has long been a familiar and fascinating tale. When Delhi was finally taken, the troop had suffered too many casualties to be able to accompany any of the columns sent south; but early in 1858 it joined Colin Campbell at Cawnpore, was engaged at the final capture of Lucknow, and took part in all the operations in Oudh. Promoted lieut.-colonel in 1861, Tombs commanded as a Brig.-General the Gwalior district, led the right column in the Bhutan campaign of 1865, and, becoming a Major-General in 1865, he commanded in succession the Allahabad and Oudh divisions. It seemed that he might aspire to the highest positions in the service of his country, when suddenly in 1873 he became unwell; he went home on leave and underwent, apparently successfully, a very severe operation, but on August 2nd of the year following he died at the early age of 49.

Perhaps we all who have studied the history of the Mutiny have met the name of Tombs oftener than that of almost any other of the famous soldiers who came to the front in those stormy days; so that we know already the details of much that is in this memoir set down in brief. But Brig.-General Holland has provided a wholly admirable record of the services of one of the most distinguished of gunners, of all that in his comparatively short life he achieved, of the estimation in which he was held by all men, whatever their rank, who had the privilege of serving with or knowing the man who always "did the right thing at the right time"; and who possessed in fullest measure the rare gift of inspiring others with deep affection and absolute confidence.

With the 32nd in the Peninsula. By Major H. Ross-Lewin, edited by John Wardell, M.A.; Dublin; Hodges, Figgis & Co.

These memoirs originally appeared in 1834, when they were published under the title of *The Life of a Soldier*, and contained considerably more matter than has been retained in the present edition. While the first title adopted for Major Ross-Lewin's recollections scarcely perhaps afforded sufficient indication of the extent of ground which they covered, that now chosen conveys but a small idea of the war services of the soldier who compiled them. He took part in the expedition to the West Indies in 1795, in that to Copenhagen, in the Walcheren expedition, and in the Waterloo campaign, as well as in the operations in the Peninsula, which began with Roleia and ended at Toulouse. The period thus covered is one of twenty years of war, during which time the writer took part in campaigns of varying severity and importance, and certainly of infinite variety; but the chief portion of the book is concerned with the operations in the Peninsula, of which he personally missed the Corunna campaign and that of Vittoria, while the 32nd, having returned to England with the shattered remnants of Moore's army, did not rejoin Wellington until the summer of 1811, when they joined the 6th, known in the Peninsula as "The Marching Division," then under Campbell, but during the greater part of the remainder of the war commanded by Clinton. The record of events as set down by Major Ross-Lewin is, of course, mainly personal, but it

provides a very useful and connected story of the work of the 32nd Regiment, and of the brigade and division in which it was included. Naturally, there are gaps in the regimental history, when the author, whether from sickness or wounds, was not present, but as a whole the book furnishes a most useful contribution to the *regimental* histories of the Peninsular War, of which there is now so large, and, on the whole, so complete a collection, though this seems to be the only record of the 32nd Regiment. Like many others corps which had formed the Peninsular Army, the 32nd were ordered to Belgium on the return of Napoleon from Elba, and joined the 5th Division, being severely engaged both at Quatre Bras and at Waterloo. The last part of the book is occupied with an account of the writer's peace soldiering in the Channel and Ionian Islands, and with the remarks which Major Ross-Lewin makes on the decadence of the army since the days when he belonged to it—views which are so general among ex-soldiers that it hardly seems necessary to have found a place for them in this edition of the book. The editor has been well advised in publishing this reprint of the experiences of a very stormy and interesting period in our military history; he has on the whole exercised a wise discretion in what he has inserted and withheld of the original matter; while at the present juncture Major Ross-Lewin's account of the treatment dealt out to the rebels of 1798, and of the suppression of the rising under Emmet, will be read with special profit.

L'evacuation de l'Espagne, et l'invasion dans le midi: Juin, 1813—Avril, 1814. 2 vols. By Captain Vidal de la Blache. Paris: Berger-Levrault. 20 fr.

This study by Captain de la Blache commences with the decisive period when Wellington, having signally defeated at Vittoria the French King imposed upon Spain, was preparing for the invasion of France. In the first volume, "The Evacuation of Spain," the author describes the replacement of King Joseph by Soult, the offensive undertaken in Navarre by the orders of Napoleon during the armistice of Pleischwitz, the special rôle played by Suchet on the coast of the Peninsula, and the battles of the Pyrenees and of the Nivelle, which laid open the frontier to the advance of the invader. In vol. 2, "The Invasion of the Midi," we learn of the Treaty of Valençay, the general condition of the departments of the Midi, the fighting about Bayonne, the intrigues which resulted in the occupation of Bordeaux, and the reasons by which Soult was influenced in taking up his position about Toulouse. The defence by Soult of the city on the Garonne, where the last shots of the long enduring struggle were fired, does not diminish the value of the operations by Suchet; and much is deservedly brought to light by Captain de la Blache about the patriotic exertions of the population of the Basses and Hautes Pyrénées, who, directed by enthusiastic *préfets*, succeeded for many long months in holding their frontiers inviolate. The author has delved in local as well as in war department archives, and has rescued from the past many inspiring memories of the patriotic endeavours of soldiers like Suchet and Thouvenot, and of civilians like the *préfet* de Vannsay.

In his general accuracy of statement and correctness of method we recognize in Captain de la Blache's work some of the best attributes of the historian, such as have been noticeable in many of the author's previous publications.

FOREIGN PERIODICALS.

NAVAL.

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY.

MITTHEILUNGEN AUS DEM GEBIETE DES SEEWESENS. **April.**—The History of the Danube Flotilla.† The Admiralty Staff. The development of the placing of turrets for heavy guns on battleships and armoured cruisers in the great Naval Powers during the past ten years. Ice and derelict control in the North Atlantic. Organization of the War Navy of Norway. Ship-building in 1913. **May.**—Aboard the frigate "Schwarzenberg" in the sea fight off Heligoland on May 9th, 1864. The History of the Danube Flotilla.§ The Admiralty Staff Tour. The torpedo and its use in war. The exercises of the 2nd Division of the First Battle Squadron of the Home Fleet. A new building programme in Russia. French and English battleship construction. Deck ahoy!

FRANCE.

REVUE MARITIME. **February.**—The co-operation of arms at sea.* The safety and scope of the Mercantile Marine† Naval recollections of Surgeon Gestin.† The storage and issue of bedding in the Army and Navy.†

LA VIE MARITIME. **April 10th.**—The manufacture of our war material. Submarine employment. **April 25th.**—Projectiles, armour and the naval battle. Battleships. Thirty-six years ago.

MONITEUR DE LA FLOTTE. **April 4th.**—Torpedo tubes in submarines. **April 11th.**—The Two-Power Standard. **April 18th.**—The English Naval Estimates. **April 25th.**—Specializing in gunnery.

GERMANY.

MARINE RUNDSCHAU. **April.**—The English Blue Book on the tactics of Trafalgar. The re-building of the Russian Fleet. Navy Bills and Foreign Policy. Long range torpedos.

ITALY.

RIVISTA MARITTIMA. **February.**—Torpedo attack by day. The use of mines in naval warfare, according to the VIIIth Hague Convention. On the equilibrium of a ship's polycylindrical motor.

*—to be continued. †—continued. §—concluded.

UNITED STATES.

NAVAL INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS. **March—April.**—The great lesson from Nelson for to-day. Naval policy as it relates to the shore establishment and the maintenance of the fleet. Early signs of intended invasion. Naval inspection duty in manufacturing districts. Navy yards and the fleet. Navy department policies. Principles of naval aeronautics. Concentration of fire and the numerical strength of a division. Wrinkles in plane chart methods. A half century of naval administration in America. United States naval radio service.

MILITARY.

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY.

KAVALLERISTISCHE MONATSHEFTE. **April.**—Tor di Quinto and the Italian cavalry. The Italian cavalry, its employment and training. The Russian cavalry manual for 1912. About our communication detachments. Reconnaissance—security—cover. Veterinary inspection of the horses in the long-distance ride of 1909.

STREFFLEUR'S MILITÄRISCHE ZEITSCHRIFT. **January, 1914.**—(The numbers for November and December, 1913, do not appear to have been published). The Bocche di Cattaro, 1813-14. The war in the Balkan Peninsula, 1912-13.† The military operations of France in Morocco from 1907-11.* Grand manœuvres of the great Powers in 1913: Germany. Sanitary work in the Russo-Japanese War. Events in Libya after the Peace of Lausanne.† **February.**—Schleswig-Holstein. Experiences of field-firing in the winter of 1912-13. My experiences in Thrace and in the second Balkan War. The military operations of France in Morocco from 1907-11.§ Events in Libya after the Peace of Lausanne.† The grand manœuvres of foreign powers: France, Russia and England.

BELGIUM.

BULLETIN DE LA PRESSE. **April 15th.**—The leading of large forces. The Imperial German Manœuvres of 1913.† The re-organized Dutch Army.† **April 30th.**—A general view of the employment of infantry and artillery in the war in the Balkans. The Imperial German Manœuvres of 1913.† The re-organized Dutch Army.†

REVUE DE L'ARMÉE BELGE. **January-February, 1914.**—Employment and organization of field artillery. The Belgian Legion of London and the Riflemen of the Meuse. The Balkan War of 1912-13. The use of the Röntgen rays in the Army. The supreme effort at the critical point and the economy of force.

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FRANCE.

REVUE MILITAIRE DES ARMÉES ETRANGÈRES. **April.**—Not received.

JOURNAL DES SCIENCES MILITAIRES. **April 1st.**—The Anti-Russian Campaign. The soldiers of 1870.* Observation from the air.* The fight of the battalion and its lesser units.‡ Discipline and punishment in the French Army.† **April 15th.**—Not received.

REVUE D'HISTOIRE. **April.**—The Battle, from the "Kriegslehren" of Moltke.§. A German view of military history criticism. The Royal Army of 1674.* The campaign of 1807: Eylau.* The organization of the Grande Armée of 1813.§ The war of 1871: the siege of Paris.† The war of 1870-71: the First Army of the Loire.†

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GERMANY.

MILITÄR WOCHENBLATT. **April 2nd, No. 47.**—The decisive day at Düppel.* The British Army and the "continental adventure." March on snow shoes by a Russian reconnoitring patrol. **No. 48.**—Sidelights on the leading of large artillery masses. Messimy's Report on the Army Estimates for Morocco. **No. 49.**—From Mukden to Portsmouth.† French views on frontier defence. Health conditions in the French Army. Plevna and Roumania. **No. 50.**—In the Hinterland of Libya. From Mukden to

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§—concluded.

Portsmouth.† The Italian aerial fleet. **No. 51.**—From Mukden to Portsmouth.† Defence efforts in the Cameroons. Protection against sunstroke. **No. 52.**—Twenty-five years in the Protectoral Force of German South-West Africa. The decisive day at Düppel.† The improvement of the French field gun. **No. 53.**—The decisive day at Düppel.§ The employment of French machine guns in action. The reprint of the artillery manual. **No. 54.**—Pack animals for machine guns. Intensive musketry training. The English Army Estimates for 1914-15.* **No. 55.**—A tactical problem. Military policy in France. The English Army Estimates for 1914-15.§ **No. 56.**—Victoriana Huerta. The Russian manoeuvres. Co-operation of infantry and artillery. **No. 57-58.**—Appointments, etc. **No. 59.**—Management, military use, etc., of the camel in the English Colonial Army. The alarm manoeuvres in Denmark. **No. 60.**—In memory of 1864.* The machine guns with the French cavalry. The Italians in Libya.

JAHRBÜCHER FÜR DIE DEUTSCHE ARMEE UND MARINE. April.—The new French tactics. Proposals for the systematic training of cavalry officers in patrol duties. Three-, two- and one-year service. The storming of the trenches at Düppel. The clothing and armament of infantry. Some lessons from Port Arthur.

ARTILLERISTISCHE MONATSHEFTE. April.—The French and German field artillery. Manoeuvre retrospect of 1913.§ The training of "layers" in the field artillery. The artillery position. Artillery lessons from the Turko-Italian War. A new telescopic sight for machine guns.

SWITZERLAND.

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